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PARTIES
The parties to this litigation are:
APPELLANT:

Kathy Lynn Higgins, individually and as guardian
ad litem for her daughter Shaundra Higgins;

APPELLEES:

Salt Lake County, by and through Salt Lake County
Mental Health, Dr. William Kuentzel and Sheryl
Steadman; The University
of Utah and the
University Medical Center;

OTHER
DEFENDANTS:

This action was originally commenced against the
Appellees, Caroline Trujillo and the State of
Utah,
by
and
through
the
Department
of
Corrections and by and through the Department of
Social Services. This is an appeal from summary
judgment entered pursuant to Rules 54(b) and 56
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in favor of
the Appellees. Caroline Trujillo remains as a
party in the trial court. Appellant settled with
the State of Utah and the case against it was
dismissed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

vi

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

vi

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

vi

STATEMENT OF CASE

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

The Utah Mental Health System in 1984

2

Salt Lake County's Community Mental
Health Services in 1984

5

Carolyn Trujillo and Her Mental Illness

7

Carolyn Trujillo's Criminal History

8

Carolyn Trujillo's First 1981 Criminal Charge

... 9

Carolyn Trujillo's Second 1981 Criminal Charge . . . 10
Trujillo's Treatment at ARTU in 1984

12

Nurse Steadman and Dr. Kuentzel

16

Schizophrenia

20

The Assault on Shaundra Higgins

20

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
No Special Relationship

23
23

No Public Duty

24

No Duty from Court Sentences

24

Kathy Higgins Failed to File Notice of Claim . . . . 24
Kathy Higgins Has No Claim

24

§63-30-10, U.C.A. Bars this Action

25

No Denial of Constitutional Rights

25

ARGUMENT

25

POINT I - Summary Judgment was Properly
Granted to the Salt Lake County Appellees
A. There were no Disputed Material
Facts Precluding Summary Judgment
B. Salt Lake County Appellees Owed
No Duty to Appellants
1. There was no Duty Created by
Reason of Any Special Relationship
2. There was no Duty Owed to the Public
3. Carolyn Trujillo's 1981 Sentences
Imposed No Duty Upon the Salt Lake
County Appellees
POINT II - Appellant Kathy Lynn Higgins' Claim
is Barred Because She Failed to File a Notice
of Claim
POINT III - Section 63-30-10 Bars this Action

26
27
28
. . . 28
. .33

38

38
. . . 39

POINT IV - Appellant Kathy Higgins Has No
Cause of Action

41

POINT V - The Lower Court's Judgment for
Appellees Did Not Violate the Utah and
United States Constitutions

41

CONCLUSION

46

-ii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE(S)
Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P.wd 413 (Utah 1986)
Bee v. Greaves. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984)
910 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1990)
Berry v. Beech Aircraft. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985)

. . 27
3

. . . . 41, 42,
43

Bowers v. Devito. 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982)

45

Bradford v. Metropolitan County. 522 S.2d 96 (Fla. 1988) . 27
Bradv v. Hooper. 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984)

29

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 327

43

Christenson v. Havward. 694 P.2d 612 (Utah 1984)

34

Clark v. State. 472 NYS.2d 170 (1980)

34

Colyar v. Third District Court. 469 F.Supp 424
(D.Utah 1979)
Condemarin v. The University Hospital.
775 P. 2d 348 (Utah 1989)

2

Connell v. Tooele City. 572 P.2d 697 (1977)

40

Cooke v. Berlin. 735 P.2d 830 (Ariz.App. 1987)

29

Currie v. U.S. . 836 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1987)

27

42, 43
44

Dimas v. County of Quay. N.M.. 730 F.Supp. 373,
380 (D. N.M. 1990)

45

Doe v. Arauelles. 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1983)

31, 37

Edwards v. Iron County. 531 P.2d 476 (Utah 1975)

39

Ferree v. State of Utah. 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989)
-iii-

. . . . 27

Greenberg v. Barbour. 322 F.Supp. 745 (E.D.PA. 1971) . . . 35
Hasenai v. U.S.. 541 F.Supp. 999 (D.Md. 1983)

29

Hinkelman v. Borgess Medical Center. 43 N.W.2d 547
(Michigan 1987)

23

Hokansen V. U.S. . 868 F.2d 372 (1989)

23, 27,
30

Jablonski v. Pauls. U.S. 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983)

. . 34

Johnson v. Rogers. 763 P.2d 771, 785 (Utah 1988)

41

Lipari v. Sears. 497 F.Supp. 185 (D.Nev. 1980)

37

Little v. Division of Family Services.
667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983)

31, 37

Martinez v. California. 444 U.S. 277 (1980)

45

Mcintosh v. Milano. 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. 1973)

35

Naidu v. Laird. 539 A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988)

36

Obray v. Malmberg. 484 P.2d (Utah 1971)

34

Owens v. Garfield. 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989)

27, 32,
37

Pavton v. United States. 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982)
Perreira v. State. 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989)

. . 37
28, 29,
36

Petersen v. State. 671 P.2d 230 (Wash. 1983)
Semler v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington. D.C..
538 F.2d 121, 127 (4th Cir. 1976)
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California.
551 P.2d 334 (CA. 1976)
Thompson v. County of Alameda. 614 P.2d 728
(10th Cir. 1984)

36
37
37
29

Varoz v. Sevev. 506 P.2d 435 (Utah 1973)

39

Yeates v. Vernal Family Health Center
617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980)
-iv-

24, 39

OTHER AUTHORITIES
PAGE(S)
Restatement (Second) of Torts 315

28

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, §1

43

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c)

43

Utah Constitution, Article I, §11

43

-v-

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is vested in the Utah Supreme Court under
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah and Rules
4(a), 54(b) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the lower court erred in determining
as a matter of law that appellees owed no
duty to appellants?

2.

Whether appellants' claims are barred by the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, §63-30-1 et.
seq. U.C.A. and e.g. §63-30-10 U.C.A.?

3.

Whether appellant Kathy Higgins' claim is
barred by her failure to file a notice of
claim upon Appellee Salt Lake County pursuant
to §63-30-11, U.C.A. and §63-30-13, U.C.A.?

4.

Whether Kathy Higgins can state a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress?

All of the above are issues of law and this Court
resolves all such legal issues without deference to the lower
court's rulings on appeal from summary judgment.
Ferre v.
State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149 (Ut. 1989).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following provisions of Utah Code Annotated are
determinative of the issues in this appeal and these statutes
are reproduced in the addendum:
§26-17-1.2; §26-17-5; §26-17-7; §63-30-1 et seq.; §63-30-10;
§63-30-10(2);
§63-30-11; §63-30-13; §64-7-7;
§64-7-28(4);
§64-7-32;
§64-7-34;
§64-7-34(2);
§64-7-36;
§64-7-36(3);
§64-7-36(8); §64-7-36(10); §76-2-301; §77-18-1; §78-3a-55
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STATEMENT OF CASE
On

April

10,

1984,

Carolyn

Trujillo,

a

chronically

mentally ill person, stabbed Shaundra Higgins, a 10-year old
girl

who

stabbing,

lived

in

Trujillo's

neighborhood.

Prior

to

the

Carolyn Trujillo had been a voluntary patient at

several of Salt Lake County's mental health facilities, as well
as, an involuntary patient at the Utah State Hospital,
Shaundra

Higgins

sued

Salt

Lake

County

Appellees

and

others for the physical and mental injuries she sustained as a
result of being

stabbed,

Kathy Higgins, Shaundra's mother,

though not present during the stabbing, sued for her emotional
distress claimed to have been caused by the stabbing.
In November,

1986, Third

District

Court

Judge

Russon

granted Summary Judgment, in separate orders, to the Defendant
Utah

State Hospital

Corrections

because

responsibility
stabbing.
Corrections'

he

for

The

and the State of Utah's
found

Carolyn

Court

(Adult

also

that

these

Trujillo
found

Probation

and

at

that

Department

defendants

had

the

of

the

Parole)

time

judgments

and

no
the

Department

of

termination

of

Carolyn Trujillo's probation was a discretionary function.
791-797; 810-15).

of

(R.

The Higginses appealed from these adverse

later

compromised

aforementioned defendants.

their

claims

with

the

In August, 1989, after extensive and prolonged discovery,
Salt Lake County Appellees moved for summary judgment on the
basis that they owed no duty to the Higginses; that no special
relationship

existed between Salt Lake County Appellees and

Carolyn Trujillo; that Salt
omissions

were

not

the

Lake County Appellees' acts or

proximate

cause

of

injury

to

the

Higginses; that Kathy Higgins/ claim was barred by her failure
to file a notice of claim (§63-30-11 and §63-30-13 U.C.A.) and
that

§63-30-10

1143-1213)

U.C.A.

barred

Appellants'

lawsuit.

(R.

Third District Judge Sawaya ruled that the Salt

Lake County Appellees owed not duty to Appellants and granted
judgment in favor of the Salt Lake County Appellees on April
23, 1990.

(R. 2345, 2349-2351).

This is Appellants' appeal

from that Judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
THE UTAH MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM IN 1984.
1.
(D. Utah
Division

In Colvar v. Third District Court, 469 F.Supp 424
1979)
of

commitment

the

Utah,
statute

non-dangerous

United

District

invalidated
which

mentally

ill

that

Court
part

for
of

the

Central

Utah's

civil

allowed

the

commitment

persons

who

lacked

of

insight

concerning their need for treatment or who lacked the capacity
to provide themselves with the basic necessities of life.
2.

Mentally ill persons in Utah have a constitutional

right to refuse medication absent a court order or an emergency

-2-

and

this

right

was

clearly

established

in

1980.

Bee

v.

Greaves. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984); 910 F.2d 686 (10th
Cir. 1990).
3.

During

mental health

1984 and before, a comprehensive

system

administered

community

by the State Division of

Mental Health under the policy direction of the State Board of
Mental Health was provided for throughout the State of Utah.
[§26-17-1.2 U.C.A. (1977)].
4.

Salt Lake County, pursuant to §26-17-7, et seq.,

U.C.A.,

established

three

community

Granite

(GMH), Copper Mountain

mental

health

centers:

(CMMH) and Salt Lake (SLCMH).

These centers were later consolidated to form Salt Lake County
Mental Health.
5.

(R. 2373, Depo. Whittaker, p. 16).

Mental health services in the State of Utah, through

Community Mental Health Centers, were available regardless of
ability to pay.
6.
State

(§26-17-5 U.C.A.).

During 1984, civil commitment/hospitalization in the

of Utah was to the State Division

of Mental

Health

(§64-7-7 U.C.A.; R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 76).
7.

Involuntary commitment/hospitalization

in the State

of Utah in 1984 was governed by §64-7-32 and §64-7-36 U.C.A.
8.

Temporary

Involuntary

Emergency

Hospitalization

in

1984 was accomplished by an application of a responsible person
with personal knowledge of the proposed patient accompanied by
certification

of

a

physician

(§64-7-34 U.C.A.).

-3-

or

a

designated

examiner.

9.

Carolyn Trujillo's mother, stepfather or aunt could

have filed an application for Temporary Involuntary Emergency
Hospitalization

in

aforementioned

February,

statute

1984,

along

with

pursuant

the

to

the

certificate

of

a

Emergency Hospitalization

in

physician or designated examiner.
10.

Temporary

Involuntary

1984 also could be accomplished

without

certification

of a

physician or designated examiner by application of a mental
health officer or a peace officer [§64-7-34(2) U.C.A.].
11.

Designated

(preferably

Examiners

psychiatrists,

professional

or

were
other

who were designated

licensed
licensed

to Utah

physicians

mental

State

health

Division of

Mental Health to sign applications for every hospital and to
examine and diagnose proposed patients.
12.
civilly

(§64-7-28(4) U.C.A.).

In 1984, a person in the State of Utah could not be
committed/involuntarily

hospitalized

unless

District

Court found by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed
patient had a mental illness which posed immediate danger or
physical
lacked

injury

to the proposed

the ability to engage

patient

or others, and he

in a rational

decision-making

process regarding the acceptance of care and that there was no
appropriate less restrictive alternative to a court order of
hospitalization

and

could

adequate

provide

the

hospital
and

or mental

appropriate

health

care

facility

[§64-7-36(10)

U.C.A.].
13.

In

1984,

involuntary

-4-

hospitalizations

were

not

ordered if persons consented to voluntary care.

[§64-7-35(3)

and (8) U.C.A].
14.

In

1984, directors

of mental

facilities

had

the

discretion whether to admit a voluntary and mentally ill person
to their facilities (§63-7-29, U.C.A.).
15.
to

In 1984, mental health personnel had no legal right

prevent

a

voluntary

patient

from

leaving

a

treatment

facility unless mental personnel believed the release would be
unsafe for the patient or others and in which a patient could
be held for up to 48-hours (§64-7-31, U.C.A.).
SALT LAKE COUNTY'S COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN 1984.
16.

Once

a person

became

a

client

of

County

Mental

Health, he or she was assigned to the out-patient unit which
serviced

the geographic

area where the client

lived.

Each

out-patient unit had its own psychiatrist and staff of trained
psychiatric

nurses,

specialists.

social

workers

and

mental

health

Each client has assigned a "primary therapist"

who had overall responsibility for the client's ongoing care
and treatment.

The primary therapist met with the client on a

regular basis, supervised the client1s medication program, and
provided other forms of therapy as needed.

(R. 2375, Depo.

Whittaker, pp. 45, 175-278; R. 2371, Depo, Steadman, p. 28)
17.

In 1984, certain specialty mental health services

and facilities were available in Salt Lake County to handle
emergencies which might arise when the out-patient units were
closed

in

the

evenings

and

on

-5-

weekends,

or

when

close

supervision was needed.

One of these special facilities was

the Adult Residential Treatment Unit
South 700 East.

("ARTU") located at 46

ARTU was a group home residence to which

County Mental Health out-patient therapists could refer clients
who were in need of a more structured treatment environment.
Clients lived on the premises while participating in medication
management, behavior modification and group programs supervised
by the on-site staff.
18.

(R. 2375, Depo. Whittaker, pp. 10-12).

In 1984, ARTU was also the base for County Mental

Health's 24-hour "crisis line" service.

Anyone could call this

service whenever he perceived he or others were "in crisis" and
needed help.

(R.

, Depo. Fisher, pp. 8; 11-12; 19-20;

28-29) .
19.

In

available

1984,

County

Mental

Health

had

expanded

its

services through contracts with other health care

providers

and

specifically

contracted

for

bed

space

was

contracted with University Hospital and Pioneer Valley Hospital
for

County

treatment.

Mental

Health

clients

who

needed

in-patient

In 1984, 20 beds were available at the University

and 17 at Pioneer Valley Hospital.

(R. 2380, Depo. Ericksen,

p. 74).
20.

ARTU typically treated people like Trujillo, who are

chronically
living.

mentally

ill

and

who

had

problems

with

daily

County Mental Health clients were commonly referred to

ARTU in lieu of hospitalization,

in part because it had to

abide by the legal requirement that all mental health patients
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be treated

in the least restrictive environment possible to

preserve their civil liberties.

(R. 2373, Depo. Whittaker, pp.

84-85; R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 79; R. 2376, Depo. Ely, p.
89) .
CAROLYN TRUJILLO AND HER MENTAL ILLNESS
21.

Trujillo first had contact with one of Salt Lake

County's mental health employees in late 1975, at age 17, while
she

was

involuntarily

in-patient

unit

at

committed

University

and

hospitalized

Hospital.

[R.

in

2371,

the
Depo.

Steadman, pp. 37,39.]
22.

Trujillo had been diagnosed repeatedly since 1975 as

suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, a chronic mental illness
for which there is no cure and little effective treatment.
Individual psychotherapy is usually ineffective and the illness
is generally treated with medication therapy.

[R. 2371, Depo.

Steadman, pp. 163, 174; R. 2376, Depo. Ely, M.D. pp. 132-34].
23.

Since

1975,

Trujillo

has

been

involuntarily

committed and held in the in-patient unit of the University
Hospital four times, most recently in February, 1979, and twice
in the Utah State Hospital in Provo.
24.
hospital
Health's

(R. 2179, 2180 and 2199)

During Trujillo's hospitalization in the University
in

late

1975,

Downtown

Unit

she was

assigned

because

of

to

County

her

Mental

geographical

location/residence and defendant Cheryl Steadman, R.N., became
her

primary

hospitalization.

therapist

after

Trujillo7s

release

(R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 39 ).
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from

CAROLYN TRUJILLO'S CRIMINAL HISTORY.
25.
provided

Adult Probation and Parole Investigator Jack Bowers,
the

following

information

about

Carolyn

Trujillo's

juvenile record in a postsentence report to the District Court
in April, 1985: (R. 1233, Exhibit 1 p. 3)
OFFENSE

DATE

DISPOSITION

12-29-70

Ungovernable

Non-Judicial Closure

02-09-72

Attempted Suicide

Non-Judicial Closure

10-16-72

Ungovernable

Non-Judicial Closure

02-23-73

Ungovernable

Non-Judicial Closure

04-04-73

Ungovernable

Non-Judicial Closure

06-21-73

Ungovernable

Non-Judicial Closure

06-22-73

Theft, Class B

No Action Taken

26.

Persons

in

Utah

are

not

criminally

responsible

before age 14 (§76-2-30, U.C.A.) and their juvenile records are
not open to public inspection (§78-3a-55, U.C.A.)
27.
provided

The
the

aforementioned
District

Court

Adult
with

the

Probation
following

and

Parole

information

about Carolyn Trujillo's adult record: (R. 1233, Exhibit 1 p.3)
AGENCY

DATE

OFFENSE

DISPOSITION

SLCPD

09/08/76

Loitering for the
purpose of
prostitution

Case dismissed;
insufficient
evidence

SLCPD

03/17/78

Trespassing; Assault
and Battery

Declined to Prosecute

U Of U
PD

03/22/78

Felony Theft

Fined $20; or 4 days
in jail

SLCPD

12/27/79

Retail Theft

9 days jail suspended
$45 fine
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SLCPD

05/27/81

False Information

Declined to Prosecute

OGDEN
PD

07/16/81

Assault

Probation; Evaluation

SLCPD

09/15/81

Aggravated Assault

Probation; Continued
treatment;
Restitution

SLCPD

04/10/84

Attempted Criminal
Homicide

Utah State Hospital;
0 to 5 USP

CAROLYN TRUJILLQ'S FIRST 1981 CRIMINAL CHARGE.
28.

A woman named Janet Jones told Ogden City Police

that when she attempted to walk past Carolyn Trujillo on July
16, 1981, that Carolyn struck at her and the small child she
was carrying with her sweatshirt, causing a small scratch on
the child's head.
29.

(R. 1143, Attachment 1).

As a result of the aforementioned incident, Carolyn

was charged with assault and disorderly conduct, and Ogden City
moved to merge the assault charge with the disorderly conduct
charge.
conduct.
30.

On July 17, 1981, Carolyn pleaded guilty to disorderly
(R. 1143, Attachment 2).
On February 22, 1982, the Circuit Court sentenced

Carolyn to sixty days in jail, but the sentence was suspended
and she was placed on probation for one year to the Department
of Corrections

/

Adult Probation and Parole upon the conditions

that she take her medication and participate in a program with
Jean Marlor.
31.

(R. 1143, Attachment 2; §77-18-1 U.C.A.).

On January 20, 1983, Karen Cole Shepherd, a District

Agent for Adult Probation and Parole, recommended that Carolyn
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Trujillo's probation be terminated because she had
regularly,

had

been

taking

her

attending her treatment sessions.
32.

On

January

28,

medications

and

reported
had

been

(R. 1143, Attachment 3).

1983,

Carolyn7s

probation

was

terminated by the Third Circuit Court in Ogden based upon the
motion of Adult Probation and Parole.

(R. 1143, Attachment 4);

(R. 791-797).
CAROLYN TRUJILLO'S SECOND 1981 CRIMINAL CHARGE.
33.

On September

15, 1981, Carolyn Trujillo stabbed a

woman in the buttocks with a pocket knife while the woman was
crossing the street.
34.
Fifth

(R. 1233, Exhibit 1 Addendum))

On September 18, 1981, Carolyn was charged in the

Circuit

Court

in

Salt

Lake

County

with

aggravated

assault, third degree felony, for the stabbing and on October
9, 1981, she was committed to the Utah State Hospital for a
thirty-day

evaluation

to

determine

her

competency

to

stand

trial, and was found incompetent to stand trial until December
1, 1981.
35.
Hospital

(See R. 1143, Attachment 5).
In a letter dated
Psychiatrist

November

Austin

and

10, 1981, Utah State
Utah

State

Hospital

Psychologist Howell informed the Third District Court that they
found

minimal

evidence

of

schizophrenic

mental

Carolyn Trujillo and that she demonstrated

illness

in

signs of organic

brain dysfunction compatible with mixed illicit drug abuse and
that her personality structure was dominated by anti-social and
passive aggressive features.

They also advised the Court that
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she was incompetent to stand trial at that time.

(R. 1143,

Attachment 5)•
36.
Circuit
simple

On

Court

December
pleaded

assault,

a

4,

1981,

no contest

Class

Carolyn

appeared

to the reduced

B misdemeanor,

and

was

in

Fifth

charge of
placed

on

probation for one year under the supervision of the Utah State
Department of Corrections' Adult Probation and Parole.

As one

of the conditions of probation, Carolyn was ordered to enter a
residential mental health program.

(R. 1143, Attachment 6 and

§77-18-1 U.C.A.); (R. 791-797).
37.

On January 20, 1983, Karen Cole-Shepherd, a District

Agent for Adult Probation and Parole, requested termination of
Carolyn Trujillo's probation even though "The defendant has had
minimal involvement with her counseling at Salt Lake Mental
Health.

She, however, continues to take her medication and the

staff of Salt Lake Mental Health feel they cannot expect a
great deal more from Carolyn.
her medication

They will continue to monitor

and urge her to attend therapy.

It is the

opinion of this agency that the defendant will not benefit from
further supervision.

She has reported regularly and no further

violations

law

of

the

have

been

reported."

(R.

1143,

Attachment 7); (R. 791-797)
38.

On

January

25,

1983,

Carolyn's

probation

was

terminated by the Fifth Circuit Court in Salt Lake City at the
request of Adult Probation and Parole.
7); (R. 791-797)
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(See R. 1143 Attachment

TRUJILLO'S TREATMENT AT ARTU IN 1984.
39.

On February

25, 1984, Trujillo was taken by her

parents to the University Hospital and then to ARTU.

Larry

Romero, an ARTU mental health specialist, interviewed Carolyn,
her parents and aunt.

On the basis of that interview, Romero

wrote the following note:
This 25 year old female was admitted
through UMC ER after being brought in by her
parents. Client reports that two days ago she
began feeling self destructive after feeling
like not living.... Family reports that client
is to get a hospital bed when one opens up
however she does not appear to be appropriate
for hospitalization.
It appears that this
family needs a time out. It also appears that
she is appropriate for residential treatment
stay. Plan: Evaluate while here thru Monday.
Make plan w/Cheryl Steadman, crisis people and
residential staffing. (Emphasis added)
Mr. Romero's note was countersigned

by

Residential

who

Coordinator

assessment and plan.
40.

for

ARTU,

Lynn Whittaker,
agreed

with

the
the

[R. 2373, Whittaker depo., pp. 4, 288].

ARTU notified Cheryl Steadman on February 28, 1984

of Trujillo's admission

for a crisis stay.

(R. 2371, Depo.

Steadman, p. 135).
41.

In

1984,

Larry

Romero

had

a

two-year

associate

degree in social science, had been working for Salt Lake County
since

September,

1976

and

had

held

various

positions

with

mental health, including the crisis specialist position he held
during 1983 and 1984 at ARTU.

(R.
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, Depo. Romero, pages

42.

Romero was a mental health officer of the State of

Utah and thereby qualified to sign an involuntary commitment
applications.
involuntary

Romero's criteria
hospitalization

for signing a petition

were

whether

the

person

for
was

displaying verbal or non-verbal behavior of dangerousness to
self or others.
43.

(R.

, Depo. Romero, pp. 57-58).

After Romero met with Carolyn Trujillo, her mother,

step-father and aunt at ARTU on February 25, 1984, he felt
Carolyn acted appropriately that she was not psychotic and that
she was taking her medications.

(R.

, Depo. Romero, pp.

80, 83 and 87).
44.

Carolyn Trujillo agreed to go to the evening-weekend

program for therapy on Tuesday and Thursday in the evenings.
(R.

, Depo. Romero, Vol. II p. 48).
45.

Mr. Romero did not think that Carolyn was in need of

hospitalization on February 25, 1984, because she was not a
danger to herself or others.

(R

, Depo. Romero, pp. 77

and 88, and Vol. II, p. 64).
46.

Mr. Romero did not have any reason to believe during

February, 1984 and thereafter that Carolyn was a danger to the
community, nor did he have any reason to petition for the civil
commitment

for Carolyn Trujillo.

(R.

, Depo. Romero,

Vol. II pp. 68-69).
47.

ARTU

typically

treated

people

like Trujillo, who

were chronically mentally ill and who had problems with daily
living.

Persons were commonly

referred to ARTU
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in lieu of

hospitalization, in part because mentally ill persons had a
statutory

right

to

be

environment possible.

treated

in

the

least

restrictive

[R. 2373, Depo. Whittaker, p. 84-85; R.

2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 79; R. 2376, Depo. Ely, p. 89].
48.

Joy Ely is a licensed psychiatrist who worked part

time at ARTU during 1983 and 1984 and who had been employed by
Salt

Lake

examiner.

County

since

1969.

Dr.

Ely

was

a

designated

(R. 2376, Depo. Dr. Ely, p. 23, 31 and 4 and 7;

§64-7-28(4) U.C.A.).
49.

Dr.

Ely

interviewed

Carolyn

Trujillo

on

Monday

morning, February 27, 1984, at ARTU and found that Carolyn did
not exhibit overly psychotic features in the sense of delusions
or hallucinations.
50.
need

of

(R. 2376, Depo. Ely, p. 67).

Dr. Ely had no reason to believe that Carolyn was in
involuntary

hospitalization/civil

commitment

on

February 27 or on March 1, 1984, nor does she recall that she
had any reason to believe that Carolyn was dangerous to others
on those dates.

(R. 2376, Depo. Dr. Ely, p. 124, 129-130 and

132) .
51.
February

Dr. Ely
27,

1984

met with
and

Trujillo

she

found

for

one-half

Trujillo

to

hour
be

on

calm,

non-delusional, and her behavior appeared to be under control.
Trujillo told Dr. Ely that she felt much better, did not need
hospitalization and wanted to go home.

[R. 2376, Depo. Ely,

pp. 64, 67-69].
52.

Dr. Ely felt competent to evaluate Trujillo based on
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the information available to her.
dealing

with

Trujillo.

In

schizophrenia
Dr.

Ely's

and

She had had prior experience
confirmed

opinion,

that

Trujillo

diagnosis
did

not

of

need

hospitalization in February and March, 1984 and Trujillo was
not dangerous to herself or others.

[R. 2376, Depo. Ely, pp.

58, 115-116; 124-125; 130-132 and 122-126].
53.

The

last

time

Romero

stabbing was on March 16, 1984.

saw

Carolyn

(R

prior

to

the

, Depo. Romero,

Vol, II, page 74).
54.

Mr. Romero believes that Carolyn knew the difference

between right and wrong, when she stabbed Shaundra Higgins on
April 10, 1984, and although he did not see Carolyn after the
March 16, 1984, he believes that if she were taking medication,
that the stabbing was a criminal act and that if she were off
the medication, it was a voluntary act that she made on her own
while she was stable.

(R

, Depo. Romero, Vol. II, p.

73-74).
55.

ARTU's Weekly Service Summaries reflect that Carolyn

Trujillo was doing well immediately prior to April 10, 1984,
when she stabbed Shaundra Higgins.
56.

ARTt^s

records

(R. 1143, Attachment 9).

reflect

that

Carolyn

Trujillo

attended group, recreational and milieu therapy sessions during
the period February 25, 1984 through March 29, 1984. (R. 1143,
Attachment 9).
57.

During Carolyn's stay at ARTU in 1984, ARTU staff

regularly met and made regular assessments of all of ARTU's
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patients' need for hospitalization.

(R. 2376, Depo. Ely, p.

123) .
NURSE STEADMAN AND DR. KUENTZEL
58.

Nurse Steadman is one of only 20-25 nurses in the

State of Utah who put in the 508 hours of group psychotherapy
and

supervision

license.

necessary

to

obtain

a

Nurse

Specialist

[R. 2371, Steadman depo., pp. 4-5, 166].

59.

Nurse

Steadman

has

had

extensive

experience

in

dealing with chronic mental illness and estimates since 1972
she has seen 5,000-6,000 patients suffering from schizophrenia,
half of whom are, like Trujillo, the paranoid type.

[R. 2371,

Depo. Steadman, p. 10-12, 18, 21 167].
60.

Based upon Nurse Steadman's contact with and role as

Carolyn Trujillo's primary therapist

she feels

she

is well

acquainted with Carolyn and that her symptoms were "typical"
for

the

illness

diagnosis
was

of

"moderate"

experience, paranoid
seldom seen.
61.
good

in

schizophrenia

degree.

schizophrenia

In

of the

and

Nurse

that

her

Steadman's

"mild" variety

is

[R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, pp. 23, 25, 168-70].

According to Nurse Steadman, Trujillo had never had

insight

into her mental

schizophrenics.

illness, a problem typical of

Like many schizophrenics, Trujillo sometimes

had hallucinations
herself.

paranoid

or heard voices which told

her to harm

Carolyn Trujillo did not suffer from constantly overt

psychiatric

symptomatology,

paranoid ideation.

delusions,

hallucinations

(R. 2371, Depo. Steadman p. 156, 168).
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or

62.

Throughout her voluntary association with Salt Lake

County's

mental

health

centers,

Carolyn

Trujillo

was

non-compliant with her medications and treatment much of the
time, but was able to comply with medication and treatment for
some period of months.

If Carolyn appeared unstable at times,

it may or may not have been due to the fact she wasn't taking
her

medications,

unstable

when

since

there

were

times

when

she was

taking

her medications.

Carolyn
Periods

was
of

instability are not uncommon with persons like Carolyn who have
a chronic mental illness.

(R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 81,

125.) .
63.

On March 10, 1982, Steadman received a phone call

from someone at Adult Probation and Parole who informed her of
the terms

of Carolyn's probation.

Even though

it was not

Steadman's obligation or role to call and advise the court or
Adult

Probation

probation

terms,

and Parole of Carolyn's non-compliance with
Steadman

did

inform

officer about her non-compliance.

Carolyn's

probation

(R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, p.

89-91).
64.

Medication

is

not

a

cure;

rather,

it

treats

symptomatology and it treats symptomatology on different levels
with

each

medication

individual.

Not

in the same way.

every

individual

In some mentally

responds

to

ill persons,

medication may alleviate all of their symptomatology, while in
others

it

may

symptomatology.

alleviate

only

a

tiny

amount

of

the

In Carolyn's case, the medications sometimes
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worked and sometimes didn't work.

(R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, p.

82) .
65.

In February 1984, Carolyn's mental health chart was

transferred

to

ARTU

and

primary

treatment

through ARTU with Steadman on the sideline.

was

thereafter

(R. 2371, Depo.

Steadman, p. 146) .
66.

Nurse

Steadman

was

"not

surprised"

at

Trujillo's

superficial suicide gesture in February 1984 and she did not
consider the episode to be a dangerous act or an indication
that Trujillo would try something more "lethal", but she agreed
that

an

evaluation

was

in

order

and

that

the

structured

environment and programs at ARTU might be better for Trujillo
at that time than out-patient care.

[R. 2371, Depo Steadman,

p. 137, 142, 172]
67.

An increase in suicidal ideation may or may not be

related to decompensation.

Suicidal gestures usually relate to

depression (R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 149).
68.

March

21,

1984, was

Carolyn prior to the stabbing.
to be stable.
69.

the

last

time

Steadman

saw

At that time she found Carolyn

(R. 1143, See Attachment 8).

On April 11, 1984, Steadman received a phone call

from a jail person who told her that Carolyn was in jail for
stabbing

a ten-year-old

surprised.
70.

girl the night before

and

she was

(R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 154).
During 1984, Carolyn was a voluntary patient of Salt

Lake County Mental Health and as such, had the right to refuse
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mental health treatment.

Steadman did not petition for civil

commitment for Carolyn in January, February or March of 1984
because Carolyn did not meet the commitment

criteria.

(R.

2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 177-182).
71.

Dr. Kuentzel obtained his medical degree from the

University of Iowa in 1973, thereafter completed

a year of

rotating internship, three years of psychiatric residency, and
in

April

neurology.
72.

1980,

became

board

certified

in

psychiatry

and

(R. 2370, Depo. Dr. Kuentzel, pp. 4-10).
Mental health specialists, including Dr. Kuentzel,

are unable to predict future violence based upon past history.
(R. 2370, Depo. Kuentzel, p. 255).
73.

Dr.

Kuentzel's

duties

in

1984

were

to

provide

psychiatric coverage in terms of medication evaluation which
meant he interviewed patients, established working diagnoses
and treatment plans and if psychopharmacology were involved,
supervised

the administration

of the medication.

(R. 2370,

Depo. Kuentzel, p. 24).
74.
never

Dr.

Kuentzel

provided

her

was

with

never

Trujillo's

psychotherapy.

(R.

therapist
2370,

and
Depo.

Kuentzel, p. 25).
75.

According to Dr. Kuentzel, the 1984 mental health

notes show that Carolyn looked the best she'd ever looked in
many years and indicated she was getting better.
Depo. Kuentzel, pp. 256-257).
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(R. 2370,

SCHIZOPHRENIA,
76.

Schizophrenia is a chronic illness for which there

is no cure.

Schizophrenia

is a difficult

illness to treat

because it does not respond terribly well to medication.
is,

schizophrenics

absolutely
some,

symptom

there

is

no

do

not

free.

become

While

guarantee

completely

normal

schizophrenics

of

any

future

That

can

and

improve

conduct.

The

severity of schizophrenia may increase or decrease during the
course of the illness.
77.

(R. 2370, Depo. Kuentzel, pp. 147; 263).

Schizophrenics,

including

Carolyn

Trujillo,

lack

insight into their illness and their need for treatment and
therefore

are

not

medication

compliant.

(R.

2370,

Depo.

Kuentzel, pp. 153-154).
78.

Lots of persons who do not suffer from schizophrenia

commit assaults and hence schizophrenia does not predict or
guarantee assaultive behavior.

(R. 2370, Depo. Kuentzel, p.

253) .
THE ASSAULT ON SHAUNDRA HIGGINS.
79.

On April 10, 1984, Shaundra Higgins was sent by her

mother to the neighborhood 7-11 store to buy some items for
dinner.
80.

(R. 2372, Depo. Higgins, p. 27).
While

Shaundra

Higgins

was

in

the

process

of

returning home from the store through an alley running behind
the

Higgins'

home,

she

was

suddenly

attacked and stabbed by Trujillo.
81.

and

without

warning

(R. 1233, Exhibit 1)

The Higgins family had never met Trujillo and had no
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idea who she was at the time of the assault.

They were also

unacquainted with any member of Trujillo's family.

[R. 2372,

Depo. Higgins pp. 22 and 23].
82.

Plaintiff Kathy Higgins did not witness the assault

on her daughter.

Her first notice that something had happened

was when she heard Shaundra's scream.

[R. 2372, Depo. Higgins

p. 31].
83.

Mrs. Higgins ran to the backyard where she found her

daughter.

When she first saw Shaundra, she did not know what

had happened, did not see Trujillo and did not feel she was in
any danger at the time.
84.
Trujillo.

(R. 2372, Depo. Higgins, p. 32).

Mrs. Higgins was never attacked

or frightened by

The damages she claims as a plaintiff in this action

are for "stress, [and] anxiety."

[R. 2372, Depo. Higgins p.

59, lines 2-9].
85.

Counsel

filed

a Notice

of

Claim

upon

Salt

Lake

County for Shaundra Higgins. (R. 1143, Attachment 11).
86.

Mrs. Higgins has never served a Notice of Claim upon

Salt Lake County for her injuries (R. 1143, Attachment 11).
87.

Carolyn Trujillo was arrested by the Salt Lake City

Police Department on April 10, 1984 and told them that she had
stabbed a young girl.
88.

Carolyn

(R. 1233, Exhibit 1).

Trujillo

gave

the

following

(written)

statement of her version of what happened to the presentence
investigator on April 15, 1985:
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"I was in my room at my Mom's house I started
to feel some pain in my stomach and head and
then started to hear voices telling me to hurt
someone and ran out of the house and ran down
this or walked down this alley and seen this
girl and stabbed her thats all."

89.

Carolyn

medication,

Trujillo

serentil

states

regularly

and

voices told her to hurt someone.

she had

been

on April

taking

her

10, 1984 when

(R. 1233, Exhibit 1; R. 114 3,

Attachment 10) .
90.

Carolyn Trujillo had not been using illicit drugs

prior to or on April 10, 1984.
91.

Carolyn

(R. 1143, Attachment 10).

Trujillo's

called ARTU on April

stepfather,

Richard

10, 1984 and stated that Carolyn had

stabbed a 10-year old girl and had been taken
custody.

Navarro,

into police

Mr. Navarro also stated that he had not seen any

unusual behavior prior to the stabbing and that Carolyn had
been taking her medication (R.2371, Depo. Steadman Exhibit #24).
92.
Trujillo

State
pursuant

Hospital
to

psychologist

court

order

on

examined
May

30,

Carolyn
1984,

and

thereafter advised the court that Carolyn Trujillo was mentally
ill on April 10, 1984, but that her mental illness did not
prevent

her

from

forming

the

intent

knowlingly stab/injure Shaundra Higgins.

to

intentionally

and

(R. 1143, Attachment

10) .
93.

Carolyn Trujillo was found guilty and mentally ill

to attempted criminal homicide, manslaughter, a third degree
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felony and sentenced to the Utah State Prison for 0-5 years,
(R. 1233, Exhibit 1).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Appellants claim that there were disputed material facts
which

precluded

summary

judgment,

however

they

failed

to

identify any such disputed material facts and their failure to
do so demonstrates the absence of any disputed material facts.
NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
An exception to the general rule that there is no duty to
control the conduct of a third party arises when a "special
relationship"

exists

between

the

parties.

Special

relationships arise when one assumes responsibility

for the

safety of another or prevents another from utilizing his normal
opportunities for self-protection.

Salt Lake County Appellees

contend that no "special relationship" existed between Salt
Lake County Appellees and Carolyn Trujillo because Carolyn was
a voluntary patient.

Further, Salt Lake County Appellees did

not have the right to control Carolyn's actions and where no
right to control exists, there is no duty.
In similar cases, the courts have refused to recognize a
duty by health care professionals to warn, detain, commit or
control patients whose participation is voluntary.
U.S. , 868 F.2d

372

Hokansen v.

(10th Cir. 1989); Hinkelman v.

Medical Center, 43 N.W.2d 547 (Michigan 1987).
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Boraess

NO PUBLIC DUTY
As

community

mental

health

care providers,

County Appellees owed no duty to appellants.

Salt

Lake

If Salt Lake

County Appellees owed any duty to the public such a public duty
does not create a duty owed to Appellants.
NO DUTY FROM COURT SENTENCES
Salt

Lake

County Appellees

had

no duty

to treat

and

control Carolyn Trujillo at anytime especially not on April 10,
1984.

Additionally, Salt Lake County Appellees had no legal

right or control over Carolyn Trujillo by reason of Carolyn's
two court sentences and probations.

Appellants' claim in this

regard is absolutely ridiculous and frivolous.
KATHY HIGGINS FAILED TO FILE NOTICE OF CLAIM
Appellant
emotional
Notice

Kathy

distress

of Claim

Lynn Higgins' claim

is barred

required

by

Governmental Immunity Act.
Claim

forever

§63-30-13).
dismissed.

bars

the

because

she

for infliction of
failed

§63-30-11, U.C.A.

to

file a

of the Utah

Failure to file a timely Notice of

prosecution

of

the

claim.

(U.C.A.

Thus, Appellant Kathy Lynn Higgins' claim must be
Yeates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352

(Utah 1980).
KATHY HIGGINS HAS NO CLAIM
Appellant Kathy Higgins seeks recovery for the emotional
distress she has experienced by reason of injuries her daughter
Shaundra received from Carolyn Trujillo's assault.

Appellant

Kathy Higgins did not witness the assault, nor did she ever
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fear injury to herself.

Hence, she was not in the "zone of

danger" and has no cause of action.
S63-30-10. U.C.A. BARS THIS ACTION
§63-30-10,

U.C.A.

County Appellees

retains

immunity

for their discretionary

for the

Salt

Lake

acts or omissions.

The Salt Lake County Appellees alleged failure to commit or
otherwise treat Carolyn Trujillo properly was discretionary and
hence Salt Lake County Appellees are immune from suit.
§63-30-10, U.C.A.

also retains immunity

from suit for

injuries which arise out of the assault, battery and infliction
Hence, Appellants/ claims are barred.

of mental anguish.

NO DENIAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Appellants

claim

that

deprived

the

summary

judgment

rights,

this is without merit.

trial

them

of

court's

various

granting

of

constitutional

ARGUMENT
Appellants

assert

that

they

are

not

seeking

to hold

mental health providers strictly liable for all harmful acts
committed

by

their

mentally

ill

and

dangerous

patients.

Rather, they claim that they are only seeking to hold mental
health

providers

responsible

for

injuries

caused

by

their

breach of duties to control and properly treat their mentally
ill

and

dangerous

patients.

These

assertions

are

untrue.

Appellants are seeking to hold mental health care providers
liable to third parties for the criminal acts of nondangerous
voluntary patients.

Furthermore, Appellants seek to establish,

-25-

contrary

to constitutional

law, the existence

of duties to

civilly commit and medicate nondangerous patients who are not
civilly

commitable

opinions contained

and

to

predicate

these

duties

upon

in the affidavits of paid mental

the

health

consultants, as well as, to establish duty in this case based
solely upon foreseeability.
Appellants

state

that

this

Court

has

heretofore

recognized that psychotherapists and other mental health care
providers owe a duty to third parties to use reasonable care in
diagnosing and treating patients who are in their control, who
are known or should be known in accordance with the standards
of the psychiatric profession, to be dangerous and to take
precautions to control their dangerous patients.

This Court

has never so ruled and even if this Court were to so rule, such
a duty would be inapplicable in this case because, contrary to
Appellants7 statements in their brief, Carolyn Trujillo did not
voluntarily submit to the control of the appellees by seeking
hospitalization in February, 1984, nor was Carolyn Trujillo in
the control

of Salt Lake County Appellees

at the time she

stabbed Shaundra Higgins, nor was she in the custody of Salt
Lake County Appellees by reason of two court sentences.
POINT I.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED
TO THE SALT LAKE COUNTY APPELLEES
As
properly

is

more

granted

fully
Summary

discussed
Judgment
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below,
to

the

the

lower

Court

Salt

Lake

County

Appellees

because

there

were

no

disputed

material

facts

precluding summary judgment and the lower Court correctly ruled
that Appellees owed no duty to Appellants.
A.

THERE WERE NO DISPUTED MATERIAL
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

FACTS

Appellants claim that although duty is a legal question,
it is also highly

fact-dependent

and can only be properly

determined

context

full

according

in
to

the
the

majority

liability cases.

of

a

of

courts

trial

of

deciding

the

facts

third-party

This is a false assertion since numerous

courts have decided duty in a Summary Judgment context as did
the lower court in the present case . See, for example: Currie
v. U.S.. 836 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1987); Bradford v. Metropolitan
County, 522 S.2d 96 (Fla. 1988); Ferree v. State of Utah, 784
P.2d 149 (Utah 1989); Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413
(Utah 1986); Owens v. Garfield. 784 P.2d

1187

(Utah 1989);

Hokansen v. U.S.. 868 F.2d 372 (10th Cir. 1989).
Appellants
material

also

claim

there

facts which precluded

were

many

disputes

of

summary judgment; however no

recitation of any such disputed facts is made and Appellants'
failure to do so establishes that there were no such disputed
material
Appellants

facts

which

identify

precluded

disputed

summary

material

judgment.

facts

Should

in their Reply

Brief, this Court should disregard the same because allowing
Appellants to delay identifing disputed facts until that time
deprives

Appellees

of

the

opportunity
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to

demonstrate

the

absence of any such disputed material facts.
In

essence, Appellants

herein

are

claiming

that

duty

should have been resolved as a fact issue by a jury which
considered the testimony of Appellants' paid experts against
the

testimony

of

the

Appellees.

Appellants'

argument

is

frivolous since duty was unarguably a legal issue to be decided
by the trial court.
B.

SALT LAKE COUNTY APPELLEES OWED NO DUTY TO
APPELLANTS

Appellants contend that there are three possible bases
giving rise to a duty to them:

(1) the special relationship

between Salt Lake County Appellees and Carolyn Trujillo; (2)
Salt Lake County Appellees' status as community mental health
care providers and

(3) Salt Lake County Appellees' custodial

relationship with Carolyn Trujillo while she was on probation.
None of these bases support any duty.
(1)

THERE WAS NO DUTY CREATED BY REASON OF ANY
SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

Appellants acknowledge in their brief that the general
rule of law set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts §315 is
that there is no duty to control the conduct of a third person
to prevent him

from causing harm to another; however, they

claim that most courts have recognized the special relationship
exception to this rule of nonliability involving a voluntary
mental health patients and mental health care providers.

This

is untrue as the Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989)
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case cited, and discussed at great length, by Appellants holds
otherwise.

Id, 1209-1212.

According to the Perreira decision

supra, courts have

failed to impose any duty on mental health care providers for
the actions of their voluntary patients for several reasons:
the difficulty

in forecasting whether a patient presents a

serious danger of violence to others; the providers' limited
opportunity

to

observe

and

determine

the

patient's

violent

propensities, lack of control over voluntary patients, as well
as, the lack of specific threats against readily identifiable
victims.

fThompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728; Brady

v. Hopper, 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984)].

Also, courts which

have focused on the control issue have found that the ability
or right to control in a voluntary patient-mental health care
provider relationship to be so lacking that there is no special
relationship to give rise to a duty to protect third parties.
rHasenai v. U.S., 541 F.Supp. 999

(D.Md 1983)] (768 P.2d at

1209-1210).
Appellants contend that courts have only refused to find
duty in voluntary patient cases where the voluntary patient is
resistant

to

treatment

and

has

little

or

no

history

of

violence.

Cited in support of this contention are Cooke v.

Berlin, 735 P.2d 830 (Ariz. App. 1987); Bradv v. Hooper, 751
F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984); and Hasenai v. U.S. , 541 F.Supp. 99
(D.Md. 1983).

Assuming, arguendo, that this is an accurate

representation

of

said

holdings,
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and

that

this

Court

were

inclined to adopt such an approach to duty, it could not hold
in this case that there was a duty owed to appellants since the
undisputed

facts

show

that

Carolyn

Truiillo

was

always

treatment resistant and had little history of violence prior to
her assault on Shaundra Hicrcrins.
Appellants' assertion that most of the jurisdictions that
have considered whether there is a duty to control voluntary
patients

have

held

there

patients is inaccurate.

is

a

duty

to

control

voluntary

The 10th Circuit Court in Hokansen v.

U.S.. 868 F.2d 372 (1989) found otherwise:
In any event, where voluntary patients are
concerned most jurisdictions have declined to
impose upon mental hospitals a common law duty
of the type urged by the plaintiffs here. See,
e.g., Hinkelman v. Borgess Medical Center, 157
Mich.App. 314, 403 N.W.2d 547 (1987) (Duty to
control vested by involuntary commitment. No
such duty for voluntary patients); Case, 523
F.Supp. at 319) (No liability for United States
under FTCA in Ohio for actions of voluntary
outpatient); Hasenei v. United States, 541
F.Supp. 999 (D.Maryland 1982) (United States
not liable for release of voluntary outpatient
by Veteran's Administration psychiatrist under
section 315 duty to control) ; see also Anthony
v. United States, 616 F.Supp. 156 (S.D. Iowa
1985) (no duty to confine voluntary alcoholism
patient without a commitment order); but see
Bradley Center, 296 S.E.2d at 693. Even were
we to consider the special relationship theory
properly raised, we can see nothing in Kansas
law or precedent to suggest that the Kansas
Supreme Court would go so far under §315
analysis as to impose an affirmative duty to
detain or seek an involuntary commitment in a
case similar to this. Id. p. 378-379
Appellants
decisions

are

suggest
consistent

that

several

of this

"this

analysis"

with
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Court's

past

(Appellants'

Brief p.38).

It is unclear what approach to duty is claimed to

have been previously adopted by this Court—duty to warn when a
specific threat is made to an identifiable victim or a duty to
establish control over a patient with violent propensities who
seeks hospitalization.

Salt Lake County Appellees contend that

neither approach was adopted by this Court in Doe v. Arguelles,
716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1983) nor in Little v. Division of Family
Services. 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983).
In Doe, plaintiff sued the State of Utah and others on
behalf of her minor ward who had been raped, sodomized and
stabbed by Arguelles, who was on conditional release from the
youth

detention

center

(YDC).

This

Court

found

that

YDC

statutorily retained legal custody and control over Arguelles
when he was on conditional release and hence had a duty to
oversee Arguelles while on conditional

release.

No statute

made the Salt Lake County Appellees the legal custodians of
Carolyn Trujillo at any time.
Little involved an action against the Utah Division of
Family Services

(DFS) for the wrongful death of plaintiff's

infant while in foster care DFS had petitioned for and received
an order allowing it to take the infant and place it in foster
care.
duty

This court recognized that DFS had the right and the
to

protect

the

infant

based

upon

the

fact

that

DFS

statutorily had legal custody and control of the infant.

In

the present case there is no statutory basis for finding that
the Salt Lake County Appellees had legal custody and control
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over Carolyn Trujillo at any time.
This Court's decision in Owens v. Garfield. 784 P.2d 1187
(Utah

1989)

does

not

support

the

finding

of

a

special

relationship and any duty to Appellants because absent in this
case was the legal right to control Carolyn Trujillo at or
before the stabbing in April, 1984.

Also# there is no evidence

in this case that the Appellants relied upon the Salt Lake
County Appellees to adequately treat Carolyn Trujillo and to
prevent injury to them.
Appellants claim that the uncontestable evidence in this
case establishes that the Salt Lake County Appellees had the
ability to control Carolyn Trujillo in April 1984, by virtue of
two court-ordered sentences and that in April, 1984 Salt Lake
County Appellees had agreed to and assumed a duty to treat
Carolyn

Trujillo

and

to make

probation authorities.

full and

accurate

reports to

No evidence supports these assertions.

In fact, in April 1984, Carolyn Trujillo was not in the care of
the Salt

Lake County Appellees

sentences

nor was

Carolyn

by virtue

Trujillo

of Court

on probation

ordered

since

her

probation had been terminated in January, 1983 by both state
courts.

Even if Trujillo had been on probation in April, 1984,

she would have been "in the custody" of Adult Probation and
Parole,

which

was

part

of

pursuant to §77-18-1, U.C.A.
were

never

Trujillo's

under

any

progress

duty

in

the

Department

of

Corrections,

Also Salt Lake County Appellees
at

mental
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any

time

health

to

report

treatment

to

Carolyn
Adult

Probation and Parole or to the state courts by reason of her
court-ordered probations.
Secondly, even if Carolyn Trujillo had voluntarily sought
and requested care hospitalization at a Salt Lake County mental
health treatment facility in February 1984, this did not place
her in the legal custody of the Salt Lake County Appellees.
Thirdly, while Carolyn Trujillo may have been entitled to
mental health care pursuant to the Community Mental Health Act,
the responsibility to supervise her treatment at any mental
health facility was that of the Utah State Division of Mental
Health, not that of the Salt Lake County Appellees pursuant to
§64-7-7, U.C.A.
Appellants
Appellees

had

last
the

argument

right

to

that

the

control

Salt

Lake

Trujillo"

County

during

1984

because of the voluntary admission and release or denial of
release statutes (§64-7-29 and §64-7-31 U.C.A.) is ridiculous
and no discussion warranted.
(2)

THERE WAS NO DUTY OWED TO THE PUBLIC

Appellants

contend

that

courts

have

universally

recognized that health care providers owe a duty to the public
to

protect

contagious

the

public

diseases.

from
This

their
duty

patients'

is

claimed

infectious
to

have

or

been

extended to impose upon mental care providers a duty to protect
the public
mentally

from harm

ill persons

caused by the criminal acts of their
who voluntarily
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seek

community

mental

health services.

No Utah cases are cited in support of any

such duty to the public.

Furthermore, none of the cases cited

by Appellants in their brief are factually similar to theie
case.

Also, not all of the cases cited by Appellants recognize

that public duty creates a duty to individuals and even if
cases from other states did so, Utah caselaw holds that duties
owed to the public are not owed to individuals.

Obrav v.

Malmberg, 484 P.2d (Utah 1971; Christenson v. Hayward. 694 P.2d
612 (Utah 1984).
In

Clark

psychiatrist

v.

State,

continued

the

472

NYS.2d

patient

as

170
an

(1980),

the

outpatient

even

through he had received information from two of the patients'
close friends about the patient's deteriorating condition.

In

the present case, no close friends of Carolyn Trujillo informed
the

Salt

Lake

County

Appellees

that

her

condition

was

deteriorating prior to her criminal assault on Shaundra Higgins.
The VA psychiatrists in the Jablonski v. Pauls, U.S. 712
F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983) case did not warn the deceased that
their outpatient, who was deceased's boyfriend, was dangerous
even

through

deceased

boyfriend/outpatient

had
and

told
that

them

that

she

feared

her

her

boyfriend/outpatient's

behavior was unusual and the psychiatrists had the opportunity
to so warn.

Also, the psychiatrists believed that the patient

was dangerous and that there was an emergency but that there
was

no

basis

for

emergency

hospitalization.

The

boyfriend/outpatient had had a history of crimes upon his wife,
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had recently

attacked the deceased's mother, and the Court

found that there was potential harm which was directed at a
readily

identifiable

person,

the

deceased,

and

the

psychiatrists had a duty to warn her and their failure to do so
was a proximate cause of deceased's death.

In the present

case, the victim Shaundra Higgins, had had no relationship with
Carolyn

Trujillo, had

not

expressed

concerns

to

Salt

Lake

County Appellees about Carolyn Trujillo's behavior and neither
Shaundra Higgins nor her mother was readily identifiable as a
potential victim of Carolyn Trujillo nor did Carolyn Trujillo
have a past history of violence toward young neighborhood girls
prior to the April 10, 1984 stabbing.
The patient

shot

and

killed

Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. 1973).

decedent

in Mcintosh

v.

The physician knew that his

patient was obsessed with the decedent and had previously shot
BB's at her car or her boyfriend's car, yet the physician
failed

to

authorities.

warn

decedent,

her

parents

or

the

appropriate

No such evidence of past danger to Appellants nor

perception of danger to Appellants was present and hence there
is no basis for any duty to warn.
In Greenberg v. Barbour, 322 F.Supp 745 (E.D.Pa. 1971),
the court denied summary judgment to a psychiatrist who had
been informed of the dangers and homicidal state of a person
who

sought

care

at

the

state

hospital

and

who

failed

to

adequately convey the information to another doctor who in turn
failed to consummate the person's admission.
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Salt Lake County

Appellees were not in possession of any such information about
Carolyn Trujillo, nor did they fail to admit her to care.
In Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198
defendants

released

an

involuntarily

later shot and killed a policeman.

(Colo. 1989), the

committed

patient

who

The court did not determine

that defendants owed a duty to the public; rather, they found a
duty based upon the special relationship created by reason of
involuntary commitment.

Also present in that case was the fact

that the patient was extremely delusional toward policemen and
blamed

them

for

his

past

problems.

Hence,

policeman was a readily identifiable victim.
case,

there

was

no

special

relationship

the

deceased

In the present
because

Carolyn

Trujillo was not an involuntarily committed patient and she had
not had any delusions toward young neighborhood girls prior o
her assault on Shaundra Higgins.
Naidu v. Laird. 539 A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988) imposed a duty
to protect potential victims upon a state hospital psychiatrist
who had released a patient from voluntary commitment more than
five months before the patient, while psychotic, drove his car
into that of plaintiff's deceased.

This case is not factually

similar to Appellants'.
The court in

Petersen v. State, 671 P. 2d 230

(Wash.

1983) , found a duty to take reasonable precaution in a case
where a psychiatrist

released an involuntary patient with a

history of drug induced schizophrenia even through the patient
had used drugs and operated a vehicle while out on a pass, the
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evening

before

his

release

and

who,

five

days

after

his

release, while under the influence of drugs, was involved in an
accident which

injured plaintiff.

Carolyn Trujillo had not

been engaged in assaultive behavior before her discharge from
ARTU, nor did she engage in assaultive behavior within five
days after her release from HRTU.
In Lipari v. Sears, 497 F.Supp. 185
court

(D.Nev. 1980) the

found a duty to detain a dangerous patient when the

patient's leaving was against medical advice.

In the present

case, although Carolyn Trujillo was asked to stay at ARTU and
declined to do so, no one believed her to be dangerous and
hence no one had any legal basis to detain her by instituting
an involuntary commitment proceeding.
The Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551
P.2d 334 (1976) case is factually dissimilar from the present
case

because,

although

it

involved

a

voluntary

treatment

relationship, the patient had made threats to kill an unnamed
girl who was readily identifiable to the psychiatrist.
case,

Carolyn

Trujillo

had

not made any threats

In this

of bodily

injury to anyone and hence there was no danger to anyone much
less to readily identifiable victims.
Appellants state that this Court has cited with approval
cases which impose a duty of care to the public.
blatant misrepresentation.

This is a

Little, Owens, and Doe, supra, do

not cite Payton, Peterson or Semler, supra, in recognition of a
public duty; rather, this Court cited the Pavton, Peterson and
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Semler cases in discussion and recognition of the difference
between discretionary acts for which there is immunity

from

lawsuit and ministerial acts for which there is no immunity.
(3) CAROLYN TRUJILLO'S 1981 SENTENCES IMPOSED
NO DUTY UPON THE SALT LAKE COUNTY APPELLEES
Appellants contend that because of the Salt Lake County
Appellees# role in the Utah criminal justice system in 1981 and
their voluntary "acceptance" of Carolyn Trujillo as a patient
in

accordance

provide

with

Carolyn

the

court

Trujillo

sentences,

with

mental

their

health

failure

to

treatment

or

failure to see that Carolyn Trujillo met the conditions of her
probations to receive mental health treatment, that the Salt
Lake County Appellees breach of said duties resulted in injury
to Appellants.

These contentions are fallicious because the

Salt Lake County Appellees were not involved in the criminal
proceedings against Carolyn Trujillo in 1981 and had no duty to
treat Carolyn Trujillo nor to insure that Carolyn complied with
the terms of her two probations.
POINT II.
APPELLANT KATHY LYNN HIGGINS' CLAIM IS BARRED
BECAUSE SHE FAILED TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM
Section

63-30-11,

U.C.A,

of

the

Utah

Governmental

Immunity Act requires any person who has a claim for injury
against

a governmental

entity

file, prior to commencing
accordance

with

the

(county) or

its employees

to

a lawsuit, a Notice of Claim in

requirements
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of

§63-30-13, U.C.A.

The

Notice of Claim must be file within a year after the claim
arises,

and the

failure to

file a timely

forever bars the prosecution of the claim.
In the

case

before

this

Court,

Notice

of Claim

(§63-30-13 U.C.A.)
Appellant

Kathy

Lynn

Higgins claims damages for infliction of emotional distress.
Although Appellant Kathy Lynn Higgins caused a Notice of Claim
to be filed on behalf of her minor child, Shaundra, she failed
to file a Notice of Claim on her own behalf against Salt Lake
County or to include her own claim in the Notice filed on
behalf of her daughter.

Hence, Appellant Kathy Lynn Higgins7

lawsuit against Defendant Salt Lake County is barred and her
claim/lawsuit

must

be

dismissed.

Yeates

v.

Vernal

Family

Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980), Varoz v. Sevev. 506
P.2d 435 (Utah 1973) and Edwards v. Iron County. 531 P.2d 476
(Utah 1975).
POINT III
SECTION 63-30-10 BARS THIS ACTION
Appellants' action against the Salt Lake County Appellees
is

barred

by

the

provisions

of

§63-30-10,

U.C.A.

which

prohibits all lawsuits for injuries arising out of the exercise
of a discretionary function, as well as, out of assault and
battery, or the infliction of mental anguish.
The claimed omission of Salt Lake County Appellees to
commit Carolyn Trujillo was a discretionary act for which they
are immune from lawsuit under §63-30-10, U.C.A.
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In Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697 (1977), plaintiff
brought an action claiming negligence on the part of the clerk
and her deputy, as well as, Tooele City.

Plaintiff alleged in

his Complaint that he was issued a citation for speeding which
was entered on the docket books of Tooele City Court in two
different places and given two separate case numbers.

He was

subsequently found guilty of the offense and fined and paid the
fine.

A conviction was entered under both case numbers on the

docket books, but payment of the fine was entered only in one
case.

A bench warrant

was

issued

in the

second

case and

plaintiff was arrested but later released when he produced a
receipt for payment of the fine.

Plaintiff was again arrested

when a clerk failed to enter payment of the fine on the second
docket and to recall the bench warrant.

Defendant Tooele City

moved to dismiss the Complaint against it on the grounds that
it was immune from suit under the provisions of §63-30-10(2),
U.C.A. for injuries arising out of false arrest.

This Court,

affirmed the lower court's decision that Tooele City was immune
from lawsuit and found that the legislature intended to retain
the immunity of the governmental entity in a case.

Although

the plaintiff's had alleged negligence of the clerk in keeping
her books, all the injuries claimed by plaintiff arose out of
plaintiff's arrest, one of the excepted torts set forth in
§63-30-10(2), U.C.A.
In the present case, Appellants' injuries arose out of an
assault by, and the infliction of mental distress by Carolyn
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Trujillo.

Hence Appellants' claims are barred by §63-30-10,

U.C.A.
POINT IV
APPELLANT KATHY HIGGINS HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION
Appellant

Kathy

Higgins'

infliction of emotional distress.

claim

is

for

negligent

Since she was not present at

the time Carolyn Trujillo stabbed Shaundra, she was not within
the "zone of danger" and did not fear for her own safety and
hence has no cause of action.

Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771,

785 (Utah 1988)
POINT V
THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT FOR APPELLEES DID
NOT VIOLATE THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS
Appellants

raise Article

I,

Section

11, of

the Utah

Constitution in support of the proposition that they have been
unconstitutionally denied a remedy by the trial court's summary
judgment in this case.

Citing this court's analysis of the

Utah Open Court Provision in Berrv v. Beech Aircraft. 717 P.2d
670

(Utah

judicial
individual

1985),
process

Appellants
and

rights

contend

"remedies

without

that they

designed

sufficient

to

were

protect

justification."

denied
basic
Id.

Berry dealt with legislative abrogation of a cause of action by
enactment of a statute of repose which did not occur in this
case.

Also, it is clear in Berry that the Utah Open Court

Provision

does

not

guarantee

a
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cause

of

action

to

every

potential litigant and that causes of action and remedies may
be

denied

with

"sufficient

justification".

Additionally,

"[t]he term "rights" when used with reference to Section 11, is
used loosely...What Section 11 is primarily concerned with is
not particular, identifiable causes of action as such, but with
the availability of legal remedies..."

Id. at 676 n.4

The trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Salt
Lake County Appellees was not an abrogation

of Appellants7

rights similar to the legislative enactment in the Berry case
because

there

liability

in

was
this

"sufficient
lawsuit.

justification"

Specifically,

to

there

excuse

should

be

liability limitations for mental health care providers who are
only remotely able to predict the often dangerous behavior of
their

voluntary

patients.

Furthermore,

this

limitation

on

liability "reasonably and substantially advances" the purpose
of avoiding

a chilling

health disciplines.

effect upon the practice

of mental

Id. at 683.

Condemarin v. The University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah
1989), was a Section 11 case analyzing a legislative expansion
of governmental

immunity

and it is distinguishable

from the

case at hand which simply recognized, reaffirmed and applied
the existing law in Utah on third party liability.

Hence, the

trial court's ruling that there was no duty owed to Appellants
did not broadly affect the "availability of legal remedies" to
Appellees.

Berry,

supra.

Nor

did

the

trial

court's

recognition of the prevailing Utah law on third party liability
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abrogate Appellants1 remedy by expanding or contracting of the
rights of either party.
Appellants' rights were not unconstitutionally affected
by the trial court's action in granting summary judgment to the
Salt

Lake

County

Appellees.

The

Berry

court

observed:

"[o]bviously, Section 11 rights also are subject to reasonable
rules of procedure for the ajudication [of] rights."
677, n.5.
"the

Summary judgment has long been a rule justified by

just,

action"

Berry, at

speedy

Celotex

and

inexpensive

Corp. v.

determination

Catrett, 477 U.S.

of

317f

every

327 and

generally proper only when "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and...the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law."

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(C).

Appellants claim that recovery for personal injury is a
substantive right guaranteed by Due Process under the Utah
Constitutions' Open

Courts

Constitution and allege
allowed

and

the United

"there is no meaningful

to seek redress

psychotherapists/mental

Provision

alternative

for injury" and the ruling
health

care

States

providers'

favors

economic

interest in avoiding liability over the Appellants' interest in
recovering damages."

(Appellants' Brief p. 50).

The meaning of Due Process in the context of the Open
Courts

Provision

has

been

addressed

by

this

Court.

In

Condemarin v. The University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989)
this Court observed: "[A]rticle I, Section 11...we determined
that

the

clear

implication

of
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this

language

is

"that

an

individual
remedies

may

not

designed

[emphasis added].

be
to

arbitrarily
protect

deprived

basic

of

effective

individual

rights."

This language makes it clear that rights

assured under Section 11 are protected if arbitrarily deprived,
and implies that Appellants are not always guaranteed a remedy
under Due Process.
The Condemarin court approved an analysis used to weight
the

competing

interests

of

individual

remedies

and

public

policies for limiting them:
"The analytic process presented in Berry under
Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution
was referred to as a "balancing analysis"...
A legislative determination to interfere
with, limit or abrogate the availability of
remedies for injuries to person, property, or
reputation requires an important state interest
and
a
rational
means
of
implementation
[intermediate scrutiny]."
Condemarin at 358.
Process

claims

This intermediate level of scrutiny for Due

balances

remedies

against

limitations.

result is that not every cause of action is recognized:

The
i.e.,

not every remedy is guaranteed.
Additionally,

Salt

Lake

County

Appellees

contend

that

ruling that there was no duty owed to Appellees did not defeat
a substantive right so fundamental that there was a denial of
Due Process under the United States Constitution:
we cannot accept the contention that this
statute deprived [the] victim of her life
without the due process of law because it
condoned a parole decision that led directly to
her death. The statute neither authorized nor
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immunized the deliberate killing of any human
being. It is not the equivalent of a death
penalty statute which expressly authorizes
state agents to take a person's life. This
statute merely provides a defense to potential
state tort-law liability.
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980).

See also Bowers

v. Devito. 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982):
"there is no constitutional right to be
protected by the state against being murdered
by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the
state fails to protect its residents against
such predators but it does not violate the due
process clause of the 14 th Amendment or, we
support,
any
other
provision
of
the
Constitution."
Cited in Dimas v. County of Quay, N.M. , 730 F.Supp. 373, 380
(D.N.M. 1990).
In

summary,

there

was

no

arbitrary

deprivation

of

Appellants7 due process rights or remedies as a result of the
trial court's ruling on duty inasmuch as public policy mandates
reasonable limitations on liability in this area.

Second, the

right to be free from personal injury does not necessarily
attach to governmental entities nor inure to Appellants in such
a way that denial of a remedy on their cause of action amounts
to a denial of Due Process.
Appellants also contend that the ruling below results in
the disparate treatment of victims and arbitrary immunization
of mental health care providers
County

Appellees

respond

that

from

liability.

there

is

a

Salt Lake
reasonable

relationship between the goals of the nonliability
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and the

means

used

to

achieve

it,

to

give

the

rule

of

law

constitutional legitimacy under both the Utah Constitution and
the United States Constitution:
The determination of reasonableness must take
into
account
the
extent
to
which
the
constitutional right—in this case the right to
sue for a full recovery under Article I,
Section 11—is diminished and the extent to
which the burden imposed actually furthers the
legislative goals, as well as the importance of
those goals.
Condermarin at 373 (Stewart).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should affirm the
trial court's judgment for the Salt Lake County Appellees.
DATED this */xf-l\

day of February, 1991.
DAVID E. YOCOM
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY

PATRICIA J. M^LOWE
A^,
Deputy County Attorney "
Governmental Services Division
Attorney for Salt Lake County
Appellees
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Addenda

26-17-1.2

Division
of
mental
health - Creation - Duties
and
responsibilities.-There is created the division of mental health, which
shall be within the department of social services under the administration
and general supervision of the executive director of social services, and
under the policy direction of the board of mental health. The division of
mental health shall be the mental health authority for the State of Utah and
shall have the following duties and responsibilities:

(1) To review and coordinate mental health functions within the division and with related
activities of other state agencies.
(2) To assist and consult with local mental health authorities and with local mental
health advisory councils in the establishment of community mental health programs,
which may include prevention, rehabilitation, case-finding, diagnosis and treatment
of the mentally ill, and consultation and education for groups and individuals
regarding mental health.
(3) To collect and disseminate information pertaining to mental health.
(4) To develop, administer, and supervise a comprehensive state program for care of the
mentally disabled, both within state and local hospitals and on an out-patient basis.
(5) To have general direction over tha Utah State Hospital at Provo.
(6) To perform such other acts as are necessary to promote mental health in the state.

26-17-5.

26-17-7.

Distribution of funds for mental health programs. —(1) The division of
mental health shall provide an equitable distribution of funds appropriated
or otherwise available for mental health programs among those counties
and cities eligible to perform these services for the division of mental health
and which are seeking contracts to provide mental health service. The
division shall recommend an appropriation for comprehensive community
mental health based on a per capita figure for the population residing within
the jurisdictions of local mental health authorities. The per capita rate shall
be based on state general fund monies appropriated by the legislature and
federal grants designated by the division of mental health with the approval
of the legislature.

Mental health services a u t h o r i z e d - F e l o n y to attempt to change
individual's belief about God.-Community mental health services are
authorized to be provided by cities and counties in accordance with the
provisions of this act. Such services shall include one or more of the
following: outpatient mental health clinics, rehabilitation services for
persons suffering from mental disorders, consultant and educational
services, and other activities necessary to protect and promote mental
health. It shall be a felony to give psychiatric treatment, nonvocational
mental health counseling, case-finding testing, psychoanalysis, drugs,
shock treatment, lobotomy, or surgery to any individual for the purpose of
changing his concept of, belief about, or faith in God.

64 7 7

""' 5 H H H ? ? ~

oi

meniaiiy HI persons in the state, who have been admitted to its car?> unrfpr
t h e Dl-OVISIOnS Of t h i s a n t w h p t h p r r P c i H i n n in »K

K ^ L ; " f l Z,

.

®

" " ^

(4)

"Designated examiner" means a licensed physician, preferably a psychiatrist,
designated by the division of mental health as specially qualified by training or
experience in the diagnosis of mental or related illness or another licensed mental

64-7-32

Involuntary hospitalization procedures. —No person shall be
involuntarily hospitalized by reason of mental illness except under the
following provisions

(1)

Emergency procedures for temporary hospitalization upon medical or designated
examiner certification as provided in subsection (1) of section 64-7-34

(2)

Emergency procedures for temporary hospitalization without endorsement of
medical or designated examiner, certification as provided in subsection (2) of section
64-7-34

(3)

Hospitalization on court order as provided in section 64-7-36

64-7-34

(a)

Temporary admission to mental health facility—Requirements and
procedures —Costs. —(1) Any individual may temporarily be admitted to a
mental health facility upon
Written application by a responsible person who has reason to know, stating a
belief that the individual is likely to cause serious injury to self or others if not
immediately restrained, and the personal knowledge of the individual's condition
or circumstances which lead to such oelief, and

(b) A certification by a licensed physician or designated examiner stating that the
physician or designated examiner has examined the individual within a
three-day period immediately preceding said certification and is of the opinion
that the individual is mentally ill and, because of the individual's mental illness,
is likely to injure self or others if not immediately restrained
Such an application and certificate shall authorize any mental health or peace
officer to take the individual into custody and transport the individual to a mental
health facility

(2)

If a duly authorized mental health officer or peace officer observes a person involved
in conduct which leads the officer to have probable cause to believe that such person
is mentally ill, as defined by this act, and that, because of such apparent mental
illness and conduct, there is a substantial likelihood of serious harm to that person or
to others pending proceedings for examination and certification as provided in this
act, the officer may take the person into protective custody A peace officer may
transport a patient pursuant to this provision either on the basis of his own
observation or on the basis of the observation of a mental health officer reported to
him by the mental health officer Immediately thereafter the officer shall transport
the person to a mental health facility and there make application for the person s
admission therein The aphcation shall be upon a prescribed form and shall include
the following

(a,

A statement by * e otncer «
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Person ... » a result o, a menta,

l e s s , a substantial and immediate danger to self or others.
(b) The specific nature of the danger.
(c)

A summary of the observations upon which the statement of danger is based.

(d) A statement of facts which called the person to the attention of the officer.
,3, Any person admitted under ^ f f Z m Z T J Z l L \ Z r Z :
o°! f h l t T m e
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6 ^ 3 1 1 . o orSero6. detention Is issued, the patient shall be released, except when
the patient has made voluntary application for admission.
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propose" patient resides or is found, by a responsible person who has
reason to know of the condition or circumstances of the proposed patient
which lead to the belief that the individual is mentally HI and should be
involuntarily hospitalized. Any such application shall be accompanied by:
(a) A certificate of a licensed physician or a designated examiner stating that within
a seven-day period immediately preceding the certification the Physician or
designated examiner has examined the individual and is of the opinion that the
individual is mentally ill and should be involuntarily hospitalized; or
(b) A written statement by the applicant that the individual has been requested to
but has refused to submit to an examination of mental condition by a licensed
physician or designated examiner. Said application shall be sworn to under oath
and shall state the facts upon which the application is based.
(2)

Prior to issuing a judicial order, the court may require the applicant to consult a
mental health facility or may direct a mental health professional from a mental health
facility to interview the applicant and the proposed patient to determine the existing
facts and report them to the court.

it)

if thP court finds from the application, any other statements under oath, or any
l l n r t , from « mental health professional that there is a reasonable basis to bel.eve
h P t h V n ? l n S e d oa ient^ mental condition and immediate danger to self, others or
proper yPre°qPui e l K n t a S h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n pending examination and hearing, or i
L n n n 3 patient has refused to submit to an interview with a mental health
n r n f S n a f a f c S r e c t e c " b y the court or to go to a treatment facility voluntarily, the
court m a i s s u f a n orderdlrected to a mental health officer or peace officer to
fmmedTately take the proposed patient to any mental health facility or a temporary
U r g e n c y facility as provided in section 64-7-38(2), there to be deta.ned for the
«conLvomination Within 24 hours of the issuance of the order for examination,

h ith faciiity r a designee sha report to th u
K"^^^^
°
"
f r ,?
oral'y o in w ting whether the patient is, in the opinion of the examiners mentally .11.

whether the oatient has agreed to become a voluntary patient pursuant to section
64 7-29 and whether treatment programs are available and acceptable without court
proceedings Based on such information, the court may withou taking any further
aSion terminate the proceedings and dismiss the application. In any event ,f the
examVerTepSrts^rally. the examiner shall immediately send the report in writing to
the clerk of the court.
(4) Notice of the commencement of proceedings fcr involuntary hospitalization, setting
forth ?he allegations of the application and any reported facts, together with a copy o
any official order of detention, shall be provided by the court to a proposed patient
prior to or upon, admission to a mental health faciiity or, with respect to any
individual presently in a mental health facility whose status is being changed .rem
voluntary to involuntary, upon the filing of an application for that purpose with the
court. A copy of such order of detention must be maintained at the place of detention.
(5)

Notice of the commencement of such proceedings shall be provided by the court as
soon as practicable to the applicant, any legai guardian, any immediate adult family
members the legal counsel for the parties involved, and any other persons the
oroDOsed'patient or the court shall designate, and shall advise such persons that a
hearing thereon may be held within the time provided by law, unless the patient has
refused to permit release of such information in which case the extent of notice shall
be determined by the court.

(6) Proceedings for the involuntary
—
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^
eighteen years who is under the cont.nu ng unsd ct on OT
J
accordance
commenced by the filing of a ^ « e n £ P ^
t0
e e d |n
with the provisions of this section.and s - u cou.t - ^ 1 have
^
^ ^
such case in the same manner and wuh the same au.nor. y
* i hosirh rpsources within the district, the court may
(7) If there are no appropriate mental Ihealth esources with
djstrjct cQurt
in its discretion transfer the case or P?*™ 1 * * r f j 0 d n o t b e a y d v e r s e to the interest
within the state of Utah provided tha. said transfer
of the proposed patient.
(8) Within twenty-four hours, excluding Saturdays. Sundaya andMega. J o l l d ^ M h .
issuance of a judicial order _or arte adm.o ,on a^ a menta
^
^
shail
proposed pat.ent under coun order for d e t - n t . "
| f r e q u e s t e d by
appint two designated examiners to e amine t r . - p op
w ^ ^ examjners a
the proposed p a t l e n f s ^ ^ ^ S ^ Z
counsel. The examinations to
a
reasonalby available ^uaimed P e ' s o n
he ^
o f t h e proposed pat.ent, a
S e
be conducted
^ c % ^ H y or at anv otner suitable olace not likely to have a
hosD.tal or other medical lacimy, "'
'harmful effect on the patient's health.

A ••
ohoii h* cot frr a hearinq to be held within ten court days ot tne appo.m.. — A time shall be se. f " r a ^ f r n " g ;° j d examiners or the clinical director of the mental

date that th9 patiePt i£ n

!!£?M
heal h facility s h a M i n t o ^ tne

^

*S

to become a votuplaPUMtlftnt pursuant i 0

i^S^^

act,on

terminate the proceedings and dismiss the application.
(9,

Prior to the
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oth-r oersons to whom notice is reauired to be given shall be afforded an oppo.ttnuy
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o n T h The
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th« court may in its discretion receive
testimony of
ma\ a l l o l a waiver of the patient's right to appear only for good cause shown which
caJs shaH be made a matter of court record. The court is a u t h c £ ^ e x c h ^ a j ,
persons not necessary for the conduct of ihe proceedings and may upon , , o j o n o.
counsel r^auire the testimony of each examiner to be given out of the presenc- .T
anv other examiners The hearing shall be conducted in as informal a manner <-, nr.a>b y c o n s i s t e X S orderly procedure and in a physical setting not likely to hava a
harmful effect on the mental health of the proposed patient. The cou t shall receive
relevant and material evidence which may be offered subject to the rules of
a
evidence

The mental health facility or the physician in charge of the P a V e n * s ^ * ' 6 * " * "
provide to the court at the time of the hearing the following information, the detention
order the admission notes, the diagnosis, any doctors' orders, the progress noies
the nursing notes and the medication records pertaining to the current
hospitalization. Said information shall aiso be suoplied to the patient s counsel at the
time of the hearing and at any time prior thereto upon request.
(10) The court shall order hospitalization if, upon completion of the'hearing and
consideration of the record, the court finds b^e^nd^nm^m^^M^^
that(a) The proposed patient has a mental illness; and
(b)

Because of the patient's illness the proposed Patient poses an ^ e d l a t e
danger of physical injury to others or self, which may include the maDiiiy i
provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter, ..
allowed to remain at liberty; and

(c) The patient lacks the ability to engage in a rational d e c i s i o r ^ ' ' " J j P ^ o l
regarding the acceptance of mental treatment as demonstrated by evidence or
inability to weigh the possible costs and benefits of treatment; and
(d) There is no appropriate less restrictive alternative to a court order of
hospitalization; and
(e) The hospital or mental health facility in which the individual Is to be hospitalized
pursuant to this act can provide the individual with treatment that is adequate
and appropriate to the individual's conditions and needs. In he absence of he
required findings of the court after the hearing, the court shall forthwith dismiss
the proceedings.

11) (a)

The order of hosoitalization shall designate the period for which the individual
shall be treated When the individual is not under an order of hospitalization at
the time of the hearing, this period shall not exceed six months without benefit of
a review hearing Upon such a review hearing, to be commenced prior to the
expiration of the previous order, an order for hospitalization may be for an
indeterminate period, if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
required conditions in section 6^-7-36(10) will last for an indeterminate period

(b) The court shall maintain a current list of all patients under its order of
hospitalization, which list shall be reviewed to determine those patients who
have been under an order of hsopitahzation for the designated period At least
two weeks prior to the expiration of the designated period of any order of
hospitalization still in effect, the court that entered the original order shall so
inform the clinical director of the mental health facility reasponsible for the care
of such patient The director shall immediately reexamine the reasons upon
which the order of hospitalization was based If the director and staff determine
that the conditions justifying such hospitalization no longer exist, the director
shall discharge the patient from involuntary treatment and make an immediate
report thereof to the court and to the division of mental health Otnerwise, the
court shall immediately appoint two designated examiners and proceed under
subsections (8) through (10) of this section
(c)

The clinical director of mental health facility or a designee responsible for the
care of a patient under an order of hospitalization for an indeterminate period
shall at six-month intervals re-examine the reasons upon which the order of
indeterminate hospitalization was based If the clinical director or the designee
determine that the conditions justifying such hospitalization no longer exist, the
director shall discharge the patient from involuntary treatment and make an
immediate report thereof to the court and the division of mental health If the
clinical director or aesignee has determined that the conditions justifying such
hospitalization continue to exist, the director shall send a written report of such
findings to the court and to the division of mental health The patient and the
patient's counsel of record shall be notified in writing that the involuntary
treatment will be continued, the reasons for such, and that the patient has the
right to a review hearing by making a request to the court Upon receiving the
request, the court shall immediately appoint two designated examiners and
proceed under subsection (8) through (10) of this section

(12) In the event that the designated examiners are unable because of rerusal of a
proposed patient to submit to an examination, to complete such exammcitin upon
the first attempt to conduct the same, the court shall fix a reasonable
compensation to be paid to such designated examiners for services in the cause
(13) Any person hospitalized under this act or a person's legally designated
representative who is aggrieved by the findings, conclusions and order of the
court shall have the right to a rehearing upon a petition filed with the court within
thirty days of the entry of the court order In the event the petition alleges error or
mistake in the findings the court shall appoint three impartial designated
examiners previously unrelated to the case who shall conduct an additional
examination of the patient The rehearing shall in all other respects be
conducted in the manner otherwise permitted
(14) Costs of all proceedings under this section shall be paid by the county in which
the proposed patient resides or is found
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CHAPTER 30
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
Section
63-30-1.
63-30-2.
63-30-3.

Short title.
Definitions.
Immunity of governmental entities from suit.
63-30-4.
Act provisions not construed as
admission or denial of liability
— Effect of waiver of immunity
— Exclusive remedy — Joinder
of employee — Limitations on
personal liability.
63-30-5.
Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations.
63-30-6.
Waiver of immunity as to actions
involving property.
63-30-7.
Waiver of immunity for injury
from negligent operation of motor vehicles — Exception.
63-30-8.
Waiver of immunity for injury
caused by defective, unsafe, or
dangerous condition of highways, bridges, or other structures.
63-30-9.
Waiver of immunity for injury
from dangerous or defective
public building, structure, or
other public improvement —
Exception.
63-30-10.
Waiver of immunity for injury
caused by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions
— Waiver for injury caused by
violation of fourth amendment
rights.
63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking
private property without compensation.
63-30-11.
Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service — Legal disability.
63-30-12.
Claim against state or its employee — Time for filing notice.
63-30-13.
Claim against political subdivision or its employee — Time for
filing notice.
63-30-14.
Claim for injury — Approval or
denial by governmental entity
or insurance carrier within
ninety days.
63-30-15.
Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time for filing action against governmental entity.
63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over
actions — Application of Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Section
63-30-17.
63-30-18.

Venue of actions.
Compromise and settlement of actions.
Undertaking required of plaintiff
63-30-19.
in action.
Judgment against governmental
63-30-20.
entity bars action against employee.
Repealed.
63-30-21.
63-30-22.
Exemplary or punitive damages
prohibited — Governmental entity exempt from execution, attachment or garnishment.
Payment of claim or judgment
63-30-23.
against state — Presentment
for payment.
63-30-24.
Payment of claim or judgment
against political subdivision —
Procedure by governing body.
63-30-25.
Payment of claim or judgment
against political subdivision —
Installment payments.
63-30-26.
Reserve funds for payment of
claims or purchase of insurance
created by political subdivisions.
63-30-27.
Tax levy by political subdivisions
for payment of claims, judgments, or insurance premiums.
63-30-28.
Liability insurance — Purchase of
insurance or self-insurance by
governmental entity authorized
— Establishment of trust accounts for self-insurance.
63-30-29.
Repealed.
63-30-29.5. Liability insurance — Government vehicles operated by employees outside scope of employment.
63-30-30.
Repealed.
63-30-31.
Liability insurance — Construction of policy not in compliance
with act.
63-30-32.
Liability insurance — Methods
for purchase or renewal.
63-30-33.
Liability insurance — Insurance
for employees authorized — No
right to indemnification or contribution from governmental
agency.
63-30-34.
Limit of judgment against governmental entity or employee.
63-30-35
Comprehensive liability plan —
Providing coverage — Expenses
of attorney general, general
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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
Section
63-30-37.

ection

(3-30-36.

counsel for state judiciary, and
general counsel for the Legislature in representing the state,
its branches, members, or employees.
Defending government employee
— Request — Cooperation —
Payment of judgment.

63-30-38.

63-30-1

Recovery of judgment paid and
defense costs by government
employee.
Indemnification of governmental
entity by employee not required.

53-30-1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Governmental
immunity Act."
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 1.
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this
ict," as used in this section, means Laws 1965,
:h. 139, §§ 1 to 37, codified as §§ 63-30-1 to
53-30-34.
Cross-References. — .Comparative negligence, §§ 78-27-37, 78-27-38.

Insect infestation emergency control activities, immunity, § 4-35-8.
Limitation of actions on claims against cities, § 78-12-30.
Mailing claims to state or political subdivisions, § 63-37-1 et seq.
Voluntary services for public entities, immunity from liability, §§ 63-30b-l to 63-30b-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Application of act.
Equitable claims.
Governmental function of sanitary district.
School districts.
Application of act.
Governmental Immunity Act applies only to
entities and does not include the entities' employees. Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925
(Utah 1977).
This act applies only to governmental entities and does not affect the personal liability of
individuals for their own torts. Madsen v.
State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978).
Judicial review of a decision of the Division
of State Lands to cancel a lease was authorized
by former § 65-1-9 and did not require compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act.
Adkins v. Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d
524 (Utah 1986).
Equitable claims.
The Governmental Immunity Act did not
abolish the common-law exception of equitable
claims from governmental immunity; claims

for overcharges on water and sewer service and
for discrimination in failing to provide usual
city services were equitable in nature, and governmental immunity and lack of notice were
not available as defenses. El Rancho Enters.,
Inc., v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778 (Utah
1977).
Governmental immunity is not a defense to
equitable claims. Bowles v. State ex rel. Department of Transp., 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah
1982).
Governmental function of sanitary district.
Operation of sewage facilities by sanitary
district was governmental function and, prior
to Governmental Immunity Act, district enjoyed immunity from suit for damages. Johnson v. Salt Lake County Cottonwood San. Dist.,
20 Utah 2d 389, 438 P.2d 706 (1968).
School districts.
Nothing in this act transforms school districts into entities separate and distinct from
the state; action against school board is action
against the state for sovereign immunity purposes. Harris v. Tooele County School Dist.,
471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Utah Governmental Immunity Act: An Analysis, 1967 Utah
L. Rev. 120.
Misapplication of Governmental Immunity
— Epting v. Utah, 1976 Utah L. Rev. 186.

Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1980
Utah L. Rev. 649.
A New Perspective — Has Utah Entered the
Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981 Utah L.
Rev. 495.
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Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Torts, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 244.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal
Corporations, Counties and Other Political
Subdivisions § 680 et seq.; 57 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability § 1 et
seq.; 68 Am. Jur. 2d Schools §§ 16, 63, 66; 72
Am. Jur. 2d States, Territories, and Dependencies §§ 99 to 128.
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Counties §§ 215 to 221,
297 to 338; 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§ 745 et seq.; 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§§ 2173 to 2214; 78 C.J.S. Schools and School
Districts §§ 100,153, 238, 318 to 322; 79 C.J.S.
Schools and School Districts §§ 423 to 444;
81A C.J.S. States §§ 196 to 202, 267 et seq.
A.L.R. — Contractors: right of contractor
with federal, state, or local public body to latter's immunity from tort liability, 9 A.L.R.3d
382.
Schools: modern status of doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to public schools and
institutions of higher learning, 33 A.L.R.3d
703.

Schools: immunity of private schools and institutions of higher learning from liability in
tort, 38 A.L.R.3d 480.
Sovereign immunity doctrine as precluding
suit against sister state for tort committed
within forum state, 81 A.L.R.3d 1239.
Official immunity of state national guard
members, 52 A.L.R.4th 1095.
Liability to one struck by golf ball, 53
A.L.R.4th 282.
Liability of school authorities for hiring or
retaining incompetent or otherwise unsuitable
teacher, 60 A.L.R.4th 260.
Tort liability of United States under Claims
Act for acts committed by aliens, 78 A.L.R.
Fed. 683.
Calculations of attorneys' fees under Federal
Tort Claims Act — 28 USCS § 2678, 86 A.L.R.
Fed. 866.
Key Numbers. — Counties «=» 141 to 148,
197 to 228; Municipal Corporations <£= 723 et
seq., 1001 to 1040; Schools and School Districts
<s=> 148(6), 88 to 89.19, 112 to 126, 147; States
«=> 112, 169 et seq., 191.

63-30-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages
against a governmental entity or against an employee.
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, employees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of
an advisory body, student teachers certificated in accordance with
Section 53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing
services to members of the public in the course of an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program, volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent
contractor.
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position receives compensation.
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions as defined in this chapter.
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential
to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons.
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity.
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate,
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent.
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(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property
damage.
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district, public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement
or taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation.
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, estate, or interest in real or personal property.
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college,
university, or other instrumentality of the state.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 2; 1973, ch.
103, § 2; 1978, ch. 27, § 1; 1981, ch. 116, § 1;
1983, ch. 129, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 2; 1987 (1st
S.S.), ch. 4, § 1; 1988, ch. 2, § 338.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment alphabetized the definitions of this section and renumbered the subsections accordingly, added present Subsection (4), and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation
The 1987 (1st S S ) amendment, effective
June 3, 1987, designated the former provisions
of Subsection (2) as (2)(a) and added subsection

(2Kb); and substituted "includes a governmental entity's officers, employees, servants,
trustees, commissioners, members of a governing body, members of a board, members of a
commission, or members of an advisory body"
for "means any officer, employee, or servant of
a governmental entity, whether or not compensated, including" and inserted "but does not
include an independent contractor" in Subsection (2)(a)
The 1988 amendment, effective February 2,
1988, in Subsection (2)(a) substituted "53A-6101" for "53-2-15 "

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

"Governmental entity."
"Injury "
"Governmental entity."
Complaint of inmate of state prison for damages from injuries inflicted by fellow prisoner
was properly dismissed as to state which is
governmental entity within meaning of statute
defining "governmental entity" and because
statute waiving sovereign immunity from negligent acts of all governmental entities specifically excepts injuries arising out of incarceration of any person in any state prison from the
operation of the statute, although warden of
the state prison is not "governmental entity"
within statute and consequently was not im-

mune from suit for alleged negligence, complaint against him was properly dismissed under common-law rule that where one inmate
has injured another, warden and other prison
officers are protected by doctrine of sovereign
immunity against claims of negligence so long
as they are acting in good faith Sheffield v.
Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P 2d 367 (1968).
"Injury."
When state university constructed building,
parking lot, and road which diverted surface
water flow onto adjoining owner's land and
basement, landowner was "injured" within
meaning of Subsection (6). Sanford v University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P 2d 741
(1971).

63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit.
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in
either public or private facilities.
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental
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entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or
damage resulting from those activities.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3; 1978, ch. 27,
§ 2; 1981, ch. 116, § 2; 1984, ch. 33, § 1; 1985,
ch. 93, § 1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment inserted "and other natural disasters" in
the second paragraph.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Construction and application.
Equitable claims.
Escrowed fund disbursement.
Extent of immunity.
Failure or omission to act.
Financial institution supervision.
Golf courses.
Governmental function.
Health care facilities.
Hospitals.
Misrepresentation by city.
Personal liability.
Proprietary or governmental function.
Recreational opportunities provided by city.
Right to maintain action.
Sewer system.
Street repair and construction.
Subdivision plan approval.
Test for determining governmental immunity.
Water system.
C constitutionality.
It is within power of legislature to impose
such conditions upon right to sue cities and
towns, which are merely arms of state government, as in its judgment may seem wise and
proper. Berger v. Salt Lake City, 56 Utah 403,
191 P. 233, 13 A.L.R. 5 (1920).
Construction and application.
This section indicates an intention that the
act be strictly applied to preserve sovereign immunity and to waive it only as clearly expressed therein. Holt v. Utah State Rd. Comm.,
30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 (1973); Eptmg v.
State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976).
Equitable claims.
Governmental immunity is not a defense to
equitable claims. Bowles v. State ex rel. Department of Transp., 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah
1982).
Escrowed fund disbursement.
The supervision of disbursement of escrowed
funds is not of such a unique nature that it
could only be performed by a governmental entity and is not essential to the core of governmental activity; therefore, disbursement of escrowed funds does not constitute a governmen-

tal function for purposes of this section and is
not subject to the notice requirement of
§ 63-30-11. Cox v. Utah Mtg. & Loan Corp.,
716 P.2d 783 (Utah 1986).
Extent of immunity.
Classification of operation of governmental
entity as "governmental function" does not signal unconditional immunity under this section
since the grant of immunity is expressly subjected to operation of other sections of this act.
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).
Failure or omission to act.
This section provides immunity from suit for
injuries resulting from both acts of commission
and omission involving the exercise of a governmental function. Madsen v. Borthick, 658
P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).
Financial institution supervision.
State's supervision of financial institutions
is of such a unique nature that it can only be
performed by a governmental agency and constitutes the exercise of a governmental function. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah
1983).
Golf courses.
Operation of a public golf course is not essential to governing and is therefore not a governmental operation with result that city is not
immune from tort liability related to its operation of golf course. Standiford v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980).
Governmental function.
A lender's complaint against the State Tax
Commission, claiming that the commission
and its employees negligently failed to advise
the lender that a duplicate vehicle title had
been issued and improperly issued to the borrower the title certificate upon which the
lender relied in making its loan, was barred by
governmental immunity. The issuance of motor vehicle titles and recordkeeping responsibilities are governmental functions and have
immunity under this section. Further, the statutory waiver of immunity for negligence does
not apply, according to § 63-30-10(l)(c), when
the alleged injury arises out of the issuance of
a title certificate. Metropolitan Fin. Co. v.
State, 714 P.2d 293 (Utah 1986).
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The regulation of public safety needs and the
evaluation, installation, maintenance and improvement of safety signals or devices at railroad crossings is a governmental function.
Gleave v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 749 P.2d 660
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Health care facilities.
While 1978 amendment was not expressly
made retroactive, the Supreme Court was disinclined, as a matter of judicial policy, to disregard the obvious manifestation of legislative
intent reflected in the amendment; for that
reason, the court held, in a case which arose
prior to the amendment, that operation of a
governmentally owned health care facility
such as a university medical center was a "governmental function" as contemplated by the
statute prior to amendment. Frank v. State,
613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).
County mental health facility was a "governmental health care facility" within the meaning of this section. Birkner v. Salt Lake
County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989).
Hospitals.
The state's operation of a hospital at a prison
facility for treatment of prisoners is a governmental function. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92
(Utah 1978).
Misrepresentation by city.
City is immune to tort action for deceit and
misrepresentation in its advertisement for construction bids which failed to disclose to bidders that a competitive advantage had been
granted to one corporation. Rapp v. Salt Lake
City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974).

63-30-3

Recreational opportunities provided by
city.
Governmental immunity was not a bar to a
negligence action against a city for injuries
sustained by a child when child's sled collided
with a post on a city owned golf course that
was open to the public for sledding in the winter. Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d
432 (Utah 1981).
Right to maintain action.
The right to maintain an action against the
state or its political subdivisions can result
from a finding that the injury did not result
from the exercise of a governmental function,
or from a finding that even though the injury
resulted from the exercise of a governmental
function, the government's immunity has been
expressly waived. Madsen v. Borthick, 658
P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).
Sewer system.
Governmental immunity was not a bar to an
action by property owner against city for damage sustained when water backed into his
home due to city's alleged negligence in maintaining the sewer system. Thomas v. Clearfield
City, 642 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982).
An action for negligence against a sanitary
district is not subject to the one-year limitations period for actions against the government, since operation of a sewer system is a
nongovernmental function, and thus not protected by governmental immunity. Dalton v.
Salt Lake Sub. San. Dist., 676 P.2d 399 (Utah
1984).
Street repair and construction.
Duty of city to repair or construct streets
within its corporate limits is a governmental
one, and in absence of statute no liability devolves on municipality for defective condition
of its streets. Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100
Utah 573, 111 P.2d 800 (1941) (decided under
former law).

Personal liability.
The Governmental Immunity Act has no application to individuals; however, under common-law principles, a governmental agent performing a discretionary function is immune
from suit for injury arising therefrom, but an
employee acting in a ministerial capacity is not
so protected; psychologist working with university medical center on contractual basis and
alleged to have been negligent in his treatment
of suicidal patient was performing ministerial
rather than discretionary acts, and thus was
not afforded immunity from suit. Frank v.
State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).

Subdivision plan approval.
City was immune from a damage suit based
on its refusal to approve a subdivision plan,
since its actions were deemed to be a "governmental function." Seal v. Mapleton City, 598
P.2d 1346 (Utah 1979).

Proprietary or governmental function.
Four factors to be considered in determining
whether an activity is a proprietary or a governmental function are: (1) whether the activity is something that is done for the general
public good; (2) whether it is generally regarded as a public responsibility; (3) whether
there is any special pecuniary benefit to the
city; and (4) whether it is in competition with
free enterprise. Greenhalgh v. Payson City,
530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975).

Test for determining governmental immunity.
Test for determining governmental immunity is whether the activity under consideration is of such a unique nature that it can
only be performed by a governmental agency
or that it is essential to the core of governmental activity: this new standard broadens governmental liability. However, the position is
consistent with the plain legislative intent of
this chapter to expand governmental liability.
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Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d
1230 (Utah 1980).
Test for determining governmental immunity is whether the activity under consideration is of such a unique nature that it can
only be performed by a governmental agency,
referring not to what government may do but
to what government alone must do, or that it is
essential to the core of governmental activity,
referring to those activities not unique in
themselves but essential to the performance of
those activities that are uniquely governmen-

tal. Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d
432 (Utah 1981).
Water system.
Where city operated water system as a commercial venture in a proprietary capacity, it
was liable for injuries allegedly suffered by
plaintiff when she stepped on loose water
meter lid whether the meter was on plaintiffs
property or in the street. Gordon v. Provo City,
15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d 430 (1964).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Defining Governmental Function Under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, 9 J. Contemp. L.
193 (1983).
Journal of Energy Law and Policy. —
Comment, The Only Way to Manage a Desert:
Utah's Liability Immunity for Flood Control, 8
J. Energy L. & Pol'y 95 (1987).
A.L.R. — Liability of municipality for personal injury or death under mob violence or
anti-lynching statutes, 26 A.L.R.3d 1142.
Liability of municipality for property damage under mob violence statutes, 26 A.L.R.3d
1198.
Modern status of rule excusing governmental unit from tort liability on theory that only
general, not particular, duty was owed under
circumstances, 38 A.L.R.4th 1194.
Governmental tort liability for failure to provide police protection to specifically threatened
crime victim, 46 A.L.R.4th 948.
Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground of
liability of state or local governmental unit or
officer, 48 A.L.R.4th 287.
Governmental liability for failure to post
highway deer crossing warning signs, 59
A.L.R.4th 1217.

State's liability for personal injuries from
criminal attack in state park, 59 A.L.R.4th
1236.
Tort liability of public authority for failure
to remove parentally abused or neglected children from parents' custody, 60 A.L.R.4th 942.
Tort liability of college or university for injury suffered by student as a result of own oi
fellow student's intoxication, 62 A.L.R.4th 81.
Medical malpractice: hospital's liability for
injury allegedly caused by failure to have properly qualified staff, 62 A.L.R.4th 692.
Liability to one struck by golf club, 63
A.L.R.4th 221.
Tort liability of college, university, fraternity, or sorority for injury or death of member
or prospective member by hazing or initiation
activity, 68 A.L.R.4th 228.
Governmental liability for negligence in licensing, regulating, or supervising private
day-care home in which child is injured, 68
A.L.R.4th 266.
Construction and application of Federal Tort
Claims Act provision excepting from coverage
claims arising out of assault and battery (28
USCS § 2680(h)), 88 A.L.R. Fed. 7.

63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity —
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Limitations on personal liability.
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, shall be
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility insofar as
governmental entities or their employees are concerned. If immunity from
suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is granted and liability of the
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person.
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely affecting any
immunity from suit which a governmental entity or employee may otherwise
assert under state or federal law.
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such
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employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority
is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil action or
proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or the
estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless the
employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice.
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the
employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority,
unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or
malice.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 4; 1978, ch. 27,
§ 3; 1983, ch. 129, § 3.
Cross-References. — Compromise and settlement, § 63-30-18.

Payment of medical and similar expenses
not admissible to prove liability for injury,
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 409.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Governmental immunity.
—Governmental function.
Official sued in representative capacity.
Personal liability.
—Applicability of section.
—Remedy for wrongful act.
Suit in federal court.
Cited.
Governmental immunity.
—Governmental function.
While legislative delegation of certain
powers and duties surely establishes that the
exercise and performance thereof is a governmental function for purposes of a political subdivision's authority to operate, it does not automatically follow that the function qualifies as a
"governmental function" for purposes of governmental immunity analysis. Loveland v.
Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987).
In a homeowner's suit based on failure to
construct a fence around a canal adjacent to
the house, the city's procedure in review and
approval of the relevant subdivision plans did
not constitute a governmental function.
Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763
(Utah 1987).
Official sued in representative capacity.
A governmental official or employee can
only be sued in a representative capacity when
the governmental entity is liable; commissioner of Department of Financial Institutions
could not be sued in a representative capacity
where the state was not liable. Madsen v.
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).

Personal liability.
This section precludes personal liability of a
governmental employee for acts or omissions
occurring during the performance of his duties,
unless the employee acted or failed to act
through gross negligence, fraud or malice.
Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983)
(decided prior to 1983 amendment).
This section barred negligence claims
against individual police officers, where plaintiff did not allege that the officers acted with
fraud or malice in beating him after an alleged
wrongful arrest. Maddocks v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 740 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987).
—Applicability of section.
Where parents contended that they were not
subject to the 1978 amendment of this section
because their cause of action accrued at the
time they received and relied upon the negligent advice of the doctors in 1977 that they
could safely have another child, it was held
that the injury in a wrongful birth claim cannot precede the birth of the child, which was 10
months after the effective date of the 1978
amendment to this section. Since there was no
allegation of gross negligence, fraud, or malice
this section precluded the personal liability of
the doctors. Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743
P.2d 186 (Utah 1987).
The 1983 amendment of this section deleting
the provision making employees personally liable for gross negligence should be applied prospectively only. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d
245 (Utah 1988).
—Remedy for wrongful act.
The 1978 amendment to this section did not
leave the parents without a remedy for their
wrongful birth injury by granting immunity
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for simple negligence to doctors employed by
the state, since parents had a remedy against
the state for injuries arising out of the negligent acts of state employees, but the parents
failed to give notice of their claim to the state
within one year as required by § 63-30-12.
Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186
(Utah 1987).
Suit in federal court.
Judgment for damages entered by federal
district court against state of Utah cannot

stand unless Utah has waived its rights under
the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; nor does the appearance of the attorney
general and the ensuing defense at trial serve
to waive the Eleventh Amendment right of the
state to be sued in its own court, which is a
jurisdictional question and may be raised at
any time. Richins v. Industrial Constr. Inc.,
502 F.2d 1051 (10th Cir. 1974)
Cited in Lancaster v. Utah State Prison, 740
P.2d 261 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Torts,
1989 Utah L. Rev. 334.

A.L.R. — Probation officer's liability for
negligent supervision of probationer, 44
A.L.R.4th 638.

63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any contractual obligation. Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations shall
not be subject to the requirements of Section 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13,
63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 5; 1975, ch.
189, § 1; 1978, ch. 27, § 4; 1983, ch. 129, § 4;
1985, ch. 82, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment divided the section into two sentences,

substituting "Actions" for "and actions" at the
beginning of the second sentence; and inserted
"63-30-14, 63-30-15" near the end of the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634
F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986).

63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions involving property.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery
of any property real or personal or for the possession thereof or to quiet title
thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other liens thereon or to determine any
adverse claim thereon, or secure any adjudication touching any mortgage or
other lien said entity may have or claim on the property involved.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 6.
Cross-References. — Mortgage foreclosure
actions, § 78-37-1 et seq.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Construction and application.
The waiver of immunity from suit "for the
recovery of any property real or personal or for
the possession thereof does not include an action for damages for impairment of access to
property caused by construction of highway

underpass; this act should be strictly construed
to preserve sovereign immunity and to waive it
only as clearly expressed therein. Holt v. Utah
State Rd. Comm., 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286
(1973).

63-30-7- Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent operation of motor vehicles — Exception.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or other
equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority; provided, however, that this section shall
not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as defined by law and while
being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 7; 1983, ch.
129, § 5.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Admiralty jurisdiction: maritime
nature of tort — modern cases, 80 A.L.R. Fed.
105.

63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways,
bridges, or other structures.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury
caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road,
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other
structure located thereon.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 8.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Complaint, sufficiency of allegations.
Construction.
Contributory negligence.
Dangerous objects.
Discretionary function.
Ice and snow on sidewalk.
Manholes.
Negligent construction.
New duties not created.
Nondelegable duty.
Private developments.
Traffic signs.

Complaint, sufficiency of allegations.
Claim for injuries "sustained on or about
January 15, 1902, while walking on the sidewalk along First West street between Seventh
and Eighth South, * * * through the negligence
of the city in suffering * * * a fence * * * to be
on said sidewalk," not having misled the city,
was sufficiently definite. Connor v. Salt Lake
City, 28 Utah 248, 78 P. 479 (1904).
Where plaintiff sustained damages to his automobile on city streets, and presented a claim
for "necessary repairs to automobile $133," he
cannot claim and recover additional damages
for $1,000 for its "depreciation in value and
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general impairment," since such claim was not
included in original claim, and could not be
said to be proximate consequence of injuries
therein included. Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43
Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 (1913).
In suit for personal injuries sustained by falling on sidewalk of defendant city, plaintiff
could not recover for permanent injuries in excess of amount claimed in notice to city on
ground that injuries were more serious than at
first supposed, where she alleged no excuse
why she could not initially state all consequences of injuries described in complaint. Berger v. Salt Lake City, 56 Utah 403, 191 P. 233,
13 A.L.R. 5 (1920).
Construction.
A city is required to exercise reasonable care
to keep its streets in safe condition and may be
held liable for injuries proximately resulting
from failure to do so and, in an action against
city for injuries, the failure of a city to warn of
or protect a row of dirt left in the street during
the installation of a curb and gutter justified
finding that city was negligent. Nyman v. Cedar City, 12 Utah 2d 45, 361 P.2d 1114 (1961).
Contributory negligence.
Ordinarily, a pedestrian with prior knowledge of a sidewalk defect and an unobstructed
daylight view who steps into a visible defect is
contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
Eisner v. Salt Lake City, 120 Utah 675, 238
P.2d 416 (1951).
In order that a temporary forgetfulness may
be excused, the cause diverting a pedestrian's
attention from a known danger in a sidewalk
must be unexpected and substantial. Otherwise, the forgetfulness itself may constitute
contributory negligence. Eisner v. Salt Lake
City, 120 Utah 675, 238 P.2d 416 (1951).
Dangerous objects.
It is primary duty of city to exercise reasonable care to maintain streets in reasonably safe
condition, and to guard against injury to persons and property by removing or making reasonably safe any dangerous objects in streets.
Morris v. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 474, 101 P.
373 (1909).
Discretionary function.
Power of public service commission under
§ 54-4-14 to require public utility to construct
and maintain appropriate safety devices at
grade crossings is a discretionary function, and
therefore § 63-30-10 excepts the commission
from waiver of immunity for injuries caused by
failure to require warnings at crossing.
Velasquez v. Union Pac. R.R., 24 Utah 2d 217,
469 P.2d 5 (1970).
The design of a system of traffic-control
semaphores did not involve "the basic policy
making level" nor constitute a discretionary
act for which § 63-30-10 would provide immu-

nity to the state in a tort action alleging dangerously designed, constructed and maintained
electric traffic-control semaphore caused an
auto accident resulting in personal injury. Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980).
Ice and snow on sidewalk.
Cities and towns are not liable for failure to
keep sidewalks free from natural accumulations of ice and snow, but may be held liable for
injuries arising from such snow and ice upon
streets or sidewalks which are placed there by
their own acts. Berger v. Salt Lake City, 56
Utah 403, 191 P. 233, 13 A.L.R. 5 (1920) (decided under former law).
Manholes.
A city was liable for damages sustained
when right rear wheel of automobile crashed
through a defective manhole lid because the
city was negligent in failing to maintain street
in a reasonably safe condition for vehicular
traffic by allowing a broken and cracked manhole lid to remain in the street. Wilson v. Salt
Lake City, 13 Utah 2d 234, 371 P.2d 644
(1962).
Negligent construction.
Where university construction diverted flow
of surface water, flooding basement and causing other damage to adjoining landowner, governmental immunity was waived and university was liable to landowner. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741
(Utah 1971).
There was adequate evidence to support jury
finding that highway project of the state, including the storm drain system, was unnecessarily defective or dangerous and had resulted
in damage to plaintiffs' property by diversion
of rainwater from channels which had previously carried it to points beyond the plaintiffs'
properties. Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117
(Utah 1975).
New duties not created.
This section did not create any new duties
but merely waived immunity, and since county
had no duty to correct conditions on private
property that obstructed motor bike driver's
view of county road, it could not be held liable
for driver's injuries caused as result of obstruction. Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 25 Utah 2d
168, 478 P.2d 496 (1970).
Nondelegable duty.
A city is charged with a nondelegable duty to
exercise due care in maintaining its streets
and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition
and may incur tort liability for breach of this
duty by virtue of this section. Murray v. Ogden
City, 548 P.2d 896 (Utah 1976).
Private developments.
This section's waiver of immunity applies
only with regard to property in the public use,
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not to private developments, such as an irrigation canal owned by a private company.
Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763
(Utah 1987).
Traffic signs.
The maintenance and repair of traffic signs
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is a governmental function for which immunity from suit has been expressly waived and
which is not within the discretionary function
exception. Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276
(Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Highways: governmental duty to
provide curve warnings or markings, 57
A.L.R.4th 342.
Governmental tort liability as to highway
median barriers, 58 A.L.R.4th 559.
Governmental tort liability for injury to roller skater allegedly caused by sidewalk or
street defects, 58 A.L.R.4th 1197.

Legal aspects of speed bumps, 60 A.L.R.4th
1249.
Highway contractor's liability to highway
user for highway surface defects, S2 A.L.R.4th
1067.
State and local government liability for injury or death of bicyclist due to defect or obstruction in public bicycle path, 68 A.L.R.4th
204.

63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or
defective public building, structure, or other
public improvement — Exception.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury
caused from a dangerous or defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir or other public improvement. Immunity is not waived for
latent defective conditions.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 9.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
one year) in § 63-30-13 is applicable to this
section. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d
1086 (Utah 1975) (decided under former law).

ANALYSIS

Latent defective condition.
Negligent construction.
Notice to city.
Nuisance action.
Other public improvement.
Private developments.
Cited.
Latent defective condition.
Defect in a county storm drain that was discoverable by a reasonable inspection was not a
latent defect. Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583
P.2d 105 (Utah 1978).
Negligent construction.
Where university construction diverted flow
of surface water, flooding basement and causing other damage to adjoining landowner, governmental immunity was waived and university was liable to landowner. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741
(1971).
Notice to city.
Requirement that notice of claim be given to
political subdivision within ninety days (now

Nuisance action.
Intent of legislature was to include within
the waiver of immunity an action for private
nuisance in so far as the action is predicated on
a dangerous or defective condition of a public
improvement that unreasonably interferes
with the use and enjoyment of the claimant's
property. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26
Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971).
Other public improvement.
Damages to house and basement partially
incurred from defective conditions of sewer
drain and canal fell under purview of this section. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d
1086 (Utah 1975).
Private developments.
This section's waiver of immunity for injuries caused by defective conditions applies only
with regard to conditions on property in the
public use, not on private developments such
as an irrigation canal owned by a private com-
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pany. Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d
763 (Utah 1987).

Cited in Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d
126 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Energy Law and Policy. —
Comment, The Only Way to Manage a Desert:
Utah's Liability Immunity for Flood Control, 8
J. Energy L. & Pol'y 95 (1987).

A.L.R. — State and local government hability for injury or death of bicyclist due to defect
or obstruction in public bicycle path, 68
A.L.R.4th 204.

63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omissiojn of employee — Exceptions —
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth
amendment rights [Effective until July 1, 1990].
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
or
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander,
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or
civil rights; or
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection or by reason of making
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it
is negligent or intentional; or
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment
of taxes; or
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison,
county, or city jail or other place of legal confinement; or
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any
activity authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(1) arises out of the activities of:
(i) providing emergency medical assistance;
(ii) fighting fire;
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or
hazardous waste; or
(iv) emergency evacuations; or
(m) arises out of research or implementation of cloud management or
seeding for the clearing of fog.
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(2) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth
amendment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the
exclusive remedy for injuries to those protected rights.
(b) If Section 78-16-5 or Subsection 77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are
held invalid or unconstitutional, this Subsection (2) shall be void and
governmental entities shall remain immune from suit for violations of
fourth amendment rights.

Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent
act or omission of employee — Exceptions —
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth
amendment rights [Effective July 1, 1990].
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of:
(a) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or civil rights;
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order, or similar authorization;
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or
negligent inspection of any property;
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause;
(f) a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it is negligent
or intentional;
(g) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations,
mob violence, and civil disturbances;
(h) or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city
jail, or other place of legal confinement;
(k) any natural condition on state lands or as the result of any activity
authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(1) the activities of:
(i) providing emergency medical assistance;
(ii) fighting fire;
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or
hazardous wastes; or
(iv) emergency evacuations; or
(m) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for
the clearing of fog.
(2) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth
amendment rights under Chapter 16, Title 78, which is the exclusive
remedy for injuries to those protected rights.
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(b) If Section 78-16-5 or Rule 12(g), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
or any parts of either of them are held invalid or unconstitutional, this
subsection is void and governmental entities remain immune from suit
for violations of fourth amendment rights.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch.
194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1;
1989, ch. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3; 1989,
ch. 268, § 29.
Amended effective July 1, 1990. — Laws
1989, ch. 187, § 3 amends this section effective
July 1, 1990. See fourth paragraph of amendment note below.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment, effective March 18, 1985, added Subsection (1)(1) and made minor changes in phraseology.
The 1989 amendment by ch. 185, effective
April 24, 1989, added Subsection (l)(m) and
designated the first and second sentences of
Subsection (2) as Subsections (2)(a) and (b).
The 1989 amendment by ch. 268, effective
July 1,1989, substituted "Board of State Lands
and Forestry" for "State Land 3oard" in Subsection (l)(k), subdivided Subsection (1)0) and
made related punctuation changes, and rewrote Subsection (l)(l)(iii), which had read,
"handling hazardous materials."

The 1989 amendment by ch. 187, effective
July 1, 1990, added "arises out of to the introductory paragraph in Subsection (1) and deleted it from the beginning of each subsection
of Subsection (1); substituted "Board of State
Lands and Forestry" for "State Land Board" in
Subsection (1)00; substituted "Rule 12(g),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure" for "Subsection 77-35-12(g)" in Subsection (2); and
made minor stylistic changes.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Compiler's Notes. — Sections 78-16-5 and
77-35-12(g) (Criminal Procedure Rule 12(g)),
cited in Subsection (2)(b), were held unconstitutional in State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181
(Utah 1987). See case note under catchline
"Constitutionality," below.
Cross-References. — Indemnification of
public officers and employees, §§ 63-30-36 to
63-30-38.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
and 77-35-12, and enacted §§ 77-23-12 and
78-16-1 to 78-16-11) violates the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Discretionary function.
Escaped prisoner.
False arrest.
Foster care of children.
Incarceration in state prison.
Individual agents' immunity.
Injunctions.
Legislative intent.
Misrepresentation in advertisement.
Release from Youth Detention Center.
Sale of recovered stolen property.
State hospital patient.
State prison inmate.
Trees negligently cut.
Vehicle title certificate.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Because the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule announced in United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed.
2d 677 (1984), can never apply to investigatory
stops and searches, and because Subsection
77-35-12(g) purports to create a "good faith"
exception to such searches, the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act (which added Subsection (2) to this section, amended §§ 67-15-5

Discretionary function.
Power of Public Service Commission under
§ 54-4-14 to require public utility to construct
and maintain appropriate safety devices at
grade crossings is a discretionary function, so
this section excepts the commission from
waiver of immunity for injuries caused by failure to require warnings at crossings.
Velasquez v. Union Pac. R.R., 24 Utah 2d 217,
469 P.2d 5 (1970).
The decision of a road supervisor to use
berms as the sole method for warning a traveler of a cut in an abandoned road was not a
basic policy decision essential to the realization or accomplishment of some basic governmental policy, program, or objective, and
therefore was not within the discretionary exception of this section. Carroll v. State Rd.
Comm., 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972).
Although the decision to build a highway
and the general location of the highway were
discretionary functions of the state, preparation of plans and specifications and supervision
of the manner in which the work was carried
out were not "discretionary" within the mean-
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ing of this section and did not exempt state
from tort liability. Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d
1117 (Utah 1975).
Psychiatric care of an individual patient is a
ministerial, rather than a discretionary, function. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).
The design of a system of traffic-control
semaphores did not involve "the basic policy
making level" nor constitute a discretionary
act for which this section would provide immunity to the state in a tort action alleging dangerously designed, constructed and maintained
electric traffic-control semaphore caused an
auto accident resulting in personal injury. Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980).
Failure of Department of Transportation to
install different safety signals or devices at a
particular railroad crossing was a purely discretionary function within the meaning of Subsection (l)(a). Gleave v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R.,
749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Escaped prisoner.
State had not waived its immunity from suit
for negligence in permitting escape of state
prisoner who subsequently killed plaintiffs'
mother; prisoner had escaped from a work release program in which he was placed at the
discretion of prison authorities; therefore,
state's negligence, if any, arose out of exercise
of discretionary function and it was immune
from suit under Subsection (1) (now (l)(a)) of
this section; likewise, state was immune under
Subsection (10) (now (l)(j)) because alleged
negligence arose out of escapee's incarceration
in a state prison. Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242
(Utah 1976).
False arrest.
City was immune from suit claiming that
plaintiff was arrested on a bench warrant due
to city court clerk's failure to enter in the
docket book that plaintiff had paid his fine.
Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697 (Utah
1977).
Foster care of children.
Failure of Division of Family Services to
properly evaluate the foster home, its failure to
supervise the child's placement and its failure
to protect her from harm was a breach of conduct implemental in nature, and when found to
be negligent entitled the parents, upon the
death oftheir child after she was placed in foster care, to maintain a wrongful death action
against the Division of Family Services, which
had obtained custody and guardianship of the
child and placed her in foster care. Little v.
Utah State Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49
'Utah 1983).
Incarceration in state prison.
The exception of the waiver of governmental
immunity for injuries arising out of the incarceration of a person in the state prison is not a
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denial of equal protection nor is it against public policy. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah
1978).
This section barred a wrongful death action
against the state and board of corrections for
death of a prisoner due to alleged negligent
treatment of the prisoner after surgery in the
prison hospital. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92
(Utah 1978).
State is immune under Subsection (10) (now
(l)(j)) of this section from claim of inmate for
negligent deprivation of property, but individual employees of the state are not immune.
Schmitt v. Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979).
This section barred an action by an inmate
against the state prison for personal injuries he
received in a fire at the prison where he was
lawfully incarcerated. Lancaster v. Utah State
Prison, 740 P.2d 261 (Utah 1987).
Individual agents' immunity.
Under Subsection (10) (now (1)0*)) of this section, individual defendants are not immune
from liability for their own torts. Schmitt v.
Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979).
Psychologist working with university medical center on contractual basis and alleged to
have been negligent in his treatment of suicidal patient was acting in a ministerial rather
than discretionary capacity and thus was not
immune from suit. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d
517 (Utah 1980).
Injunctions.
The Utah State Tax Commission, as an
agency of the state of Utah, has immunity from
suits seeking to enjoin an investigation to determine whether a taxpayer has violated any
provision of the state individual income tax
law. Hamilton v. Mengel, 629 F. Supp. 1110
(D. Utah 1986).
Legislative intent.
Since the waiver of immunity in § 63-30-8
and § 63-30-9 encompasses a much broader
field of tort liability than merely negligent conduct of employees within the scope of their employment, the Legislature could not have intended that this section, with its exceptions,
should modify the preceding two sections even
though it be conceded that the negligent conduct of an employee might be involved in an
action for injuries caused by the creation or
maintenance of a dangerous or defective condition. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d
285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971).
Misrepresentation in advertisement.
City is immune to tort action for deceit and
misrepresentation m its advertisement for construction bids which failed to disclose to bidders that a competitive advantage had been
granted to one corporation. Rapp v. Salt Lake
City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974).
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Release from Youth Detention Center.
In a guardian's suit on behalf of her ward
who was raped, sodomized, and stabbed by a
juvenile, summary judgment for the state and
a Youth Detention Center superintendent was
reversed and remanded for a trial to determine
whether the ward's injuries resulted from the
superintendent's negligence in monitoring prescribed treatment after making a discretionary
decision to release the juvenile into the community. Mary Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279
(Utah 1985).

ages from injuries inflicted by fellow prisoner
was properly dismissed as to state which is
governmental entity within meaning of statute
defining "governmental entity" and because
statute waiving sovereign immunity from negligent acts of all governmental entities specifically excepts injuries arising out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison from
the operation of the statute; although warden
of state prison is not "governmental entity"
within statute and consequently was not immune from suit for alleged negligence, com, plaint against him was properly dismissed unSale of recovered stolen property.
Where plaintiffs motorcycle was stolen, re- der common-law rule that where one inmate
covered, held for trial of alleged thief, then sold has injured another, warden and other prison
by State Tax Commission without notice to officers are protected by doctrine of sovereign
plaintiff (who never received notice letter), the immunity against claims of negligence so long
motorcycle's sale did not involve such exercise as they are acting in good faith. Sheffield v.
of "basic policy evaluation" as to make it a dis- Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 (1968).
cretionary decision under Subsection (1) (now
(l)(a)) of this section, but rather the decision to Trees negligently cut.
City and sidewalk contractor were liable for
sell was an operation function and not immune
from attack; also, since defendant tax commis- damage sustained by abutting homeowner
sion never claimed taxes were owing on the , when trees were blown down as result of unmotorcycle and no taxes were deducted from necessary and negligent cutting of roots. Morthe sale price, and since the motorcycle was ris v. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 474, 101 P. 373
being held as evidence in a criminal prosecu- (1909).
tion, the commission could not claim immunity
on basis of the tax exception under Subsection Vehicle title certificate.
A lender's complaint against the State Tax
(8) (now (l)(h)) of this section. Morrison v. Salt
Commission, claiming that the commission
Lake City Corp., 600 P.2d 553 (Utah 1979).
and its employees negligently failed to advise
State hospital patient.
the lender that a duplicate vehicle title had
State was immune from liability for wrong- been issued and that it had improperly issued
ful death of patient who voluntarily entered to the borrower the title certificate upon which
state hospital since she was "incarcerated" or the lender relied in making its loan, was
"confined" within the meaning of this section;
"other place of legal confinement" includes the barred by governmental immunity. The issuhospital. The fact that decedent was voluntary ance of motor vehicle titles and recordkeeping
patient did not preclude conclusion that she responsibilities are governmental functions
was "incarcerated" since she had not sought and have immunity under § 63-30-3. Further,
release and had she done so, superintendent the statutory waiver of immunity for neglicould obtain court order preventing her re- gence does not apply, under Subsection (l)(c) of
lease. Emery v. State, 26 Utah 2d 1, 483 P.2d this section, when the alleged injury arises out
of the issuance of a title certificate. Metropoli1296 (1971).
State's immunity from suit was waived un- tan Fin. Co. v. State, 714 P.2d 293 (Utah 1986).
der this section in action alleging negligent
Cited in Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d
treatment of suicidal patient by psychiatrist
126
(Utah 1987); Maddocks v. Salt Lake City
and psychologist at university medical center.
Corp., 740 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987); Loveland v.
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).
Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987);
Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053
State prison inmate.
Complaint of inmate of state prison for dam- (Utah 1989).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Misapplication of
Governmental Immunity — Epting v. Utah,
1976 Utah L. Rev. 186.
Journal of Energy Law and Policy. —
Comment, The Only Way to Manage a Desert:

Utah's Liability Immunity for Flood Control, 8
J. Energy L. & Pol'y 95 (1987).
A.L.R. — Liability of municipality for building inspector's negligent performance of duties,
41 A.L.R.3d 567.
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Validity and construction of statute authot i n g or requiring governmental unit to indemnify public officer or employee for liability
arising out of performance of public duties, 71
A.L.R.3d 90.
Governmental tort liability for failure to provide police protection to specifically threatened
crime victim, 46 A.L.R.4th 948.
Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground of
liability of state or local governmental unit or
officer, 48 A.L.R.4th 287.
Liability of hospital or sanitarium for negligence of physician or surgeon, 51 A.L.R.4th
235.

Municipal liability for negligent fire inspection and subsequent enforcement, 69 A.L.R.4th
739.
Applicability of libel and slander exception
to waiver of sovereign immunity under Federal
Tort

Claims

A
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§ 2m(h))

79
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Applicability of 28 LSCS §§ 2680(a) and
2680(h) to Federal Tort Claims Act liability
arising out of government informant's conduct,
85 A.L.R. Fed. 848.
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63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking private property without compensation.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of compensation from the governmental entity when the governmental
entity has taken or damaged private property without just compensation.
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according to the requirements of Chapter 34, Title 78.
History: C. 1953, 63-30-10.5, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 75, § 3.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Development
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Civil Procedure, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 166.

63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service
— Legal disability.
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the
claim were against a private person begins to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or
against an employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall
file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are
known.
(b) The notice of claim shall be signed by the person making the claim
or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian, and shall be
directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity according
to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, mentally incompetent
and without a legal guardian, or imprisoned at the time the claim arises,
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the claimant may apply to the court to extend the time for service of
notice of claim.
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court
may extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the
merits.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 11; 1978, ch.
27, § 5; 1983, ch. 131, § 1; 1987, ch. 75, §* 4.
Amendment Note. — The 1987 amendment, in Subsection (2), added "before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental" to the end of the sub-

section; added the subsection designations
within Subsections (3) and (4); in Subsection
(4)(a), added "at the time the claim arises, the
claimant may apply to the court to extend the
time for service of notice of claim"; and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Action based on exercise of governmental function.
Assignment of municipal debt.
Clear statement of claims required.
Conditions for right to recover.
Damages not specified.
Failure to file claim.
Notice.
Sufficiency of notice.
Waiver of objections by city.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Functions of the notice of claim requirement
in giving the affected governmental entity an
opportunity to promptly investigate and remedy defects immediately, in avoiding unnecessary litigation, and in minimizing difficulties
which might attend changes in administration
provide sufficient justification for its imposition as to governmental but not other tort-feasors, and therefore this section does not constitute a denial of equal protection. Sears v.
Southworth, 563 P.2d 192 (Utah 1977).
Action based on exercise of governmental
function.
Action against state which was predicated
on governmental supervision of financial institutions involved the exercise of a governmental function and was barred where there was
no compliance with the notice of claim provisions of §§ 63-30-11 and 63-30-12. Madsen v.
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).
Assignment of municipal debt.
Assignment directing city to pay debt it owes

assignor to assignee is not kind of claim required to be submitted to city in accordance
with this statute. Cooper v. Holder, 21 Utah 2d
40, 440 P.2d 15 (1968) (decided under former
law).
Clear statement of claims required.
The purpose of this section is to require
every claimant to state clearly all of the elements of his claims to the board of commissioners or city council for allowance as a condition precedent to his right to sue the city and
recover his damages in an ordinary action.
Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P.
1167 (1913).
Conditions for right to recover.
Statutory right to recover can be availed of
only when there has been a compliance with
the conditions upon which right is conferred.
One who seeks to enforce the right must by
allegation and proof bring himself within the
conditions prescribed thereby. Hamilton v. Salt
Lake City, 99 Utah 362, 106 P.2d 1028 (1940).
Damages not specified.
A claim which stated the time, place and
general nature of the injury and the sidewalk
defect causing it fulfilled the purpose of former
section even though the amount of damages
was not stated; since the claim had to be filed
within thirty days of the injury, the exact
amount of damages was impossible to ascertain. Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d
362, 412 P.2d 449 (1966) (decided under former
law).
Failure to file claim.
Where no claim was filed as required by this
section, action to recover moneys expended to
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construct bridge which city had agreed to construct was barred. Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v.
Salt Lake City, 87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d 405
(1934).
Notice.
The supervision of disbursement of escrowed
funds is not of such a unique nature that it
could only be performed by a governmental entity and is not essential to the core of governmental activity; therefore, disbursement of escrowed funds does not constitute a governmental function for purposes of § 63-30-3 and is not
subject to the notice requirement of this section. Cox v. Utah Mtg. & Loan Corp., 716 P.2d
783 (Utah 1986).
Service of notice is a precondition to suit.
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988).
Sufficiency of notice.
Under this section, a notice in which damages were specified as "for general impairment" of an automobile was an insufficient description of the damages and one which could
not be cured by amendment. Sweet v. Salt
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Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 (1913)
(decided under former law).
Waiver of objections by city.
In action against city for injuries sustained
as result of defective sidewalk, objection that
plaintiffs claim was not verified and did not
sufficiently describe extent of injury was
waived by city, where it did not decline to consider claim, but acted upon it. Bowman v.
Ogden City, 33 Utah 196, 93 P. 561 (1908) (decided under former law).
Failure to file claim barred action against
town; and consideration of claim by town did
not waive the filing requirement. Hurley v.
Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213
(1924).
City council had no discretion to waive verification of notice of street or sidewalk injury
claims; evidence of waiver or estoppel by city
employees respecting filing of notice was inadmissible where not alleged. Hamilton v. Salt
Lake City, 99 Utah 362, 106 P.2d 1028 (1940)
(decided under former law).
Cited in Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165
(Utah 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Amount of damages stated in notice of claim against municipality or county as
limiting amount of recovery, 24 A.L.R.3d 965.
Incapacity caused by accident in suit as affecting notice of claim required as condition of
holding state and local governmental unit liable for personal injury, 44 A.L.R.3d 1108.
Attorney's mistake or neglect as excuse for
failing to file timely notice of tort claim
against state or local governmental unit, 55
A.L.R.3d 930.
Waiting period: plaintiffs right to bring tort

action against municipality prior to expiration
of statutory waiting period, 73 A.L.R.3d 1019.
Class action: maintenance of class action
against governmental entity as affected by requirement of notice of claim, 76 A.L.R.3d 1244.
Local government tort liability: minority as
affecting notice of claim requirement, 58
A.L.R.4th 402.
Insufficiency of notice of claim against municipality as regards statement of place where
accident occurred, 69 A.L.R.4th 484.

63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for
filing notice.
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with
the attorney general and the agency concerned within one year after the claim
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 12; 1978, ch.
27, § 6; 1983, ch. 131, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment near the end of the section substituted
"Section 63-30-11" for "Subsection 63-30-11(4)"
and added "regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the claim is character-

ized as governmental" and made minor
changes in phraseology.
Cross-References. — Actions arising out of
contractual rights or obligations not subject to
this section, § 63-30-5.
Health Care Malpractice Act, § 78-14-1 et
seq.
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Mailing claims to state or political subdivisions, § 63-37-1 et seq.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Claims for death.
Compliance with section.
Federal claim.
Notice.
Quiet title actions.
Remedy for wrongful act.
Claims for death.
In cases involving claims for death, the statutory period would commence to run on the
date of death of the person injured, inasmuch
as that is the date upon which the damage accrues to the personal representative or third
party entitled to recover for such wrongful
death. Nelson v. Logan City, 103 Utah 356,
135 P.2d 259 (1943) (decided under former
law).
Compliance with section.
Complaint alleging that tax commission and
its agent acted maliciously and arbitrarily in
attempting to enforce payment of excise taxes
and in compelling plaintiff to supply a surety
in greater amount than was reasonable to ensure payment of the tax, requesting damages
both compensatory and punitive was fatally
defective in that it did not allege compliance
with this section; tax commission and its agent
were immune from suit for damages where the
acts complained of were performed in good
faith and within the statutory authority
granted to them. Roosendaal Constr. & Mining
Corp. v. Holman, 28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446
(1972).
Plaintiffs complied with this section where,
within a year after the cause of action arose,
they filed notice of claim with the attorney
general and the agency concerned on the same
day they filed the original complaint with the
court, and amended complaint alleging compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act
was filed, as a matter of right, within one year

after denial of the claim or after the end of the
90-day period in which the claim is deemed to
have been denied. Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980).
Action against state which was predicated
on governmental supervision of financial institutions involved the exercise of a governmental function and was barred where there was
no compliance with the notice of claim provisions of §§ 63-30-11 and 63-30-12. Madsen v.
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).
Federal claim.
A federal claim under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 may
not be barred by failure to meet state statutory
requirements, such as the "notice of claim" requirement in this section. Edwards v. Hare,
682 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1988).
Notice.
Service of notice is a precondition to suit.
Madsen v. Borthick, 97 769 P.2d 245 (Utah
1988). (But see note under catchline "Federal
claim" above.)
Quiet title actions.
Notice of a claim for quiet title complies with
this section if it is given not more than one
year after plaintiffs right to possession has
been disturbed or encroached upon by the
state. Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1977).
Remedy for wrongful act.
The 1978 amendment to § 63-30-4 did not
leave the parents without a remedy for their
wrongful birth injury by granting immunity
for simple negligence to doctors employed by
the state, since parents had a remedy against
the state for injuries arising out of the negligent acts of state employees, but the parents
failed to give notice of their claim to the state
within one year as required by this section.
Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186
(Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Torts,
1989 Utah L. Rev. 334.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d States, Territories, and Dependencies §§ 124, 126.

C.J.S. — 81A C.J.S. States §§ 269, 271, 272,
310.
A.L.R. — See A.L.R. Annotations set forth
under § 63-30-11.
Key Numbers. — States s=> 174, 177, 197.
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63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its employee — Time for filing notice.
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an act or
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted
under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise
to the claim is characterized as governmental.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 13; 1978, ch.
27, § 7; 1983, ch. 131, § 3; 1987, ch. 75, § 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment near the end of the section substituted
"Section 63-30-11" for "Subsection 63-30-11(4)"
and added "regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental."

Cross-References. — Actions arising out of
contractual rights or obligations not subject to
this section, § 63-30-5.
Mailing claims to state or political subdivisions, § 63-37-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
claim against state. Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d
158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973).
Trial court properly dismissed complaint
against county where notice of the claim was
not filed with the county commission during
the year following plaintiffs discovery of her
injuries. Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980).

Administrative proceedings.
Claims barred.
Claims by minors.
Claims for death.
Contract action.
Estoppel.
Full compliance required.
Necessity for presentation of claim.
Notice.
Cited.
Administrative proceedings.
Tenured teacher seeking reinstatement following decision to terminate his services had
no claim for breach of contract until after adverse result at administrative hearing provided for by the school termination provisions
(now § 53A-8-101 et seq.); therefore, where he
filed his notice of claim within the statutory
period after termination of the hearing, he
complied with the requirements of this section.
Pratt v. Board of Educ, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah
1977) (decided under former law).
Claims barred.
Neither actual knowledge by county officials
of circumstances which resulted in death of
four-year-old child's mother in an automobile
accident nor minority of the child dispensed
with necessity of filing timely claim in action
against county in which it was alleged that
death was due to inadequate warning signs
and an improperly constructed guardrail;
timely claim against county was necessary
even though county highway department employee allegedly advised child's attorney, incorrectly, that highway in question was maintained by state, resulting in initial filing of

Claims by minors.
Failure of a minor to give notice within the
time provided in this section does not bar the
minor's claim as the time for notice is tolled
during minority by § 78-12-36. Scott v. School
Bd., 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977).
Claims for death.
In cases involving claims for death, the statutory period would commence to run on the
date of death of the person injured, inasmuch
as that is the date upon which the damage accrues to the personal representative or third
party entitled to recover for such wrongful
death. Nelson v. Logan City, 103 Utah 356,
135 P.2d 259 (1943) (decided under former
law).
Contract action.
An action on a contractual obligation is a
claim permitted under this chapter, and notice
of such claim must be filed in accordance with
this section. Baugh v. Logan City, 27 Utah 2d
291, 495 P.2d 814 (1972).
Estoppel.
County was not estopped from pleading the
filing deadline of the statutory period as a bar
to the claim of a boy who had been injured at
school while playing with dangling wires, even
though the principal of the school erroneously
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informed the mother that public service company was responsible for the wires, and she did
not discover until after the filing deadline that
the county tree-trimming employees were in
fact responsible. Scarborough v. Granite School
Dist., 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975) (decided under
former law).

Salt Lake City, 45 Utah 544, 147 P. 622 (1915
(decided under former law).
Presentation of claim within time fixed by
law is a condition precedent to bringing action
against municipality. Brown v. Salt Lake City,
33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570, 14 L.R.A. (n.s.) 619,
126 Am. St. R. 828, 14 Ann. Cas. 1004 (1908);
Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228
P. 213 (1924) (decided under former law).

Full compliance required.
Before suit against a political subdivision
can be allowed, plaintiff must have fully complied with the statutory requirements; and
thus, prior to filing suit, a claim must be filed
which (1) is in writing, (2) states the facts and
the nature of the claim, (3) is signed by the
claimant, (4) is directed and delivered to someone authorized to receive it, and (5) has been
filed within the prescribed time. Scarborough
v. Granite School Dist., 531 P.2d 480 (Utah
1975).
Necessity for presentation of claim.
Plaintiff had no cause of action for damages
to his crops caused by seepage of water from
defendant city's canal where no claim was presented therefor to city within a year. Dahl v.

Notice.
The fact that employees of the county in fact
knew of the plaintiffs injuries at the time they
occurred does not dispense with the necessity
of filing a timely claim. Edwards v. Iron
County ex rel. Valley View Medical Center,
531 P.2d 476 (Utah 1975).
Notice provision in this section is applicable
to § 63-30-9. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542
P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975) (decided under former
law).
Cited in Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276
(Utah 1985); Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165
(Utah 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political
Subdivisions § 680 et seq.
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Counties §§ 297, 298,
323; 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 2173,
2174, 2199; 79 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts §§ 423, 433.

A.L.R. — See A.L.R. Annotations set forth
under § 63-30-11.
Key Numbers. — Counties «=» 200, 203, 213;
Municipal Corporations «=» 1001, 1005, 1008,
1021; Schools and School Districts <®=» 112, 115.

63-30-14, Claim for injury — Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance carrier within
ninety days.
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental entity or its
insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the claimant in writing of its
approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end
of the ninety-day period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has
failed to approve or deny the claim.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 14.

63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time
for filing action against governmental entity.
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity.
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the
claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has
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expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 15; 1983, ch.
129, § 6; 1985, ch. 82, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment substituted "or an employee of the entity" for "in those circumstances in which immunity from suit has been waived in this chapter" at the end of the first sentence.

The 1987 amendment added the designations to the previously undesignated section; in
Subsection (2), added at the end "regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the
claim is characterized as governmental"; and
made minor changes in phraseology.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Amended complaint.
Estoppel.
Extension of time for filing suit.
Waiver for contractual obligations.
Amended complaint.
Plaintiffs complied with this section where,
within a year after the cause of action arose,
they filed notice of claim with the attorney
general and the agency concerned on the same
day they filed the original complaint with the
court, and amended complaint alleging compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act
was filed, as a matter of right, within one year
after denial of the claim or after the end of the
90-day period in which the claim is deemed to
have been denied. Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980).
Estoppel.
Whether city was estopped to assert statute
of limitations in suit for injuries sustained by
child in cave-in at city-owned clay bank adjacent to municipally maintained park was a
question of fact; entry of no cause of action
judgment was precluded where evidence presented dispute as to whether plaintiffs' attorney had been "lulled" into not filing suit by
assurances there would be a settlement within
insurance policy limits. Whitaker v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 522 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1974).

Governmental entity was not estopped from
asserting the statute of limitations on the basis
that an adjustor of its insurance carrier
"lulled" plaintiff into delay where plaintiff was
at all times represented by an attorney.
Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977).
Extension of time for filing suit.
Where plaintiff sustained injuries from alleged fall from negligently maintained
bleachers on school grounds and evidence indicated that delay in filing claim was caused by
misrepresentations of school's insurance agent,
trial court erred in dismissing complaint with
prejudice on grounds that statute of limitations
barred such claim. Rice v. Granite School Dist.,
23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969), distinguished, Scarborough v. Granite School Dist.,
531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975).
Waiver for contractual obligations.
Where a sanitary district sewer line became
clogged, resulting in damages to houses owned
by a private citizen, a subsequent action
against the sewer district was not subject to
the one-year limitations period for actions
against the government insofar as it was based
on breach of contract. Dalton v. Salt Lake Sub.
San. Dist., 676 P.2d 399 (Utah 1984).

63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions — Application of Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over any action
brought under this chapter, and such actions shall be governed by the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure in so far as they are consistent with this chapter.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 16; 1983, ch.
129, § 7.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
District court jurisdiction.
Sovereign immunity in federal courts.

mitted in his official capacity since this section
is not in conflict with Utah Const., Art. VII,
S e c 1 3 H ulbert v. State, 607 P.2d 1217 (Utah
1980)

District court jurisdiction.
The district court had exclusive, original jurisdiction of an action by the former chairman
and director of the state liquor control commission for attorneys' fees incurred in the successful defense of twelve indictments issued
against him for alleged acts or omissions com*-

.
., . . ,
.
,
Sovereign immunity m federal courts.
Thls act lacks the clear m t e n t
necessary
under
Eleventh Amendment to U.S. Constitution to w a i v e
state's immunity from suit in federal court. Harris v. Tooele County School
Dist., 471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973).
0

63-30-17. Venue of actions.
Actions against the state may be brought in the county in which the claim
arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against a county may be brought in the
county in which the claim arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon leave
granted by a district court judge of the defendant county, in any county contiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be granted ex parte. Actions
against all other political subdivisions including cities and towns, shall be
brought in the county in which the political subdivision is located or in the
county in which the claim arose.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 17; 1983, ch.
129, § 8.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Federal court actions.
This section indicates Utah does not intend
to waive sovereign immunity under Eleventh

Amendment to U.S. Constitution. Harris v.
Tooele County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218 (10th
Cir. 1973).

63-30-18. Compromise and settlement of actions.
A political subdivision, after conferring with its legal officer or other legal
counsel if it has no such officer, may compromise and settle any action as to
the damages or other relief sought.
The risk manager in the Department of Administrative Services may compromise and settle any claim for damages filed against the state up to and
including $10,000 for which the Risk Management Fund may be liable, and
may, with the concurrence of the attorney general or his representative and
the executive director of the Department of Administrative Services, compromise and settle a claim for damages in excess of $10,000 for which the Risk
Management Fund may be liable.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 18; 1981, ch.
250, § 6; 1983, ch. 303, § 2; 1983, ch. 320,
§ 54Cross-References. — Governmental Immunity Act provisions; not construed as admission
or denial of liability, § 63-30-4
Payment of medical and similar expenses

not admissible to prove liability for injury,
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 409.
Rescission of release or settlement by injured
person, §§ 78-27-32 to 78-27-36
R i s k m a n a g e r in Department of Administrative ServiceS) § ^ . ^
et
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63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff in action.
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall file an undertaking in a
sum fixed by the court, but in no case less than the sum of $300, conditioned
upon payment by the plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by the governmental
entity in the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails to
recover judgment.
History: L« 1965, ch. 139, § 19.
Cross-References. — Actions arising out of

contractual rights or obligations not subject to
this section, § 63-30-5.

63-30-20- Judgment against governmental entity bars action against employee.
Judgment against a governmental entity in an action brought under this
act shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of
the same subject matter, against the employee whose act or omission gave rise
to the claim.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 20.
Meaning of "this act." — See the note under the same catchline following § 63-30-1.

Cross-References. — Indemnification of
public officers and employees, §§ 63-30-36 to
63-30-38.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Judgment against governmental entity required.
There must first be a judgment against the
governmental entity before this section bars a
claim against an employee; claim against an

employee was not barred where claim against
the entity was dismissed for failure to file it
within the prescribed time limits. Cornwall v.
Larsen, 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of statute authorizing or requiring governmental
unit to indemnify public officer or employee for

liability arising out of performance of public
duties, 71 A.L.R.3d 90.

63-30-21. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 63-30-21, as enacted by
Laws 1965, ch. 139, § 21 prohibiting claims
under the act by the United States or any

state, territory, nation or governmental entity,
was repealed by Laws 1978, ch. 27, § 12.

63-30-22. Exemplary or punitive damages prohibited —
Governmental entity exempt from execution, attachment or garnishment.
No judgment shall be rendered against the governmental entity for exemplary or punitive damages; nor shall execution, attachment or garnishment
issue against the governmental entity.
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History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 22.
Cross-References. — Archives and Records
Service and Information Practices Act, exemplary damages under, § 63-2-88.
Health Care Malpractice Act, relation to this
chapter, § 78-14-10.

Salaries of public officers subject to garnishment, § 78-27-15.
Tax levy for payment of punitive damages
awarded against elected official or employee,
§ 63-30-27.

63-30-23. Payment of claim or judgment against state —
Presentment for payment
Any claim approved by the state as defined by Subsection 63-30-2(1) or any
final judgment obtained against the state shall be presented to the state risk
manager, or to the office, agency, institution or other instrumentality involved for payment, if payment by said instrumentality is otherwise permitted by law. If such payment is not authorized by law then said judgment or
claim shall be presented to the board of examiners and the board shall proceed
as provided in Section 63-6-10.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 23; 1983, ch.
129, § 9; 1987, ch. 75, § 8.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-

ment substituted "Subsection 63-30-2(1)" for
"Subsection 63-30-2(5)."

63-30-24. Payment of claim or judgment against political
subdivision — Procedure by governing body.
Any claim approved by a political subdivision or any final judgment obtained against a political subdivision shall be submitted to the governing body
thereof to be paid forthwith from the general funds of said political subdivision unless said funds are appropriated to some other use or restricted by law
or contract for other purposes.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 24.

63-30-25. Payment of claim or judgment against political
subdivision — Installment payments.
If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or award during the current
fiscal year it may pay the claim or award in not more than ten ensuing annual
installments of equal size or in such other installments as are agreeable to the
claimant.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 25.

63-30-26. Reserve funds for payment of claims or purchase of insurance created by political subdivisions.
Any political subdivision may create and maintain a reserve fund or may
jointly with one or more other political subdivisions make contributions to a
joint reserve fund, for the purpose of making payment of claims against the
co-operating subdivisions when they become payable pursuant to this chapter,
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or for the purpose of purchasing liability insurance to protect the co-operating
subdivisions from any or all risks created by this chapter.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 26; 1983, ch.
129, § 10.

63-30-27. Tax levy by political subdivisions for payment of
claims, judgments, or insurance premiums,
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, all political subdivisions may levy an annual property tax sufficient to pay the following:
(a) any claim;
(b) any settlement;
(c) any judgment, including any judgment against an elected official or
employee of any political subdivision, including peace officers, based upon
a claim for punitive damages but the authority of a political subdivision
for the payment of any judgment for punitive damages is limited in any
individual case to $10,000;
(d) the costs to defend against any claim, settlement, or judgment; or
(e) the establishment and maintenance of a reserve fund for the payment of claims, settlements, or judgments as may be reasonably anticipated.
(2) It is legislative intent that the payments authorized for punitive damage judgments or to pay the premium for such insurance as authorized is
money spent for a public purpose within the meaning of this section and
Article XIII, Sec. 5, Utah Constitution, even though as a result of the levy the
maximum levy as otherwise restricted by law is exceeded. No levy under this
section may exceed .0001 per dollar of taxable value of taxable property. The
revenues derived from this levy may not be used for any other purpose than
those stipulated in this section.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 27; 1973, ch.
165, § 1; 1978, ch. 27, § 8; 1985, ch. 165, § 81;
1988, ch. 3, § 234.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment substituted ".0001" for "one-half mill"
near the end of the section.
The 1988 amendment, effective February 9,
1988, rewrote the section, as amended by Laws

1985, ch. 165, § 81, to the extent that a detailed comparison is impracticable.
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1988,
ch. 3, § 269 provides that the act has retrospective operation to January 1, 1988.
Cross-References. — No judgment for punitive damages to be rendered against governmental entity, § 63-30-22.

63-30-28. Liability insurance — Purchase of insurance or
self-insurance by governmental entity authorized
— Establishment of trust accounts for self-insurance.
Any governmental entity within the state may purchase commercial insurance, self-insure, or self-insure and purchase excess commercial insurance in
excess of the statutory limits of this chapter against any risk created or recognized by this chapter or any action for which a governmental entity or its
employee may be held liable.
In addition to any other reasonable means of self-insurance, a governmental
entity may self-insure with respect to specified classes of claims by establish543
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ing a trust account under the management of an independent private trustee
having authority with respect to claims of that character to expend both
principal and earnings of the trust account solely to pay the costs of investigation, discovery, and other pretrial and litigation expenses including attorneys ,
fees, and to pay all sums for which the governmental entity may be adjudged
liable or for which a compromise settlement may be agreed upon. The monies
and interest earned on said trust fund shall be subject to investment pursuant
to Chapter 7, Title 51, the State Money Management Act of 1974, and shall be
subject to audit by the state auditor. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary,
the trust agreement between the governmental entity and the trustee may
authorize the trustee to employ counsel to defend actions against the entity
and its employees and to protect and safeguard the assets of the trust, to
provide for claims investigation and adjustment services, to employ expert
witnesses and consultants, and to provide such other services and functions
necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of the trust.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 28; 1978, ch.
27, § 9; 1979, ch. 94, § 1; 1983, ch. 130, § 1;
1985, ch. 21, § 32.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment substituted "Chapter 7, Title 51, the
State Money Management Act of 1974" for "the
State Money Management Act, 51-7-1 to
51-7-2" in the second sentence of the second
paragraph.
Cross-References. — Department of Alco-

holic Beverage Control to maintain liability insurance on its motor vehicles, § 32A-1-18.
Professional liability insurance for health
care providers, § 78-14-9.
Settlement of claim under liability insurance
policy not admission of liability, Utah Rules of
Evidence, Rule 409.
Waiver of policy provisions or defenses, what
does not constitute, § 31A-21-312.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Right to hire legal counsel.
This section provides University of Utah
Hospital with authority to hire independent legal counsel; this section does not violate attorney general's authority under Art. VII, Sec. 16
of the state constitution and provides an excep-

tion to the general authority of the attorney
general to perform legal services for any
agency of state government. Hansen v. Utah
State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332 (Utah
1977).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Legislative
Survey — 1979, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 155.
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of statute authorizing or requiring governmental

63-30-29.

unit to procure liability insurance covering
public officers or employees for liability arising
out of performance of public duties, 71
A.L.R.3d 6.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Section 63-30-29, as amended
by Laws 1978, ch. 27, § 10 relating to provi-

sions of liability insurance policies, was repealed by Laws 1983, ch. 130, § 5.
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63-30-29.5- Liability insurance — Government vehicles operated by employees outside scope of employment,
A governmental entity that owns vehicles driven by employees of the governmental entity with the express or implied consent of the entity, but which,
at the time liability is incurred as a result of an automobile accident, is not
being driven and used within the course and scope of the driver's employment
is considered to provide the driver with the insurance coverage required by
Chapter 12a, Title 41. However, the liability coverages considered provided
are the minimum limits under Section 31A-22-304.
History: C. 1953, 63-30-29.5, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 128, § 1; 1985, ch. 242, § 53.

63-30-30. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 63-30-30, as enacted by
Laws 1965, ch. 139, § 30, requiring that any
liability policy purchased under act include
provision whereby insurer agreed not to assert

defense of sovereign immunity and to pay all
sums for which it would otherwise be liable
under policy, was repealed by Laws 1978, ch.
27, § 12.

63-30-31. Liability insurance — Construction of policy not
in compliance with act.
Any insurance policy, rider or endorsement hereafter issued and purchased
to insure against any risk which may arise as a result of the application of
this chapter, which contains any condition or provision not in compliance with
the requirements of the chapter, shall not be rendered invalid thereby, but
shall be construed and applied in accordance with such conditions and provisions as would have applied had such policy, rider or endorsement been in full
compliance with this chapter, provided the policy is otherwise valid.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 31; 1983, ch.
129, § 11.

63-30-32. Liability insurance — Methods for purchase or
renewal.
No contract or policy of insurance may be purchased or renewed under this
chapter except upon public bid to be let to the lowest and best bidder; except
that the purchase or renewal of insurance by the state shall be conducted in
accordance with the provisions of Sections 63-56-1 through 63-56-73.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 32; 1981, ch.
250, § 7; 1983, ch. 129, § 12.
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63-30-33. Liability insurance — Insurance for employees
authorized — No right to indemnification or contribution from governmental agency,
(1) (a) A governmental entity may insure any or all of its employees
against liability, in whole or in part, for injury or damage resulting from
an act or omission occurring during the performance of an employee's
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, regardless of whether or not that entity is immune from suit for that act or
omission.
(b) Any expenditure for that insurance is for a public purpose.
(c) Under any contract or policy of insurance executed under authority
of this section, the insurer has no right to indemnification or contribution
from the governmental entity or its employee with respect to any loss or
liability covered by the contract or policy.
(2) Any surety covering a governmental entity or its employee under any
faithful performance surety bond has no right to indemnification or contribution from the governmental entity or its employee with respect to any loss
covered by that bond based on any act or omission for which the governmental
entity would be obligated to defend or indemnify under the provisions of
Section 63-30-36.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 33; 1979, ch.
94, § 2; 1983, ch. 130, § 2; 1989, ch. 220, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, subdivided and
designated as Subsection (1) the existing provi-

sions, making minor stylistic changes, and
added Subsection (2).
Cross-References. — Indemnification of
public officers and employees, §§ 63-30-36 to
63-30-38.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of statute authorizing or requiring governmental
unit to procure liability insurance covering
public officers or employees for liability arising
out of performance of public duties, 71
A.L.R.3d 6.

Validity and construction of statute authorizing or requiring governmental unit to indemnify public officer or employee for liability
arising out of performance of public duties, 71
A L R 3d 90

63-30-34. Limit of judgment against governmental entity
or employee.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for damages for
personal injury against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one person in
any one occurrence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the injury is characterized as governmental.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for property damage
against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity
has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $100,000 in any one occurrence, the court
shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the damage is characterized as governmental.
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(3) The damage limits established in this section do not apply to damages
awarded as compensation when a governmental entity has taken or damaged
private property without just compensation.
History: C. 1953, 63-30-34, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 130, § 3; 1987, ch. 75, § 9.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1983,
ch. 130, § 3 repealed former § 63-30-34, as
amended by Laws 1979, ch. 94, § 3, relating to
excess judgments, and enacted present
§ 63-30-34.

Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment added to the end of Subsections (1) and
(2) "regardless of whether or not the function
giving rise to the injury is characterized as
governmental," rewrote Subsection (3), and
made minor changes in phraseology.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
The recovery limits provisions are unconstitutional as applied to University Hospital in

Salt Lake City, a teaching hospital associated
with the University of Utah School of Medicine
and essentially supported by non-state funds.
Condemarin v. University Hosp., 107 Utah
Adv. Rep. 5 (1989).
Cited in Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743
P.2d 186 (Utah 1987).

63-30-35. Comprehensive liability plan — Providing coverage — Expenses of attorney general, general
counsel for state judiciary, and general counsel
for the Legislature in representing the state, its
branches, members, or employees.
(1) After consultation with appropriate state agencies, the risk manager in
the Department of Administrative Services shall provide a comprehensive
liability plan, with limits not lower than those set forth in Section 63-30-34,
which will protect the state and its indemnified employees from claims and
liability. Deductibles and maximum limits of coverage shall be determined by
the risk manager in consultation with the executive director of the Department of Administrative Services.
(2) The risk manager may expend funds from the Risk Management Fund
established in Section 63-1-47, to procure and provide coverage to all state
agencies and their indemnified employees, except those specifically exempted
by law, and shall apportion the cost of such coverage in accordance with
Section 63-1-47. Unless specifically authorized by statute to do so, including
Subsection 63-1-47(8), no agency other than the risk manager may procure or
provide liability insurance for the state.
(3) (a) The Office of the Attorney General has primary responsibility to
provide legal representation to the judicial, executive, and legislative
branches of state government in cases where Risk Management Fund
coverage applies.
(b) When the attorney general has primary responsibility to provide
legal representation to the judicial or legislative branches, the attorney
general shall consult with the general counsel for the state judiciary and
with the general counsel for the Legislature, to solicit their assistance in
defending their respective branch, and in determining strategy and making decisions concerning the disposition of those claims. The decision for
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settlement of monetary claims in those cases, however, lies with the attorney general and the state risk manager.
(4) (a) If the Judicial Council, after consultation with the general counsel
for the state judiciary, determines that the Office of the Attorney General
cannot adequately defend the state judiciary, its members, or employees
because of a conflict of interest, separation of powers concerns, or other
political or legal differences, the Judicial Council may direct its general
counsel to separately represent and defend it.
(b) If the general counsel for the state judiciary undertakes independent legal representation of the st^te judiciary, its members, or employees, the general counsel shall notify the state risk manager and the
attorney general in writing, prior to undertaking that representation.
(c) If the state judiciary elects to be represented by its own counsel
under this section, the decision for settlement of claims against the state
judiciary, its members, or employees, where Risk Management Fund coverage applies, lies with the general counsel for the state judiciary and the
state risk manager.
(5) (a) If the Legislative Management Committee, after consultation with
general counsel for the Legislature, determines that the Office of the
Attorney General cannot adequately defend the legislative branch, its
members, or employees because of a conflict of interest, separation of
powers concerns, or other political or legal differences, the Legislative
Management Committee may direct its general counsel to separately represent and defend it.
(b) If the general counsel for the Legislature undertakes independent
legal representation of the Legislature, its members, or employees, the
general counsel shall notify the state risk manager and the attorney
general in writing, prior to undertaking that representation.
(c) If the legislative branch elects to be represented by its own counsel
under this section, the decision for settlement of claims against the legislative branch, its members, or employees, where Risk Management Fund
coverage applies, lies with the general counsel for the Legislature and the
state risk manager.
(6) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 67-5-3 or any other provision
of this code, the attorney general, the general counsel for the state judiciary,
and the general counsel for the Legislature may bill the Department of Administrative Services for all costs and legal fees expended by their respective
offices, including attorneys' and secretarial salaries, in representing the state
or any indemnified employee against any claim for which the Risk Management Fund may be liable and in advising state agencies and employees regarding such claims. The risk manager shall draw funds from the Risk Management Fund for this purpose.
History: C. 1953, 63-30-5, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 250, § 8; 1983, ch. 130, § 4; 1987,
ch. 92, § 115; 1988, ch. 221, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, in the last sentence of Subsection (1),
substituted "executive director of the Department of Administrative Services" for "director
of Administrative Services" and substituted
"Subsection 63-1-47(8)" for "Subsection

63-1-47(9)" in the last sentence in Subsection
(2)
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,
1988, added Subsections (3) to (5), redesignated
former Subsection (3) as Subsection (6) and in
the first sentence of Subsection (6) substituted
"attorney general, the general counsel for the
state judiciary, and the general counsel for the
L e g i s l a t e may bill the Department of Administrative Services for all costs and legal
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"state attorney general may bill the Department of Administrative Services for all costs
and legal fees expended by the attorney general."
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Applicability. — Laws 1983, ch. 130, § 6
made the act applicable only to claims that
arise on or after the effective date of the act,
j u i y it 1983.

63-30-36. Defending government employee — Request —
Cooperation — Payment of judgment.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a governmental entity
shall defend any action brought against its employee arising from an act or
omission occurring:
(a) during the performance of the employee's duties;
(b) within the scope of the employee's employment; or
(c) under color of authority.
(2) (a) Before a governmental entity may defend its employee against a
claim, the employee shall make a written request to the governmental
entity to defend him:
(i) within ten days after service of process upon him; or
(ii) within a longer period that would not prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining a defense on his behalf; or
(iii) within a period that would not conflict with notice requirements imposed on the entity in connection with insurance carried by
the entity relating to the risk involved,
(b) If the employee fails to make a request, or fails to reasonably cooperate in the defense, the governmental entity need not defend or continue
to defend the employee, nor pay any judgment, compromise, or settlement
against the employee in respect to the claim.
(3) The governmental entity may decline to defend an action against an
employee if it determines:
(a) that the act or omission in question did not occur:
(i) during the performance of the employee's duties; or
(ii) within the scope of his employment; or
(iii) under color of authority; or
(b) that the injury or damage resulted from the fraud or malice of the
employee; or
(c) that the injury or damage on which the claim was based resulted
from:
(i) the employee driving a vehicle, or being in actual physical control of a vehicle:
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to or greater by weight
than the established legal limit; or
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any drug to a degree that rendered the person incapable of safely driving the
vehicle; or
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol and any
drug to a degree that rendered the person incapable of safely
driving the vehicle; or
(ii) the employee being physically or mentally impaired so as to be
unable to reasonably perform his job function because of the use of
alcohol, because of the nonprescribed use of a controlled substance as
defined in Section 58-37-4, or because of the combined influence of
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alcohol and a nonprescribed controlled substance as defined by Section 58-37-4.
(4) (a) Within ten days of receiving a written request to defend an employee, the governmental entity shall inform the employee whether or not
it shall provide a defense, and, if it refuses to provide a defense, the basis
for its refusal.
(b) A refusal by the entity to provide a defense shall not be admissible
for any purpose in the action in which the employee is a defendant.
(5) If a governmental entity conducts the defense of an employee, the governmental entity shall pay any judgment based upon the claim, or any compromise or settlement of the claim, except as provided in Subsection (6).
(6) A governmental entity may conduct the defense of an employee under
an agreement with the employee that the governmental entity reserves the
right not to pay a judgment, if the conditions set forth in Subsection (3) are
established.
(7) (a) Nothing in this section or Section 63-30-37 affects the obligation of a
governmental entity to provide insurance coverage according to the requirements of Subsection 41-12a-301(3) and Section 63-30-29.5.
(b) A governmental entity may refuse to defend an action against its
employee under the conditions set forth in Subsection (3), but shall still
provide coverage up to the amount specified in Sections 31A-22-304 and
63-30-29.5.
History: C. 1953, 63-30-36, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 131, § 4; 1987, ch. 30, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective July 1, 1987, added Subsection
(1), redesignated former Subsection (1) as
present Subsection (2), adding the internal designations and making minor word changes,
added Subsections (3) and (4), redesignated former Subsection (2) as present Subsection (5),
inserting "the claim" following "based upon"
and substituting "Subsection (6)" for "Subsection (3)," redesignated former Subsection (3) as
present Subsection (6), rewriting that subsection which formerly read "A governmental entity may conduct the defense of an employee
under an agreement with the employee that

the government entity reserves the right not to
pay the judgment, compromise, or settlement
unless it is established that the claim arose out
of an act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of his
employment, or under color of authority," and
added Subsection (7).
Cross-References. — Judgment against
government bar to action against employee,
§ 63-30-20.
Liability insurance for employees, purchase
by government, § 63-30-33.
Negligent act or omission of employee,
waiver of governmental immunity for injury
from, § 63-30-10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Liability of insurer.
Cited.
Liability of insurer.
School district and its insurer and not the
teacher and his insurer were liable to defend
and respond to action by a student against the

teacher for an alleged tort committed by the
teacher within the scope of his duties. Gulf Ins.
Co. v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 567 P.2d 158
(Utah 1977) (decided under former Title 63,
Chapter 48).
Cited in Schaefer v. Wilcock, 676 F. Supp.
1092 (D. Utah 1987).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political
Subdivisions §§ 208, 804; 57 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability § 34;
63A Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees § 319.
C J . S 7 20 C J S Counties §§139 220; 42
C.J.S. Indemnity § 10; 62 C.J.S. Municipal
Corporations §545; 67 C.J.S. Officers H 251
to 254; 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts
§§ 129,153, 238, 320; 81A C.J.S. States § 126.

A.L.R. — Validity and construction of statute authorizing or requiring governmental
unit to indemnify public officer or employee for
liability arising out of performance of public
duties 71 A.L.R.3d 90.
Key Numbers. - Counties •» 88, 146; In„ 6 ; Municipal Corporations - 170,
demnit
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63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and defense costs by
government employee.
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), if an employee pays a judgment entered
against him, or any portion of it, which the governmental entity is required to
pay under Section 63-30-36, the employee may recover from the governmental
entity the amount of the payment and the reasonable costs incurred in his
defense.
(2) If a governmental entity does not conduct the defense of an employee
against a claim, or conducts the defense under an agreement as provided in
Subsection 63-30-36(6), the employee may recover from the governmental
entity under Subsection (1) if:
(a) the employee establishes that the act or omission upon which the
judgment is based occurred during the performance of his duties, within
the scope of his employment, or under color of authority, and that he
conducted the defense in good faith; and
(b) the governmental entity does not establish that the injury or damage resulted from:
(i) the fraud or malice of the employee;
(ii) the employee driving a vehicle, or being in actual physical
control of a vehicle:
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to or greater by weight
than the established legal limit;
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any drug to a degree that rendered the person incapable of safely driving the
vehicle;
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol and any
drug to a degree that rendered the person incapable of safely
driving the vehicle; or
(iii) the employee being physically or mentally impaired so as to be
unable to reasonably perform his job function because of the use of
alcohol, because of the nonprescribed use of a controlled substance as
defined in Section 58-37-4, or because of the combined use of alcohol
and a nonprescribed controlled substance as defined in Section
58-37-4.
History: C. 1953, 63-30-37, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 131, § 5; 1987, ch. 30, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective July 1, 1987, substituted "the

employee may recover from the governmental
entity the amount of the payment and the reasonable costs incurred in his defense" for "the
employee is entitled to recover the amount of
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such payment and the reasonable costs incurred in his defense from the governmental
entity" in Subsection (1) and, in Subsection (2),
substituted "or conducts the defense under an
agreement as provided in Subsection

63-30-36(6)" for "or does conduct the defense
under an agreement as provided in Subsection
63-30-36(3)" in the introductory paragraph and
added the provisions in Subsections (b)(n) and
(b)(m)

63-30-38, Indemnification of governmental entity by employee not required.
If a governmental entity pays all or part of a judgment based on or a compromise or settlement of a claim against the governmental entity or an employee, the employee may not be required to indemnify the governmental
entity for the payment
History: C. 1953, 63-30-38, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 131, § 6.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Liability shifted.
This section shifts liability from the employee and his insurer to the public entity and

its insurer Gulf Ins Co v Horace Mann Ins
Co, 567 P2d 158 (Utah 1977) (decided under
former § 63-48-5)

CHAPTER 30a
REIMBURSEMENT OF LEGAL FEES
AND COSTS TO OFFICERS
AND EMPLOYEES
Section
63-30a-l
63-30a-2

Section
Definitions
Indictment or information against
officer or employee — Reimbursement of attorneys' fees

63-30a-l.

63-30a-3

and court costs incurred in defense
Payment of reimbursement of attorneys' fees and court costs

Definitions.

As used m this act
(1) "Officer or employee" means any individual who at the time of an
event giving rise to a claim under this act is or was elected or appointed to
or employed by a public entity, whether or not compensated, but does not
include an independent contractor
(2) "Public entity" means the state or any political subdivision of it or
any office, department, division, board, agency, commission, council, authority, institution, hospital, school, college, university, or other instrumentality of the state or any such political subdivision
History- L. 1977, ch. 245, § 1.
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this
act," as used in this section, means Laws 1977,

ch 245, §§ 1 to 3 which are codified as
§§ 63-30a-l and 63-30a-2

552

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
History: C. 1953, 63-29a-101, enacted by
L. 1987, ch. 164, § 1; 1988, ch. 149, § 1; 1990,
ch. 56, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-

63-30-3

ment, effective April 23, 1990, in the first sentence in Subsection (5), deleted "or" before
"other" and added the phrase at the end beginning "or the building official."

63-29a-103. Liquefied Petroleum Gas Board — Creation
Composition — Appointment — Terms of office
Meetings — Compensation.
Sunset Act. — Section 63-55-263 provides
that the Liquefied Petroleum Gas Board is repealed July 1, 1997.

CHAPTER 30
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
Section
63-30-7.
63-30-10.
63-30-18.

Waiver of immunity for injury
from negligent operation of motor vehicles — Exception.
Waiver of immunity for injury
caused by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions.
Compromise and settlement of actions.

Section
63-30-35.

Expenses of attorney general,
general counsel for state judiciary, and general counsel for
the Legislature in representing
the state, its branches, members, or employees.

63-30-1. Short title.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Construction and application of
Federal Tort Claims Act provision excepting
from coverage claims arising out of interfer-

ence with contract rights (28 USCS § 2680(h)),
92 A.L.R. Fed. 186.

63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Construction and application.
Creek drainage system.
Prisoners.
Schools and school districts.
Construction and application.
The 1984 amendment to this section could
not be applied retroactively to bar a valid
cause of action that had already arisen when
the amendment went into eflfect. Irvine v. Salt
Lake County, 785 P.2d 411 (Utah 1989); Rocky
Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989).
Creek drainage system.
Construction, operation, and maintenance of

a creek drainage system was a governmental
function. Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989).
Prisoners.
Bailiffs action against state for gunshot
wound inflicted by a prisoner was properly dismissed, because either: (1) the prisoner had
totally escaped the control of the officers escorting him and was thus acting on his own so
the officers were not responsible for him, or (2)
he was still under the control of the officers, in
which case the officers would be immune from
suit under the statute. Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d
1255 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Schools and school districts.
School, in pumping water out of its base-
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ment, was not engaged as a governmental entity in the "management of flood waters" so as
to be immune from suit. Branam v. Provo
School Dist., 780 P.2d 810 (Utah 1989).
School district was not shielded from possible liability for damages arising from its negli-

gence in the resurfacing of a school parking lot
which resulted in surface water runoff on an
adjoining landowner's property. Williams v
Carbon County Bd. of Educ, 780 P.2d 816
(Utah 1989).

63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent operation of motor vehicles — Exception.
(1) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle
or other equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope
of employment, or under color of authority.
(b) This subsection does not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as defined by law and while being driven in accordance with the
requirements of Section 41-6-14.
(2) (a) All governmental entities employing peace officers retain and do not
waive immunity from liability for civil damages for personal injury or
death or for damage to property resulting from the collision of a vehicle
being operated by an actual or suspected violator of the law who is being,
has been, or believes he is being or has been pursued by a peace officer
employed by the governmental entity in a motor vehicle.
(b) Enactment of this subsection does not state nor imply that this
immunity was ever previously waived or this liability specifically or implicitly recognized.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 7; 1983, ch.
129, § 5; 1990, ch. 204, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-

ment, effective April 23, 1990, designated the
former section as Subsection (1); added Subsection (2); and made related stylistic changes.

63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or
defective public building, structure, or other
public improvement — Exception,
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Rocky Mt Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989).

63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or civil rights;
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the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or
,al to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate,
oval, order, or similar authorization;
i a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or
igent inspection of any property;
) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proing, even if malicious or without probable cause;
) a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it is negligent
ntentional;
) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations,
) violence, and civil disturbances;
I) or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes;
9) the activities of the Utah National Guard;

10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city
, or other place of legal confinement;
11) any natural condition on state lands or as the result of any activity
;horized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for
3 clearing of fog; or
;i3) the activities of:
(a) providing emergency medical assistance;
(b) fighting fire;
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes;
(d) emergency evacuations; or
(e) intervening during dam emergencies.
My: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch.
11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1;
2h. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3; 1989,
3, § 29; 1990, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch.
§ 1, 2.
sndment Notes. — The 1990 amendDy ch. 15, effective July 1, 1990, deleted
bsection designation (1) from the begin)f the section, redesignated former Subas (l)(a) to (1X1) as Subsections (1) to (13)
lade related changes, and deleted former

Subsection (2), waiving immunity from suit for
violation of Fourth Amendment rights and
making the provisions of Chapter 16 of Title 78
the exclusive remedy for injuries caused by
such violations.
The 1990 amendment by ch. 319, effective
J u l y 1, 1990, added Subsection (13)(e) and
made a related stylistic change.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Decisions regarding the design, capacity,
and construction of a flood control system were
discretionary functions. Rocky Mt. Thrift
Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake Citv Corp., 784 P.2d
459 (Utah 1989).

ANALYSIS

•etionary function,
ped prisoner,
lses.
,*retionary function.
leged negligent conduct of a county emee in operating a backhoe pursuant to a
ilar program of dredging stream channels
lear away silt, gravel deposits, debris, and
»r matter which obstructed the flow of
er did not fall within the discretionary
ction exception of Subsection (1). Irvine v.
t Lake County, 785 R 2 d 411 (Utah 1989).

E s c a p e d prisoner.
Bailiffs action against state for gunshot
wound inflicted by a prisoner was properly dismissed, because either: (1) the prisoner had
totally escaped the control of the officers escorting him and was thus acting on his own so
the officers were not responsible for him, or (2)
he was still under the control of the officers, in
which case the officers would be immune from
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suit under the statute. Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d
1255 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Licenses.
Governmental immunity provisions barred a
negligence action against the Department of
Financial Institutions alleging that the department's failure to regulate supervised lenders

had resulted in investors' losses, where the
claims asserted were for injuries arising out of
licensing decisions allegedly made in a negligent fashion. Gillman v. Department of Fin.
Insts., 782 P.2d 506 (Utah 1989); Hilton v.
Borthick, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (1989).

63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for
filing notice.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Forsman v. Forsman, 779 P.2d 218
(Utah 1989).

63-30-18. Compromise and settlement of actions.
(1) A political subdivision, after conferring with its legal officer or other
legal counsel if it does not have a legal officer, may compromise and settle any
action as to the damages or other relief sought.
(2) The risk manager in the Department of Administrative Services may:
(a) compromise and settle any claim of $25,000 or less in damages filed
against the state for which the Risk Management Fund may be liable;
and
(b) with the concurrence of the attorney general or his representative
and the executive director of the Department of Administrative Services,
compromise and settle any claim of more than $25,000 in damages for
which the Risk Management Fund may be liable.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 18; 1981, ch.
250, § 6; 1983, ch. 303, § 2; 1983, ch. 320,
§ 54; 1990, ch. 97, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted the
subsection designations; substituted "of
$25,000 or less in damages filed against the

state" for "for damages filed against the state
up to and including $10,000" in present Subsection (2)(a); substituted "any claim of more
than $25,000 in damages" for "a claim for dama g e s j n excess of $10,000" in present Subsect i o n (2 )(b) ; and made stylistic changes.

63-30-35. Expenses of attorney general, general counsel
for state judiciary, and general counsel for the
Legislature in representing the state, its
branches, members, or employees.
(1) (a) After consultation with appropriate state agencies, the state risk
manager shall provide a comprehensive liability plan, with limits not
lower than those set forth in Section 63-30-34, that will protect the state
and its indemnified employees from claims and liability.
(b) The risk manager shall establish deductibles and maximum limits
of coverage in consultation with the executive director of the Department
of Administrative Services.
(2) (a) The Office of the Attorney General has primary responsibility to
provide legal representation to the judicial, executive, and legislative
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riches of state government in cases where Risk Management Fund
Brage applies.
)) When the attorney general has primary responsibility to provide
al representation to the judicial or legislative branches, the attorney
eral shall consult with the general counsel for the state judiciary and
h the general counsel for the Legislature, to solicit their assistance in
ending their respective branch, and in determining strategy and makdecisions concerning the disposition of those claims. The decision for
tlement of monetary claims in those cases, however, lies with the atney general and the state risk manager.
0 If the Judicial Council, after consultation with the general counsel
the state judiciary, determines that the Office of the Attorney General
mot adequately defend the state judiciary, its members, or employees
:ause of a conflict of interest, separation of powers concerns, or other
titical or legal differences, the Judicial Council may direct its general
msel to separately represent and defend it.
b) If the general counsel for the state judiciary undertakes indepennt legal representation of the state judiciary, its members, or em)yees, the general counsel shall notify the state risk manager and the
torney general in writing before undertaking that representation.
(c) If the state judiciary elects to be represented by its own counsel
tder this section, the decision for settlement of claims against the state
diciary, its members, or employees, where Risk Management Fund covage applies, lies with the general counsel for the state judiciary and the
ate risk manager.
a) If the Legislative Management Committee, after consultation with
meral counsel for the Legislature, determines that the Office of the
ttorney General cannot adequately defend the legislative branch, its
embers, or employees because of a conflict of interest, separation of
3wers concerns, or other political or legal differences, the Legislative
tanagement Committee may direct its general counsel to separately rep^sent and defend it.
(b) If the general counsel for the Legislature undertakes independent
>gal representation of the Legislature, its members, or employees, the
eneral counsel shall notify the state risk manager and the attorney
eneral in writing before undertaking that representation.
(c) If the legislative branch elects to be represented by its own counsel
mder this section, the decision for settlement of claims against the legisative branch, its members, or employees, where Risk Management Fund
overage applies, lies with the general counsel for the Legislature and the
tate risk manager.
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 67-5-3 or any other provi;ion of this code, the attorney general, the general counsel for the state
udiciary, and the general counsel for the Legislature may bill the Department of Administrative Services for all costs and legal fees expended
3y their respective offices, including attorneys' and secretarial salaries, in
representing the state or any indemnified employee against any claim for
which the Risk Management Fund may be liable and in advising state
agencies and employees regarding any of those claims.
(b) The risk manager shall draw funds from the Risk Management
Fund for this purpose.
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History: C. 1953, 63-30-5, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 250, § 8; 1983, ch. 130, § 4; 1987,
ch. 92, § 115; 1988, ch. 221, § 1; 1990, ch. 97,
§ 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, designated the
first and second sentences in Subsection (1) as

Subsections (l)(a) and (1Kb); deleted former
Subsection (2), relating to the provision of liability insurance for state agencies and employees; designated former Subsections (3) to
(6) as Subsections (2) to (5); and made stylistic
changes.

CHAPTER 31
BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
Sunset Act. — Section 63-55-263 provides that this chapter is repealed July 1, 1992.

CHAPTER 33
COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
Part 1
Department of Community and
Economic Development
Section
63-33-1.
Department of Community and
Economic Development — Creation — Divisions within department.
Part 3
Shared Foreign Sales Corporations
63-33-13.
Creation of shared foreign sales
corporations.

Section
63-33-14.

Shared foreign sales corporations
management fees.
Part 4

Child Care Advisory Committee
63-33-15.
63-33-16.
63-33-17.
63-33-18.
63-33-19.

Definitions.
Creation of office.
Functions and duties of office.
Duties of director.
Creation of committee.

PART
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
63-33-1. Department of Community and Economic Development — Creation — Divisions within department.
There is created within state government the Department of Community
and Economic Development which is responsible for community and economic
development within the state and for the administration and coordination of
all state or federal grant programs which are, or become, available for community and economic development or for any of the programs over which the
department has administrative supervision. The Department of Community
and Economic Development is also responsible for the administrative supervi152
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64-7-31. Release of voluntary patient,
A voluntary patient who requests release or whose release is requested, in
writing, by the patient's legal guardian, parent, spouse, or adult next of kin
shall be released forthwith except that:
(1) If the patient were admitted on the patient's own application and
the request for release is made by a person other than the patient, release
may be conditioned upon the agreement of the patient thereto, and
(2) If the patient, by reason of age, was admitted on the application of
another person, any release prior to becoming sixteen years of age may be
conditioned upon the consent of the patient's parent or guardian, and
(3) If the clinical director of the mental health facility or a designee is
of the opinion that release of a patient would be unsafe for the patient or
others, release of the patient may be postponed for up to 48 hours excluding weekends and holidays provided that the clinical director or a designee must cause to be instituted involuntary hospitalization proceedings
with the district court within the specified time period unless cause no
longer exists for instituting such proceedings. Written notice of such denial with the reasons for such denial must be given to the patient without
undue delay. No judicial proceedings shall be commenced with respect to
a voluntary patient unless release of the patient has been requested by
the patient or, if under the age of sixteen, by the patient's parent or
guardian.
History: C. 1943, 85-7-58, enacted by L.
1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1971,
ch. 172, § 6 [a]; 1975, ch. 198, § 19; 1979, ch.
97, § 13.

Cross-Keferences. — Limitation of application as to criminally insane, § 64-7-54.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incompetent
Governmental tort liability for injuries
Persons §§ 44 to 48.
caused by negligently released individual, 6
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Asylums and Institutional A.L.R.4th 1155.
Care Facilities § 11; 41 C J.S Hospitals § 7;
K e y N u m b e r s . — Asylums «=» 5; Hospitals
44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 72.
^ 5- Mental Health «=» 59
A.L.R. — Immunity of public officer
from
'
liability for injuries caused by negligently released individual, 5 A.L.R.4th 773.

64-7-32. Involuntary hospitalization — General procedures.
No person shall be involuntarily hospitalized by reason of mental illness
except under the following provisions:
(1) emergency procedures for temporary hospitalization upon medical
or designated examiner certification as provided in Subsection (1) of
§ 64-7-34.
(2) emergency procedures for temporary hospitalization without endorsement of medical or designated examiner, certification as provided in
Subsection (2) of § 64-7-34.
(3) hospitalization on court order as provided in § 64-7-36.
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into all the hospital departments of labor and expenses, and a careful examination of the buildings, property and general condition of the hospital, at least
once in every three months. The division shall estimate and determine as
nearly as may be the actual expense per annum of keeping and taking care of
a patient in the hospital and such amount or portion thereof shall be assessed
to and paid by the applicant, patient, spouse, parents, child or children who
are of sufficient financial ability to do so, or by the guardian of the patient
who has funds of the patient that may be used for such purpose.
History: R.S. 1898, § 2159; L. 1903, ch.
115, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 2159; C.L. 1917, § 5389;
R.S. 1933,85-7-6; L. 1941, ch. 71, § 1; C. 1943,
85-7-6; L. 1945, ch. 121, § 1; 1947, ch. 123,
§ 1; 1951, ch. 113, § 2; 1967, ch. 174, § 117.
Cross-References. — Liability of estate for
care and treatment, § 64-7-18.

Limitation of application as to criminally insane, § 64-7-54.
Order in which relatives liable for support,
§ 17-14-2.
State Building Board, § 63-1-33 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Criminally insane.
This section is inapplicable to one declared
insane prior to determination of guilt in criminal prosecution and committed to state hospi-

tal; therefore, guardian cannot be compelled to
pay cost of care and treatment. Ollerton v.
Diamenti, 521 P.2d 899 (Utah 1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incompetent
Persons §§ 55 to 61.
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Asylums and Institutional
Care Facilities §§ 3, 4; 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 4;
44 C.J.S. Insane Persons §§ 73 to 76.
A.L.R. — Constitutionality of statute imposing liability upon estate or relatives of insane

person for his support in asylum, 20 A.L.R.3d
363.
Civil liability for physical measures undertaken in connection with treatment of mentally disordered patient, 8 A.L.R.4th 464.
Key Numbers. — Asylums «=» 2; Hospitals
«=> 2; Mental Health «= 71 to 86.

64-7-7. Supervision and treatment of mentally ill persons
by division.
The Division of Mental Health shall have the responsibility for supervision
and treatment of mentally ill persons in the state, who have been admitted to
its care under the provisions of this act, whether residing in the hospital or
elsewhere.
History: R.S. 1898, § 2610; L. 1903, ch.
115, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 2160; C.L. 1917, § 5390;
R.S. 1933,85-7-7; L. 1941, ch. 71, § 1; C. 1943,
85-7-7; L. 1951, ch. 113, § 2; 1963, ch. 159,
§ 1; 1967, ch. 174, § 118; 1975, ch. 198, § 4.
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this
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act," referred to in this section, means Laws
1963, ch. 159, § 1, which appears as §§ 64-7-7,
64-7-33, and 64-7-48.
Cross-References. — Limitation of application as to criminally insane, § 64-7-54.

UTAH STATE HOSPITAL
History: R.S. 1898, § 2197; L. 1903, ch.
115, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 2197; C.L. 1917, § 5427;
R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 85-7-49; L. 1975, ch. 198,
§ 14.
Cross-References. — Escape of patient

64-7-28

committed for causing fire, duty to report,
§ 63-29-25.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

64-7-24.5. Escape of criminals.
Any person committed to the Utah State Hospital under the provisions of
Title 77, Chapters [Chapter] 48 or 49, or under the provisions of § 77-24-15,
who escapes or leaves without proper legal authority shall be deemed guilty of
a class A misdemeanor.
History: L. 1973, ch. 175, § 1; 1979, ch. 97,
§ 10.
Compiler's Notes. — Section 77-24-15 and
Chapters 48 and 49 of Title 77, referred to in
this section, were repealed by Laws 1980, ch.
15, § 1. For present provisions relating to com-

64-7-25.

mitment on findings of incompetency in criminal proceedings, see Chapters 15 and 16 of Title 77.
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Section 64-7-25 (R.S. 1898,
§ 2198; L. 1903, ch. 115, § 1; C.L. 1907,
§ 2198; C.L. 1917, § 5428; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 85-7-50; L. 1951, ch. 113, § 2), relating to

penalties for bringing a mentally ill person
into the state with intent to make such person
a charge upon the state, was repealed by Laws
1975, ch. 198, § 35.

64-7-26. Violation of chapter — Penalty.
Any person who willfully and knowingly violates any of the provisions of
this chapter, except where another penalty is provided by law, shall be guilty
of a class C misdemeanor.
History: R.S. 1898, § 2199; L. 1903, ch.
115, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 2199; C.L. 1917, § 5429;
R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 85-7-51; L. 1975, ch. 198,
§ 15.

64-7-27.

Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Section 64-7-27 (L. 1935, ch. 95,
§ 2; 1941, ch. 71, § 1; C. 1943, 85-7-54; L.
1945, ch. 121, § 1; 1951, ch. 113, § 2; 1967, ch.
174, § 129), relating to boarding out of indi-

gent patients who were quiet and not dangerous with suitable families, was repealed by
Laws 1975, ch. 198, § 35.

64-7-28. Words and phrases defined.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Mental illness" means a psychiatric disorder as defined by the
current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders which
substantially impairs a person's mental, emotional, behavioral, or related
functioning.
(2) "Patient" means an individual under observation, care, or treatment in a mental health facility.
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(3) "Licensed physician" means an individual licensed under the laws
of this state to practice medicine or a medical officer of the government of
the United States while in this state in the performance of official duties.
(4) "Designated examiner" means a licensed physician, preferably a
psychiatrist, designated by the Division of Mental Health as specially
qualified by training or experience in the diagnosis of mental or related
illness or another licensed mental health professional designated by the
Division of Mental Health as specially qualified by training and at least
five years' continual experience in the treatment of mental or related
illness. At least one designated examiner in any case shall be a licensed
physician. No person who is the applicant, or who signs the certification,
under § 64-7-36 may be a designated examiner in the same case.
(5) "Comprehensive community mental health center" means a community mental health center providing essential services to residents of a
designated geographic area and complying with the state standards for
comprehensive community mental health centers.
(6) "Mental health facility" means the Utah State Hospital, a comprehensive community mental health center, or a hospital inpatient unit
which has been accredited for care and treatment of involuntary patients
by the Board of Mental Health.
(7) "Mental health officer" means an individual designated by the Division of Mental Health to interact with and transport persons to any mental health facility.
(8) "Hospitalization" means admission to inpatient treatment in a
mental health facility followed by partial or outpatient treatment in a
variety of settings as required by the patient's needs.
(9) "Institution" means a hospital, jail, prison, or health facility licensed under the provisions of § 26-21-9.
(10) "Chief executive officer" means the individual who has the ultimate responsibility for the operation of the mental health facility. All
medical functions shall be designated to a physician who is the clinical
director or a designee.
(11) "Designee" means a physician who has responsibility for medical
functions including admission and discharge.
History: C. 1943, 85-7-55, enacted by L.
1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1971, ch. 172, § 4; 1975,
ch. 198, § 16; 1979, ch. 97, § 11; 1985, ch. 49,
§ 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment substituted "chapter" for "act" in the in-

troductory language and "health facility licensed" for "agency duly registered" and
"§ 21-26-9" for "section 58-15-2" in Subsection
(9).
Cross-References. — Limitation of application as to criminally insane, § 64-7-54.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Designated examiner.
_,
. ,.
-*?**********
^
. . _ _. +.
The doctor who signs the original application
for commitment as provided in § 64-7-36 is dis-

qualified to act as a designated examiner on a
re-examination pursuant to § 64-7-45. In re
Wahlquist (1978) 585 P.2d 437.
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History: C. 1943, 85-7-58, enacted by L.
1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1971,
ch. 172, § 6 [b]; 1975, ch. 198, § 20; 1979, ch.
97, § 14.

64-7-34

Cross-References. — Inquiry into defendant's sanity, Chapter 15 of Title 77.
Limitation of application as to criminally msane, § 64-7-54.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur 2d Incompetent
Persons §§ 8 to 25, 39 to 42.
C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons §§ 14 to
34.

Key Numbers. — Mental Health
46.

37 to

64-7-33. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 64-7-33 (C. 1943,
85-7-59, enacted by L. 1951, ch. 113, § 3; L.
1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1963, ch. 159, § 1; 1967, ch.
174, § 130; 1971, ch. 172, § 7), relating to ad-

mission to the Utah State Hospital on certification by examiners, was repealed by Laws 1975,
ch. 198, § 35

64-7-34. Temporary admission to mental health facility —
Requirements and procedures — Costs.
(1) Any individual may temporarily be admitted to a mental health facility
upon:
(a) written application by a responsible person who has reason to know,
stating a belief that the individual is likely to cause serious injury to self
or others if not immediately restrained, and the personal knowledge of
the individual's condition or circumstances which lead to such belief, and
(b) a certification by a licensed physician or designated examiner stating that the physician or designated examiner has examined the individual within a three-day period immediately preceding said certification
and is of the opinion that the individual is mentally ill and, because of the
individual's mental illness, is likely to injure self or others if not immediately restrained.
Such an application and certificate shall authorize any mental health or
peace officer to take the individual into custody and transport the individual
to a mental health facility.
(2) If a duly authorized mental health officer or peace officer observes a
person involved in conduct which leads the officer to have probable cause to
believe that such person is mentally ill, as defined by this act, and that,
because of such apparent mental illness and conduct, there is a substantial
likelihood of serious harm to that person or to others pending proceedings for
examination and certification as provided in this act, the officer may take the
person into protective custody. A peace officer may transport a patient pursuant to this provision either on the basis of his own observation or on the basis
of the observation of a mental health officer, reported to him by the mental
health officer. Immediately thereafter, the officer shall transport the person to
a mental health facility and there make application for the person's admission
therein. The application shall be upon a prescribed form and shall include the
following:
(a) a statement by the officer that the officer believes on the basis of
personal observation or on the basis of the observation of a mental health
officer reported to him by the mental health officer that the person is, as a
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result of a mental illness, a substantial and immediate danger to self or
others.
(b) the specific nature of the danger.
(c) a summary of the observations upon which the statement of danger
is based.
(d) a statement of facts which called the person to the attention of the
officer.
(3) Any person admitted under this section may be held for a maximum of
24 hours excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays. At the expiration
of that time period, the person shall be released unless application for involuntary hospitalization has been commenced pursuant to § 64-7-36. If such
application has been made, an order of detention may be entered pursuant to
Subsection (3) of § 64-7-36. If no order of detention is issued, the patient shall
be released, except when the patient has made voluntary application for admission.
(4) Cost of all diagnosis and treatment under this section shall be paid by
the county in which such person is found, unless the county participates in the
state social services medical program as outlined in § 55-15a-3, in which
event the state shall pay, or unless the person is financially able to pay the
same in which event that person shall pay.
History: C. 1943, 85-7-60, enacted by L.
1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1963,
ch. 159, § 1; 1971, ch. 172, § 8; 1975, ch. 198,
§ 21; 1979, ch. 97, § 15; 1981, ch. 261, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amendment deleted "upon endorsement for such purpose by a judge of the district court or a member of the board of county commissioners of the
county in which the individual is present" after

«

,.% , „ .

,,

,

,

rCt

1

of a mental health officer reported to him by
the mental health officer" in Subsection (2)(a).
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this
act," referred to in this section, means Laws
1975^ c h. 198, §§ 1 to 34, which appear as vario u s sec tions throughout Titles 26 and 64. See
T a b l e o f S e s s i o n L a w s i n P a r a i l e l T a b i e s volu m
Compilel,s

certificate in the second paragraph of Subsection (1); inserted "officer" after "mental
health" in the first sentence of Subsection (2);
and
"inserted
" o r 7 n tsentence
h e " b ^ of Subsection (2);
inserted
the second

Notes. _
Section
55.15a.3.
V/umuucr 9 routes. — oecuun oo-ioa-o,
cited
in
£
•* J • 0 u +• <A\
I J O
c§l t e26-18-10.
d m Subsectlon
«>• l s r«P«aled. See
Cross-Re
.
t i o n a s to
criminally insane,
§ 64-7-54,
. Cross-References.
Limitation
of applica-

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incompetent
Key Numbers. — Mental Health «=» 37 to
Persons §§ 8 to 25, 39 to 42.
46.
C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons §§ 14 to
34.

64-7-35. Mental health commissioner — Appointment —
Qualifications — Duties.
The court is authorized to appoint a mental health commissioner to assist in
the conduct of hospitalization proceedings who shall be an attorney licensed to
practice law in this state and knowledgeable about mental health. In any case
in which the court refers an application to the commissioner, the commissioner shall promptly cause the proposed patient to be examined and, on the
basis thereof, shall either recommend dismissal of the application or hold a
hearing as provided in this chapter and make findings of fact and recommen54
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dations to the court regarding the order for involuntary hospitalization of the
proposed patient.
History: C. 1953, 64-7-35, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 97, § 16.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1975, ch. 198,
§ 35 repealed former § 64-7-35 (C. 1943,
85-7-61, enacted by L. 1951, ch. 113, § 3; L.

1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1971, ch. 172, § 9), relating
to protective custody pending examination and
certification.
Cross-References. — Admission to practice
law, § 78-51-10.

64-7-36. Involuntary hospitalization on court order — Examination of patient — Hearing — Power of court
— Findings — Costs.
(1) Proceedings for the involuntary hospitalization of an individual may be
commenced by the filing of a written application with the district court of the
county in which the proposed patient resides or is found, by a responsible
person who has reason to know of the condition or circumstances of the proposed patient which lead to the belief that the individual is mentally ill and
should be involuntarily hospitalized. Any such application shall be accompanied by:
(a) a certificate of a licensed physician or a designated examiner stating that within a seven-day period immediately preceding the certification the physician or designated examiner has examined the individual
and is of the opinion that the individual is mentally ill and should be
involuntarily hospitalized; or
(b) a written statement by the applicant that the individual has been
requested to but has refused to submit to an examination of mental condition by a licensed physician or designated examiner. Said application
shall be sworn to under oath and shall state the facts upon which the
application is based.
(2) Prior to issuing a judicial order, the court may require the applicant to
consult a mental health facility or may direct a mental health professional
from a mental health facility to interview the applicant and the proposed
patient to determine the existing facts and report them to the court.
(3) If the court finds from the application, any other statements under oath,
or any reports from a mental health professional that there is a reasonable
basis to believe that the proposed patient's mental condition and immediate
danger to self, others or property requires involuntary hospitalization pending
examination and hearing, or if the proposed patient has refused to submit to
an interview with a mental health professional as directed by the court, or to
go to a treatment facility voluntarily, the court may issue an order directed to
a mental health officer or peace officer to immediately take the proposed
patient to any mental health facility, or a temporary emergency facility as
provided in Section [Subsection] 64-7-38(2), there to be detained for the purpose of examination. Within 24 hours of the issuance of the order for examination, the clinical director of a mental health facility or a designee shall report
to the court orally or in writing whether the patient is, in the opinion of the
examiners, mentally ill, whether the patient has agreed to become a voluntary patient pursuant to § 64-7-29, and whether treatment programs are
available and acceptable without court proceedings. Based on such information, the court may without taking any further action terminate the proceed55
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ings and dismiss the application. In any event, if the examiner reports orally,
the examiner shall immediately send the report in writing to the clerk of the
court.
(4) Notice of the commencement of proceedings for involuntary hospitalization, setting forth the allegations of the application and any reported facts,
together with a copy of any official order of detention, shall be provided by the
court to a proposed patient prior to, or upon, admission to a mental health
facility or, with respect to any individual presently in a mental health facility
whose status is being changed from voluntary to involuntary, upon the filing
of an application for that purpose with the court. A copy of such order of
detention must be maintained at the place of detention.
(5) Notice of the commencement of such proceedings shall be provided by
the court as soon as practicable to the applicant, any legal guardian, any
immediate adult family members, the legal counsel for the parties involved,
and any other persons the proposed patient or the court shall designate, and
shall advise such persons that a hearing thereon may be held within the time
provided by law, unless the patient has refused to permit release of such
information in which case the extent of notice shall be determined by the
court.
(6) Proceedings for the involuntary hospitalization of an individual under
the age of eighteen years who is under the continuing jurisdiction of the
juvenile court may be commenced by the filing of a written application with
the juvenile court in accordance with the provisions of this section and said
court shall have jurisdiction to proceed in such case in the same manner and
with the same authority as the district court.
(7) If there are no appropriate mental health resources within the district,
the court may in its discretion transfer the case or patient's custody to any
other district court within the state of Utah provided that said transfer will
not be adverse to the interest of the proposed patient.
(8) Within twenty-four hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, of the issuance of a judicial order or after admission at a mental health
facility of a proposed patient under court order for detention or examination,
the court shall appoint two designated examiners to examine the proposed
patient. If requested by the proposed patient's counsel, the court shall appoint
as one of the examiners a reasonably available qualified person designated by
counsel. The examinations, to be conducted separately, shall be held at the
home of the proposed patient, a hospital or other medical facility, or at any
other suitable place not likely to have a harmful effect on the patient's health.
A time shall be set for a hearing to be held within ten court days of the
appointment of the designated examiners unless said examiners or the clinical director of the mental health facility shall inform the court prior to said
hearing date that the patient is not mentally ill, that the patient has agreed to
become a voluntary patient pursuant to § 64-7-29, or that treatment programs are available and acceptable without court proceedings in which event
the court may without taking any further action terminate the proceedings
and dismiss the application.
(9) Prior to the hearing, an opportunity to be represented by counsel shall
be afforded to every proposed patient, and if neither the patient nor others
provide counsel, the court shall appoint counsel and allow sufficient time to
consult with the patient prior to the hearing. In the case of an indigent patient, the payment of reasonable attorney's fees for counsel as determined by
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the court shall be made by the county in which the patient resides or was
found. The proposed patient, the applicant, and all other persons to whom
notice is required to be given shall be afforded an opportunity to appear at the
hearing, to testify, and to present and cross-examine witnesses, and the court
may in its discretion receive the testimony of any other person. The court may
allow a waiver of the patient's right to appear only for good cause shown,
which cause shall be made a matter of court record. The court is authorized to
exclude all persons not necessary for the conduct of the proceedings and may,
upon motion of counsel, require the testimony of each examiner to be given
out of the presence of any other examiners. The hearing shall be conducted in
as informal a manner as may be consistent with orderly procedure and in a
physical setting not likely to have a harmful effect on the mental health of the
proposed patient. The court shall receive all relevant and material evidence
which may be offered subject to the rules of evidence.
The mental health facility or the physician in charge of the patient's care
shall provide to the court at the time of the hearing the following information:
the detention order, the admission notes, the diagnosis, any doctors' orders,
the progress notes, the nursing notes and the medication records pertaining to
the current hospitalization. Said information shall also be supplied to the
patient's counsel at the time of the hearing and at any time prior thereto upon
request.
(10) The court shall order hospitalization if, upon completion of the hearing
and consideration of the record, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(a) The proposed patient has a mental illness; and
(b) Because of the patient's illness the proposed patient poses an immediate danger of physical injury to others or self, which may include the
inability to provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and
shelter, if allowed to remain at liberty; and
(c) The patient lacks the ability to engage in a rational decision-making process regarding the acceptance of mental treatment as demonstrated by evidence of inability to weigh the possible costs and benefits of
treatment; and
(d) There is no appropriate less restrictive alternative to a court order
of hospitalization; and
(e) The hospital or mental health facility in which the individual is to
be hospitalized pursuant to this act can provide the individual with treatment that is adequate and appropriate to the individual's conditions and
needs. In the absence of the required findings of the court after the hearing, the court shall forthwith dismiss the proceedings.
(11) (a) The order of hospitalization shall designate the period for which
the individual shall be treated. When the individual is not under an order
of hospitalization at the time of the hearing, this period shall not exceed
six months without benefit of a review hearing. Upon such a review
hearing, to be commenced prior to the expiration of the previous order, an
order for hospitalization may be for an indeterminate period, if the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the required conditions in
Section [Subsection] 64-7-36(10) will last for an indeterminate period.
(b) The court shall maintain a current list of all patients under its
order of hospitalization, which list shall be reviewed to determine those
patients who have been under an order of hospitalization for the desig57
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nated period. At least two weeks prior to the expiration of the designated
period of any order of hospitalization still in effect, the court that entered
the original order shall so inform the clinical director of the mental
health facility responsible for the care of such patient. The director shall
immediately reexamine the reasons upon which the order of hospitalization was based. If the director and staff determine that the conditions
justifying such hospitalization no longer exist, the director shall discharge the patient from involuntary treatment and make an immediate
report thereof to the court and to the Division of Mental Health. Otherwise, the court shall immediately appoint two designated examiners and
proceed under Subsections (8) through (10) of this section.
(c) The clinical director of a mental health facility or a designee responsible for the care of a patient under an order of hospitalization for an
indeterminate period shall at six-month intervals reexamine the reasons
upon which the order of indeterminate hospitalization was based. If the
clinical director or the designee determine that the conditions justifying
such hospitalization no longer exist, the director shall discharge the patient from involuntary treatment and make an immediate report thereof
to the court and the Division of Mental Health. If the clinical director or
designee has determined that the conditions justifying such hospitalization continue to exist, the director shall send a written report of such
findings to the court and to the Division of Mental Health. The patient
and the patient's counsel of record shall be notified in writing that the
involuntary treatment will be continued, the reasons for such, and that
the patient has the right to a review hearing by making a request to the
court. Upon receiving the request, the court shall immediately appoint
two designated examiners and proceed under Subsections (8) through (10)
of this section.
(12) In the event that the designated examiners are unable, because of
refusal of a proposed patient to submit to an examination, to complete such
examination upon the first attempt to conduct the same, the court shall fix a
reasonable compensation to be paid to such designated examiners for services
in the cause.
(13) Any person hospitalized under this act or a person's legally designated
representative who is aggrieved by the findings, conclusions and order of the
court, shall have the right to a rehearing upon a petition filed with the court
within thirty days of the entry of the court order. In the event the petition
alleges error or mistake in the findings, the court shall appoint three impartial designated examiners previously unrelated to the case who shall conduct
an additional examination of the patient. The rehearing shall in all other
respects be conducted in the manner otherwise permitted.
(14) Costs of all proceedings under this section shall be paid by the county
in which the proposed patient resides or is found.
History: C. 1943, 85-7-62, enacted by L.
1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1963,
ch. 60, § 1; 1967, ch. 174, § 131; 1971, ch.
172, § 10; 1975, ch. 198, § 22; 1979, ch. 97,
§ 17; 1981, ch. 261, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend-

ment substituted "issuing a judicial order" in
Subsection (2) for "filing the application", inserted "or to go to a treatment facility voluntanly" and "or a temporary emergency facility
as provided in section 64-7-38(2)" in the first
sentence of Subsection (3), added the last three
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PART 3
DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
76-2-301.

Person under fourteen years old not criminally
responsible.

A person is not criminally responsible for conduct performed before he
reaches the age of fourteen years. This section shall in no way limit the
jurisdiction of or proceedings before the juvenile courts of this state.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-301, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-301.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
in prosecution where attainment of particular
age is statutory requisite of guilt, 49 A.L.R.3d
526.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law <3= 65.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law § 38.
C.J.S. — 43 C.J.S. Infants § 31, 32.
A.L.R. — Burden of proof of defendant's age,

76-2-302.

Compulsion.

(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when he engaged in the proscribed
conduct because he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent
use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third person, which force or
threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would not
have resisted.
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section shall be unavailable
to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places himself in a
situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress.
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the presence of her husband, to any presumption of compulsion or to any defense of compulsion except as in Subsection (1) provided.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-302, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-302.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
unlock the doors, but instead gave him hacksaw blades, she was not incapable of commission of crime because she departed from his
coercion and committed a crime of her own
choosing. Farrell v. Turner, 26 Utah 2d 351,
482 P.2d 117 (1971).
Escape.
In prosecution for escape from state prison,
trial court did not err in refusing to submit to

ANALYSIS

Deviation from compelled behavior.
Escape.
—Instructions.
Standard.
Deviation from compelled behavior.
Where wife was asked by imprisoned husband to break into jail and get the keys and
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THE JUDGMENT
i n state criminal case during its progress as
ground for mistrial, new trial, or reversal, 46
% L.R.4th 11.

Key Numbers. — Criminal Law <s= 857(1).

77-17-12. Defendant on bail appearing for trial may be
committed.
When a defendant who has given bail appears for trial, the court may, at
any time after his appearance for trial, order him to be committed to the
custody of the proper officer to await the judgment or further order of the
court.
History: C. 1953, 77-17-12, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Bail «=» 80.

CHAPTER 18
THE JUDGMENT
Section
77-18-1.

77-18-2.
77-18-3.
77-18-4

Suspension of sentence — Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension
— Hearings.
Expungement and sealing of
records.
Disposition of fines.
Sentence — Term — Construction.

Section
77-18-5.
77-18-5.5.
77-18-6.
77-18-7.
77-18-8.

Reports by courts and prosecuting
attorneys to Board of Pardons.
Judgment of death — Defendant
to select method — Time of selection.
Judgment to pay fine or restitution constitutes a hen.
Costs imposed on defendant —
Restrictions.
Fine not paid — Commitment.

77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards —
Confidentiality — Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termination, revocation, modification,
or extension — Hearings.
(1) (a) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and
place the defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a
private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court.
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(b) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of th
department is with the Department of Corrections. The legal custody 0f
all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court is vested as
ordered by the court. The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(2) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and pre*
sentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the de«
partment. These standards shall be based on the type of offense, the
demand for services, the availability of agency resources, the public
safety, and other criteria established by the Department of Corrections to
determine what level of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and Board of Pardons on an annual basis foi
review and comment prior to adoption by the Department of Corrections,
(c) The Judicial Council and department shall establish procedures tc
implement the supervision and investigation standards.
**
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (2)(a)
and other criteria as they consider appropriate.
f$
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
committee.
$
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections
is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C
misdemeanors or infractions, or to conduct presentence investigation reports
on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department
standards.
^
(4) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections or
information from other sources about the defendant. The presentence
investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the Department of Corrections regarding the payment of restitution by the defendant. The contents
of the report are confidential and not available except for purposes of
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council and for use by the
Department of Corrections.
4*
(b) At the time of sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony or information shall be
presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
(5) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may
be required to perform any or all of the following:
h
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
-*
(b) pay amounts required under Chapter 32a, Title 77, Defense Costs;
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(d) participate in available treatment programs;
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(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year;
(f) serve a term of home confinement;
(g) participate in community service restitution programs;
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance
with Subsections 76-3-201(3) and (4); and
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate.
(6) The Department of Corrections is responsible, upon order of the court,
for the collection of fines and restitution during the probation period in cases
for which the court orders supervised probation by the department. The prosecutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to the clerk of the court. The
clerk shall place the order on the civil docket and shall provide notice of the
order to the parties. The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(7) (a) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C
misdemeanors or infractions. If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the probation period, has outstanding fines or restitution owing,
the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant
on bench probation or place the defendant on bench probation for the
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines and restitution. Upon
motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own motion, the court may
require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay should not be
treated as contempt of court or why the suspended jail or prison term
should not be imposed.
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court
and prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will occur by law. The notification shall
include a probation progress report and complete report of details on
outstanding fines and restitution orders.
(8) (a) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to
revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke
the probation. Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or
decision concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of
time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated
at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
warrant by the court.
(9) (a) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that
the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. Probation may
not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the
conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that
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authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable
cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is
justified. If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing, and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the
hearing. The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. The
order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if
he is indigent. The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to
present evidence.
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of
the affidavit. If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. The defendant may
call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence.
(e) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. Upon a
finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court
may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire
probation term commence anew. If probation is revoked, the defendant
shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(10) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for "willful
and malicious injury" for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 523, U.S.C.A. 1985.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 59, § 2; 1982, ch.
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1;
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, § 1; 1985, ch.
212, § 17; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114,
§ 1; 1989, ch. 226, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment rewrote this section, as last amended by
Laws 1985, ch. 229, § 1, to the extent that a
detailed analysis is impracticable.
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,
1989, rewrote Subsections (1), (7)(a), and (8)(b);
inserted "the public safety" in the second sentence of Subsection (2)(a); inserted "on an annual basis" in Subsection (2Kb); added Subsections (2)(c) through (2)(e) and (5)(j), making related changes in Subsection (5); added the "(a)"
and "(b)" designations in Subsection (4); inserted "upon order of the court" in the first
sentence of Subsection (6) and substituted "enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure" for "under which the victim may seek
civil remedy" in the last sentence of that subsection; deleted "45 days" following "in writing" in the first sentence of Subsection (7)(b);
deleted Subsection (7)(c), concerning extension
of probation; deleted the former first sentence

of Subsection (8)(a), concerning the applicability of time served without violation while on
probation; deleted Subsection (8)(c), which provided: "Nothing in this section precludes the
court from discharging a probationer at any
time, at the discretion of the court"; deleted
"Except as provided in Subsection (7)(c) of this
chapter" from the beginning of Subsection
(9)(a); in Subsection (9)(b), inserted "a warrant
for his arrest or" in the second sentence; and
made stylistic changes throughout the section.
Severability Clause. — Section 3 of Laws
1983, Chapter 85 provided: "If any provision of
this act, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of this act shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application."
Cross-References. — Indecent public display, incarceration without suspension of sentence, § 76-10-1228.
Payment of costs of defense as condition of
probation or suspension, § 77-32a-6.
Presentence investigation reports, Rules
4-607, 6-301, Rules of Judicial Administration.
Rules of Evidence inapplicable to sentencing
and probation proceedings, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 1101.
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History: L. 1965, ch. 165, *> 53, formerly C.
1953, 55-10-115 r e d e s , a s 78-3a-54; L. 1977,
ch. 79, § 8; 1979, ch. 135, *} 1; 1983, ch. 83,
§ 12; 1986, ch. 104, § 1; 1987, ch. 182, § 5.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1983 amend
ment, in the second paragraph, inserted "or
forfeiture" in the first sentence, substituted
"Funds" for 'Tines" in the third sentence and
substituted "not encumbered bv work orders
fulfilled or in process" for r but not disbursed"
in the third sentence
The 1986 amendment redesignated the first
two paragraphs as Subsection (1), the first two
sentences of the third paragraph as Subsection
(2), the rest of the third paragraph as Subsec
tion (3) and the Last paragraph as Subsection
(4), in the second paragraph of Subsection (1)
substituted "25%" for "20%" and ' prov ides for
for "supervises public service" in the first sen
tence, in the second sentence inserted "and any
private contributions to the rehabilitative em
ployment program" following "provision" and
substituted "are" for ' shall be" and substi
tuted "and private contributions are nonlap^
ing and may be transferred for use among

counties within the district in which they are
donated or collected The Board of Juvenile
Court Judges shall establish policies for the
use of the funds" for "not encumbered by work
orders fulfilled or in process before the last day
of the county fiscal year shall be paid to the
county treasurer of the county in which they
were collected " in the third sentence, in Subsections (2) and (3) made minor word changes,
and substituted "youth corrections facilities"
for "the state industrial school" in Subsection
(4)
The 1987 amendment, effective July 1, 1987,
in Subsection (1) inserted the designations and
in Subsection (l)(a) substituted "state treasurer for deposit in the General Fund" for
"county treasurer of the county in which they
are collected," in Subsection (l)(c) in the second
sentence deleted "and may be transferred for
use amoung counties within the district in
which they are donated or collected" from the
end of the first sentence and made minor
changes in phraseology, punctuation and style
throughout this section

78-3a-55. Court records — Inspection — Fingerprints or
photographs prohibited, exception.
The court and the probation department shall keep such records as may be
required by the board and the presiding judge. Court records shall be open to
inspection by the parents or guardian, other parties m the case, the attorneys,
and agencies to which custody of a child has been transferred; and with the
consent of the judge, court records may be inspected by the child, by persons
having a legitimate interest in the proceedings, and by persons conducting
pertinent research studies Probation officers' records and reports of social and
clinical studies shall not be open to inspection, except by consent of the court
given pursuant to rules adopted by the board.
Without the consent of the judge, no fingerprints or photographs shall be
taken of any child taken into custody, unless the case is transferred for criminal proceedings.
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 54, formerly C.
1953, 55-10-116 redes, as 78-3a-55; L. 1983,
ch. 83, § 13.

Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amendment inserted "or photographs" in the second
paragraph

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Fingerprinting.
Where the procedure of § 78-3a 25 is not followed, there is no transfer of the case for criminal proceedings and the fingerprints of the
child cannot be taken without the consent of
the judge H A G v Fillis, 577 P 2d 964 (Utah
1978)
Judge's consent to fingerprint a child re-

quires affirmative action by an individual juvenile judge, Rule 39 of the Utah State Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure
which authorizes a blanket consent, unindividuahzed by juvenile judge, does not satisfy the
consent reqi irement H A G v Fillis, 577 P.2d
964 (Utah 1978)
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H i s t o r y : L. 1965, ch. 165, § 53, formerly C.
1953, 55-10-115 r e d e s , as 78-3a-54; L. 1977,
ch. 79, § S; 1979, ch. 135, § 1; 1983, ch. 83,
§ 12; 1986, ch. 104, § 1; 1987, ch. 182, § 5.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1983 amendment, in the second paragraph, inserted "or
forfeiture" in the first sentence, substituted
"Funds" for "Fines" in the third sentence, and
substituted "not encumbered by work orders
fulfilled or in process" for "but not disbursed"
in the third sentence.
The 1986 amendment redesignated the first
two paragraphs as Subsection (1), the first two
sentences of the third paragraph as Subsection
(2), the rest of the third paragraph as Subsection (3) and the Last paragraph as Subsection
(4); in the second paragraph of Subsection (1)
substituted "25%" for "20%" and "provides for"
for "supervises public service" in the first sentence, in the second sentence inserted "and any
private contributions to the rehabilitative employment program" following "provision" and
substituted "are" for "shall be", and substituted "and private contributions are noniapsing and may be transferred for use among
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counties within the district in which they are
donated or collected. The Board of Juvenile
Court Judges shall establish policies for the
use of the funds" for "not encumbered by work
orders fulfilled or in process before the last day
of the county fiscal year shall be paid to the
county treasurer of the county in which they
were collected." in the third sentence; in Subsections (2) and (3) made minor word changes;
and substituted "youth corrections facilities"
for "the state industrial school" in Subsection
(4).
The 1987 amendment, effective July 1, 1987,
in Subsection (1) inserted the designations and
in Subsection (l)(a) substituted "state treasurer for deposit in the General Fund" for
"county treasurer of the county in which they
are collected," in Subsection (l)(c) in the second
sentence deleted "and may be transferred for
use amoung counties within the district in
which they are donated or collected" from the
end of the first sentence and made minor
changes in phraseology, punctuation and style
throughout this section.

Court records — Inspection — Fingerprints or
photographs prohibited, exception.

The court and the probation department shall keep such records as may be
required by the board and the presiding judge. Court records shall be open to
inspection by the parents or guardian, other parties in the case, the attorneys,
and agencies to which custody of a child has been transferred; and with the
consent of the judge, court records may be inspected by the child, by persons
having a legitimate interest in the proceedings, and by persons conducting
pertinent research studies. Probation officers' records and reports of social and
clinical studies shall not be open to inspection, except by consent of the court
given pursuant to rules adopted by the board.
Without the consent of the judge, no fingerprints or photographs shall be
taken of any child taken into custody, unless the case is transferred for criminal proceedings.
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 54, formerly C.
1953, 55-10-116 r e d e s , a s 78-3a-55; L. 1983,
ch. 83, § 13.

Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amendment inserted "or photographs" in the second
paragraph.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Fingerprinting.
Where the procedure of § 78-3a-25 is not followed, there is no transfer of the case for criminal proceedings and the fingerprints of the
child cannot be taken without the consent of
the judge. H.A.G. v. Fillis, 577 P.2d 964 (Utah
1978).
Judge's consent to fingerprint a child re-

quires affirmative action by an individual juvenile judge; Rule 39 of the Utah State Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure
which authorizes a blanket consent, unindividualized by juvenile judge, does not satisfy the
consent requirement. H.A.G. v. Fillis, 577 P.2d
964 (Utah 1978).
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